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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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GENERAL DRAGUNSKIY ON OFFICERS' TECHNICAL TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Tank Troops D. Dragunskiy, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "With a Consideration for Front Line Experience"]

[Text] I read with interest on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Maj. V. Shipitsin's letter about the problems in technical training. I, as Chief of the "Vystrel" Higher Officer Courses imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov, have had to delve constantly into the training of young commanders who are the same age as the author of the letter. During classes, you especially become aware of the swift tempo of development of military affairs and the growth of the demands on an officer's professional training. The tasks connected with mastering equipment and weapons have become particularly complicated. While reflecting on how to solve them, I came to the immutable conclusion that front line experience has not lost its significance even today. Moreover, the mastery of modern equipment and methods for its combat employment cannot be effective without studying it and using it in practice.

I would also like to approach some of the statements in Major V. Shipitsin's letter with a front line yardstick. The battalion commander does not remove from himself guilt for the fact that some of the officers subordinate to him do not have a thorough knowledge of the equipment. However, in this he emphasizes that the subunit had come under his command only six months ago. Any front line soldier will say that this is not a short time. It is only necessary to treat the job with full responsibility.

In this connection, I remember Andrey Petrovich Tkachev who in the summer of '41 was appointed commissar in the tank battalion I was forming. Before this, he had worked on the railroad. On the first day, we decided organisational questions from morning to night and then the commissar disappeared somewhere. We met at dawn. Andrey Petrovich said with deep satisfaction,

"I studied tank science all night. I took platoon member Petr Moskalev for my instructor. I already know how to close the gun's breechblock, reload a machinegun, and mount a sight. I even started up a tank and stopped it.

Jumping ahead, I will say that the commissar had learned "tank science" well. During one battle when we were forced to assume the defense, he counterattacked the superior forces of the Hitlerites in the flank with the fire of the last tanks, and by this ensured the performance of the mission assigned to us. Tkachev perished in this battle, having managed to personally set on fire two enemy tanks and an armored personnel carrier. The commissar did very much for our victory although less than six months passed from our first meeting to his last battle. During the war, time and an individual's capabilities were measured according to a special scale. When one talks about combat readiness and an officer's professional skill, this scale must be used during peacetime also. A keen sense of duty -- here is the factor which mobilizes an individual to overcome any difficulty.

Why do military school graduates sometimes not succeed in acquiring the necessary organizational skills for a long time and in eliminating this or that gap in their personal training? I think that the lack of exactingness on the part of senior comrades and the inability to find the proper correlation between theoretical classes and work on the physical components and training in the field and on the ground has this effect. As sometimes happens, they gather lieutenants together for the first instructional methods assemblies in their officer service, and they devote the biggest part of the time to lectures. But the theoretical luggage of school graduates is quite sufficient to immediately begin solving tasks at the range, firing range and tank driving range.

When we met academy classmates on the roads of war, we invariably recalled the training years. We talked about the academy with warmth and gratitude. The knowledge with which it had equipped us was as necessary as air. With respect to the development and improvement of practical skills there are the widest opportunities for this in the forces. Everything depends on the organization of command training and the diligence of the officer himself.

During the process of thoroughly studying the equipment, an officer at times has to turn to subordinates for help. Does he not injure his commander's authority by this? Of course not. I remember how I -- at the time, still a platoon commander -- had to learn a lot from Anatoliy Kuznetsov, a tank commander, and Ibragim Valeyev, a mechanic driver. They possessed a lot of experience in driving the machines over the Far East hills and through the taiga forests. I found everything difficult at first. The joint training drew me nearer to the men and helped me to really master the machine.

During the war, it was not only an officer who used the training method -- shoulder to shoulder with the "instructor". The gun layer and mechanic driver trained literally over the course of two-three weeks an

understudy who was capable -- when necessary -- of taking his place at the levers or at the sight. One cannot forget this training method. When new equipment arrives in a regiment, it is by no means dishonorable for even a high ranking commander to work with it with an officer who has studied this type of machine in a school, and with soldiers and sergeants who have acquired skills on it in a training subunit.

During the war, I had occasion more than once to observe how the commander of the 3d Guards Tank Army, Pavel Semenovich Rybalko--who later became a marshal of armored troops -- studied the construction features of the latest equipment models. Having put on overalls, he delved into the engine with the crew, drove the tank, and tested the weapons. It would have appeared that he, who was solving operational tasks, could have avoided this. However, the army commander thought otherwise. He constantly took up tactical questions also, and had an excellent knowledge of the equipment.

One cannot fail to agree with Major V. Shipitain that the technical training of a commander is inseparable from his tactical training. To develop this, tactics require more effective equipment for waging battle. When new equipment arrives in the forces, it in its turn provides a powerful inducement for a creative search in tactics. Command training is always conceived of as being investigatory in nature. Young officers must also be daring.

I remember an episode in my own service. On 13 June 1938, my crew crossed the bottom of the rapid Razdol'naya River in a tank equipped with two pipes, sealed with red lead oxide and grease. Most likely, we were not the first to perform the experiment. Something else was important. Being armed with the T-26, we at the time were trying to see the future of the tank troops who today are capable of fording broad rivers on the bottom. At the time, I received an engraved watch from the hands of the commander of the 32d Rifle Division, Major Nikolay Erastovich Bernarin. I value this first award very much. When I hear that a young officer was the first to use some operating method or step over the edge of the usual, I am filled with respect for him.

In my opinion, it is possible to adopt a lot from front line experiences in the area of studying the enemy, his tactics and equipment. For example, the crew of a T-34 always used a different tactic when dwelling with heavy, medium and light tanks, trying to use the strong points of their machine in the best way possible in order to stick the enemy with conditions unfavorable to him. I would say that studying the tactics and equipment of a probable enemy during peacetime is also a topical trimming. Studying the tactical and technical characteristics of this or that system for waging battle is needed not only based on tables but especially on terrain equipped in the appropriate manner. This develops in officers the ability to evaluate a situation and make a decision rapidly.

The love of fighting men for their equipment and weapons was a great force during the war. One of the most courageous commanders in our brigade was

Vasiliy Usakov. I can not mentally picture him without the tank with the turret number 233. In 1942, Usakov attacked in this tank on the Western Front and travelled to Berlin in it. The tank's engine had exceeded the estimated motor hour norm long ago, the track links sparkled in the sun like a mirror and the paint did not adhere to the charred hull; however, the crew did not want to be transplanted to a new machine. Usakov and his subordinates were very proud of their "super-reliable". They had much in common with it. More than once the Ural armor had saved their lives -- not that all the other crews did not regard their equipment with love.

Instilling love for equipment in subordinates is the duty of commanders. This feeling must be active. Life proves that affection for equipment is always stronger in the one who has studied it, so to say, down to the "screws", who has tried it in difficult tests, and who has convinced himself of its high qualities. Training and indoctrination are inseparable.

A lot of attention is devoted to improving technical training during the "Vystrel" Courses. The intensification of the training process is achieved by the widespread use of technical training systems. Students work in special classrooms, equipped with various devices, and in a special training system center where training time is "packed" to the limit. All this permits them to be thoroughly prepared for classes on the equipment and for training sessions in the "auditorium" which is the main one for a commander--on the ground. The stress in practice, the formation of skills in organizing for combat, the development of command thinking and high will qualities -- front line experience properly compels us to this.

New equipment places complicated tasks upon a commander -- the organizer of the training process. Effective ways to solve them are determined as a result of a creative search. In this search, it is important to be skilfully guided by the experience of the past and to use everything that has undergone the test of time.

8802
CSO: 1801

GENERAL SHKADOV ON OFFICER RATING RESULTS

Moscow KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by General of the Army I. Shkadov, chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "After the Ratings"]

[Text] The scheduled rating of the officer corps has been conducted in the armed forces. Its results are a convincing testimony that the officer corps of the army and navy has been staffed with personnel who are politically mature, devoted to the party and people and well trained in a professional respect. An evaluation of the work of each officer, general and admiral was given, ways to improve their knowledge, skills, and work style and methods were defined, and the prospects for their further service assignment were outlined.

In characterizing the work of an officer during a certain stage of service, the content of a rating is directed toward the future. It requires the rated officer to improve his political and work qualities even more persistently and points out shortcomings which must be eliminated. Commanders, staffs, and political and personnel organs are now solving the critical tasks in implementing the conclusions, recommendations and information in the ratings. The experience, acquired during the ratings, permits military personnel to grow even more successfully and assures their most rational assignment and the firm implementation of the requirements of the party's 25th congress and the November (1979) CPSU Central Committee's plenum about the bold promotion of politically erudite, energetic, and creatively thinking workers who are full of initiative.

The results of the ratings convince one that the overwhelming majority of commanders and chiefs know subordinates thoroughly and comprehensively, can evaluate their qualities in a party and highly principled way, draw objective conclusions, and give specific recommendations. Among the units, where the ratings were conducted at a high level and contributed to intensifying the officer's struggle for a further improvement in combat readiness, one can mention for example the regiment which Lieutenant Colonel V. Morozkin commanded until recently.

Here, during the ratings the commanders of subunits and chiefs of branches and services held conversations with subordinate officers, pointing out their positive qualities which had to be developed and improved. They also pointed out derelictions of duties and deficiencies in service and gave advice about eliminating them. A detailed description of the political, mental-psychological, and moral qualities of an officer; his professional training; and work styles and methods was given in each of the ratings compiled in the Regiment. Energetic work was continued with the men after the ratings. The conclusions in the rating report were realized, and noted deficiencies were eliminated. Incidentally, the regimental commander himself was promoted to a higher position by way of carrying out a rating conclusion.

Many ratings contain the conclusion that an officer deserves a promotion. This means that an individual has proven himself in the best way in the position held, has acquired experience, and demonstrated the ability to solve more complicated and critical tasks. However, does this give cause to think that an officer will not require the help and support of senior personnel in the higher position? In no way. The mastery of a wider circle of duties takes place more quickly where the principle, "the chief teaches the subordinate," is firmly established, where the exchange of experience is organized, where an atmosphere of goodwill and comradeship collaboration reigns, and where party concern for the growth of personnel is genuinely demonstrated. It is especially important for an officer, who is going through the formation stage in a new position, to learn to combine organizational and indoctrinal work. The CPSU Central Committee, "On Further Improving Ideological, Political, and Indoctrinal Work", requires this from leading personnel.

It is possible to mention quite a few commanders and chiefs who consider painstaking work with officers, who have been promoted to a higher position, to be their primary obligation and a service and party duty. For example, more than one young officer nourishes a sense of gratitude for Colonel V. Khotov who is capable of detecting difficulties in the formation of subordinates in a timely fashion, examining their causes, and helping to eliminate shortcomings. In the unit which Colonel Khotov commands, the conclusions of a number of rating reports have already been carried out. And you cannot say about a single one of the officers who received a service promotion that he is not justifying the trust. On the contrary, the majority of them are confidently mastering the new positions and are in the ranks of right flank men in competition. This is a testimony to the high quality of the ratings and the effectiveness of training and indoctrinal work at whose basis is persuasion, trust and help.

Unfortunately, the task is not arranged this way everywhere. Some officers, not concerned about the formation of officers who have taken new positions, punish them for any slip-up. This begets in subordinates a doubt in their ability to cope with the task entrusted to them. For example, they certified Captain V. Buylenkov for promotion, pointing out his work and political qualities. At the end of last year, the office accepted a new position in

his unit. At first, when he encountered difficulties, he did not always find the correct solutions. How did those who rated him react to this? Instead of helping the officer organize his work, they reprimanded him four times over the course of three months. The question arises: Was the rating objective and, if yes, then why do the senior comrades not consider themselves obliged to help a comrade to whom they gave a positive rating?

Similar questions also arise because some commanders and chiefs treat ratings without a sense of high responsibility. Some ratings do not reflect the political and moral qualities of the rated officers and do not permit the prospects for the officer's further service to be distinctly seen. At times, they are extremely one-sided -- with stress on professional training. About the officer's ability to work with people, to indoctrinate subordinates, and to be an example for them -- there is not a word. These rating reports are filled with formalism and facelessness.

Sometimes, obvious deficiencies in the service work and conduct of officers are not mentioned in the reports. The reluctance to "offend" a subordinate, the failure to understand that objectivity in evaluating the work qualities of an individual testifies to genuine respect for him, has let down some commanders.

Instances of a deliberately non-objective rating of subordinates where the rater has stricken a bargain with his conscience deserve special attention. Such rating reports are isolated; however, no matter how distressing it is, they do exist. For example, Major B. Bychkov had serious deficiencies in his work and personal conduct. Knowing about them, the commander nevertheless recommended the officer for a higher position. Most likely because he wanted to get rid of him and remove from himself the trouble of indoctrinating his subordinate.

It is impossible in this connection not to mention the fact that an irresponsible and unprincipled approach to ratings does not always receive the necessary evaluation. Ratings, as has already been mentioned more than once, also characterize the one who draws them up. Recently, Lieutenant Colonel I. Sergeyev was severely reprimanded for misuse of his service position and unbecoming conduct. The officer's low moral qualities, as it turned out, had been demonstrated for a long time. They were well known to the senior chief. However, nothing was said about this in the rating report. This and other cases of a non-objective rating must receive a strict and highly principled evaluation.

On the other hand it is impossible to justify mentioning an officer's transient and immaterial shortcomings. The striving to find them no matter what in a rated officer and to necessarily attach a critical tone to the document cannot bring any benefit -- however, some officers in personal organs have this preconceived idea. It happens that an officer has long ago eliminated the shortcomings pointed out in earlier reports but they

nevertheless treat him with distrust, setting aside his personal file without justification during the selection of candidates for promotion. Such cases are encountered infrequently, but they should not exist at all. One must treat with understanding capable and industrious officers who, having deviated once, are now firmly on the path to correction. In the next rating it is important to point out that this or that shortcoming has been eliminated. An accidental mistake must not become a roadblock on the path of an individual who has selected military service as his profession, as his life work.

The following cases are also encountered when checking on the progress of implementing the rating report conclusions in the forces and in the navy. An officer has been certified for promotion or for sending to school, but the commander detains him in the old position using every possible pretext. The motives are narrow minded. They may, if I promote the best, I will be left with the less experienced. Such a position inflicts moral damage on people, lowers the effectiveness of indoctrination and interferes with the growth of the personnel.

How is the service of prospective and well prepared officers at times organised? For several years they command platoons, no many companies, then they are kept in a battalion for about a year and a half, and a little longer at the regimental level. This is not the best way to acquire the needed experience. Experience shows that an officer who has completed a higher military school is capable during the primary stages of command work -- in a platoon and company -- of learning to direct people skilfully and organise their training and indoctrination correctly within two-three years. The battalion and especially the regiment -- these are links where it is necessary to provide an officer the opportunity to pass a more substantial school. The exceptional importance of these links in the formation of a commander is emphasised by the entire history of the Soviet armed forces and by experience from the Great Patriotic War. Front line soldiers know that if battalions and regiments are united and well trained, divisions and armies are invincible.

It is also impossible to justify a purely formal approach to the promotion of personnel where it is considered necessary to detain an officer, regardless of his capabilities, the prescribed number of years in each of the positions and require that he climb all the rungs of the service ladder. The Leninist principle for working with personnel must be the basic one. The main thing is not formal information but the true political and work qualities of a worker.

The rating permitted strengthening the deputy level which serves as a reserve for promotions to the primary command, staff, political, and engineer positions. This category of military personnel must be continually kept in view. One must work persistently with deputies, improving their ideological, operational tactical, and military technical training; instructional methods skills; and will qualities, and purposefully prepare them for a higher position.

Naturally, not all officers were recommended for service promotions or school. One had recently assumed the position; another had not had time to prove himself for some reason or other. Does this mean that the comrade cannot be appointed to a higher position until the next rating? Of course not. The officer's daily work and his seal constantly fill out a rating. On the other hand, one cannot hurry with the appointment of candidates, who have begun to treat their job worse and lowered their indicators, to higher positions. The conclusion of the rating report must be corroborated continuously by irreproachable service.

The ratings have been completed. The work connected with them is continuing. To solve personnel questions correctly, to achieve a further improvement in the quality and effectiveness of the officers' work in training and indoctrinating personnel and in maintaining units and ships at constant combat readiness -- means to ensure the successful solution of the tasks assigned to the armed forces by the party.

8802
CSO: 1801

FOOD SUPPLY: FROM MILITARY FARMS AND GARDENS

Moscow KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 80 p 2

[Text] In accordance with the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the July (1978) Plenum of the party's Central Committee, a lot is being done in our country to improve agriculture further. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Additional Measures To Prepare for and Conduct the Spring Field Work in 1980", has evoked a new upsurge in the work and political activity of farmers and cattle-breeders.

The workers on military sovkhozes, the kitchen and galley farms of military units, and other agricultural enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense are making their contribution to the production of the most important food products. They have completely managed the tasks of the five-year plan's four years. During the past year alone, they supplied the troops with 11.8 percent more potatoes and vegetables, 12 percent more milk and 6 percent more meat than the plan provided for. Field and farm workers are filled with the determination to intensify the tempo of agricultural production in the future.

A concrete manifestation of this determination was the initiative of the workers and employees on the "Oktyabr'skiy" Military Sovkhoz in the Central Asian Military District. This collective addressed a call to all the workers of agricultural enterprises in the USSR Ministry of Defense to take part in the socialist competition to greet the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth in a fitting manner and to complete the 10th Five-Year Plan successfully. The initiative of the first-rate people received the approval of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the central committee of the trade union for agricultural workers. It was heartily supported in the army and navy.

The workers in our enterprises have some one to compete with and take an example from in the struggle to improve the fertility of the fields and the productivity of animal husbandry. The military sovkhoz, where MO [Praporshchik] S. Siliuk is the chief, came to the final year of the five-year plan with good results. This Far East Military District farm was the initiator

of the socialist competition among military sovkhoz last year. Despite unfavorable climatic conditions, they harvested 20.3 metric centners (100 kg) of grain and 150 metric centners of potatoes from each hectare, achieved an average daily weight gain of 600 grams in the fattening of pigs, and received 4,650 kilograms of milk from each grazing cow.

The farms where P. Garayev (Transbaykal MD) and A. Kangiyev (Turkestan MD) are the directors, the "Soyma" Sovkhoz (Moscow MD), and others are recognized leaders in their zones. What helps people to take the maximum possible from the ground?

First of all, it is a proprietary attitude toward the land itself. For example, it is easy to imagine what soils one must work with in Kamchatka or in the Far North. Capt-Lt V. Pavlov, chief of a military sovkhoz in Kamchatka devotes his main attention to land reclamation operations and looks for areas suitable for hay-sowing on hills and in ravines. The "Severomorsk" Sovkhoz is famous for its hothouses and forcing beds. In these, they receive up to 32 kilograms of vegetables from one square meter.

The work of the laborers on the North Caucasus MD military sovkhoz, which G. Dedyukhin directs, is noted for its zealoumess and proprietary attitude toward the task. Here, everything that is new and progressive is boldly incorporated. For example, a single sheep-breeding complex was created from seven small sheep pens. The sheep-breeding was converted to early lambing. Chemical processing of the wool is used instead of shearing the sheep. When the animals are driven to pasture, ducks take their places in the pens. Fish are being bred in the numerous ponds.

The experience of progressive collectives provides quite a few examples of the effective use of equipment, fertiliser and seed stocks. In particular, mechanisation of labor was successfully introduced into plant-growing, cattle-breeding and poultry-raising. A number of farms refused delivery of potato seeds since they grew them themselves.

One cannot fail to mention that all these processes are also typical -- to one degree or another -- of the development of unit kitchen and galley farms. Their contribution is especially noticeable in supplying meat, milk and fresh vegetables to the troops' table. The number of farms, where dairy cattle-breeding, poultry-raising, rabbit-breeding, and pond fish-raising are being developed along with the fattening of pigs, is continuously growing. A completely mechanised combined farm has been created in one of the units in the Moscow Military District.

At the same time, kitchen and galley farms are still being developed one-sidedly here and there. The productivity of the animals, to whom the necessary care is not shown, is still low there. Military sovkhoz do not always help these farms. This help is extremely necessary, especially in building up pedigree cattle, preparing fields for sowing, and supplying the farms with seeds, fertiliser and chemical weed and pest killers. It seems that commanders and rear area specialists -- especially those in the food service -- should devote more attention to kitchen and galley gardens.

These, where a decrease in the number of animals is allowed, where the plots of land are decreased and where work is organized in the old way, stand out quite distinctly against the overall background of the successes of the USSR Ministry of Defense agricultural enterprises. For example, the Ural Military District sovkhoz, where V. Shikanov is the director, completed last year with a loss. Poultry raising is poorly developed in one of the Transbaykal Military District farms which N. Volkov heads. In analysing the deficiencies, we see their causes in the fact that people are poorly using the accomplishments of science and progressive practices, that work discipline is sometimes low on the farms, and that there are serious errors in organising competition.

Consequently, it is necessary to arrange the matter in such a way that the accomplishments of the best farmers and cattle-breeders become the property of all workers as quickly as possible. It is important to raise the professional level of specialists, and combat violations of work discipline and personnel turbulence. In the organisation of socialist competition, it is necessary to see to it that it affects the final work results of the workers and employees in the best way possible and contributes to their unconditional performance of adopted obligations.

As inspections have shown, the weakest link here is the organisation of competition within sovkhoz subunits and between them. It seems that the quantity and quality of products produced by one worker should be the basic criterion in evaluating work results. The winner is the one who obtained more average daily weight gain in the animals, or turned over more milk, eggs or wool than others, or achieved the best harvest, or prepared more fodder for the animals.

Today, the primary task of military sovkhoz and our other enterprises is to prepare for and conduct the moving for the last year of the five-year plan in an excellent manner, and maintain the number of animals and fowl. To do this, it is necessary to be concerned about seeds, fertilisers and repair equipment, and completely staff the machine operators in a timely fashion.

The directors of military sovkhoz received practical recommendations on all these questions during a recent meeting. General of the Army S. Kurkotkin, deputy minister of defense and chief of the Rear Services of the USSR armed forces, spoke to them.

To fulfill and overfulfil the planned goals in the five-year plan's final year, to provide more meat, milk, potatoes, and vegetables to the troops -- this is the high duty of each worker on a military sovkhoz or kitchen or galley farm.

8802
CSD: 1801

COMBAT TRAINING: COMPETITION ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Moscow KRAYNAYA SVIZH in Russian 28 Feb 80 p 1

[Article: "The Commander and Competition"]

[Text] The Training Tank Dvinskii Red Banner, twice Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Regiment is one of the best in the Red Banner Ural Military District. Based on last year's results, the regiment was awarded the temporary Red Banner of the district's military council. Here, a lot is being done to increase quality in the training of junior specialists for the tank troops. Socialist competition serves as one of the effective levers for improving the training process and strengthening organization, discipline and regulation. In the regiment the majority of classes are conducted in a spirit of competition, results are summarised regularly and instructively, and contests for the title of best specialist and squad are organized.

Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Stepanovich Piyalkin, the regimental commander, is rightfully mentioned first among those by whose efforts the regiment's achievements in combat and political training and its successes in socialist competition were accomplished. Having commanded in the past a platoon, company and battalion, he has been convinced by his own experience of what a powerful system socialist competition is in the hands of a commander to mobilize the men for exemplary service and for further rallying the collective. Now, it always occupies a leading place within the circle of his numerous command concerns and, is integrally blended with all the other jobs. For example, he does not conceive of demonstration and instructional methods classes and assemblies during which the experience of progressive subunits is not publicized and attention paid to the organization of competition. Questions about raising its effectiveness are regularly discussed here during service conferences and officer meetings.

The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces point out: "A commander (chief) is required to organize socialist competition among the men of a unit or ship (subunit) and to provide for its day-to-day direction in order to mobilize all servicemen to perform the tasks assigned by the

Communist Party and the Soviet government to the armed forces; to instill in personnel a constant striving to carry out fully and in a qualitative way the socialist obligations which have been adopted." Commanders organize socialist competition with political organs and party and Komsomol organizations with the active participation of staffs. They bear full responsibility for its effectiveness and the discharge of its indoctrinal function.

It would be possible to mention many other commanders who are devoting constant attention to questions on the organization of competition and who are skilfully using this important method to mobilize personnel for the successful solution of combat and political training tasks. Guided by the Leninist principles of socialist competition when implementing the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and the requirements of the November (1979) Plenum of the party's Central Committee about its further development and more clear-cut orientation toward qualitative indicators, commanders have acquired significant experience in organising competition. It is being enriched with a new content, its organisational forms are being improved, and its scale is being enlarged. Regiments and ships have begun to compete with each other. The movement for progressive large unit has been expanded. This has led to a growth in an officers' responsibility for the effectiveness of competition.

Along with this, it is impossible not to point out that the level of some commanders' direction of competition still does not satisfy modern requirements. It does not have a specific and business-like nature everywhere. Adopted obligations are not always supported by organizational work. It happens that a commander examines competition questions only during the stage for adopting obligations. Later, he addresses problems on organising competition in an incidental fashion, does not display necessary concern for the strict performance of the obligations, and does not demand the exemplary execution of each combat training task. The fact that individual units and ships do not carry out obligations during competition is explained a lot by this. One cannot reconcile oneself to such a situation.

The task of commanders is to see to it that competition is an inseparable part of combat training, is closely tied to the tasks of maintaining the troops' constant combat readiness, and contributes to improving the quality of combat and political training and service. It is important to be tireless in improving competition's role in political, work, and moral indoctrination and in developing the social activity of servicemen, military construction personnel and the workers and employees of the army and navy; and to improve its influence on the strengthening of military discipline and the maintenance of regulation order in troop units and on ships.

Command concern for the effectiveness of competition is first of all a concern for the clear-cut organization of the training process and for the creation of conditions for carrying out the obligations. The commander is called upon to support in every way possible the fighting men's patriotic initiatives which have been directed toward the further improvement of combat

Readiness and the skilful mastery of equipment and weapons, and to develop in the men a desire to look for reserves in competition. This is a dependable way to reach new frontiers in combat training. It is emphasized in comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the veterans. "If people boldly understand the task, if they give full range to initiative, if they are caught up in sensible undertakings, -- success is assured." It is necessary to expand competition during classes more and make more effective use of tank and horn competitions. The regular and instructive summing up of results, the moral stimulation of progressive people and the adoption of effective measures with respect to those lagging behind also mean a lot.

The duty of the commander is to set an example of exactingness in evaluating what has been accomplished and create in the collective an atmosphere of mutual exactingness and responsibility for the carrying out of obligations. The effective solution of these tasks, naturally, is unthinkable without constant reliance on the party and Komsomol organizations and without the active participation of the staff. Commanders must teach subordinate officers, especially the young ones, the practices for organizing competition.

Raising the responsibility of commanders for the effectiveness of competition is an important task of political organs and party organizations. Listening to the reports of communist leaders about the organization of competition in entrusted subunits during party committee and bureau meetings and individual conversations with them on these questions have proven themselves. It is necessary to proceed from the fact that the ability of a commander to organize competition and mobilize personnel to carry out obligations is a very important indicator of his professional and party maturity.

The final stage of winter training and of the competition to greet the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday and the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War is approaching. It is a matter of honor for army and navy fighting men to greet these significant dates with new successes in combat and political training. The duty of commanders is to be tireless in improving the organizational work for directing competition and to achieve the complete and highly qualified performance of socialist obligations.

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COMBAT TRAINING: UNDER WINTER CONDITIONS

Moscow KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Ziyemin'sh, KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Far East Military District; "Winter Signs of Combat"]

[Text] The ash-grey clouds sowed such a thick white haze that nothing could be seen a half kilometer away. Faint notes of despondency appeared in the mood of the tankers: "The reference points have completely disappeared. How will we fire?"

During these minutes, the company commander, Lieutenant N. Martynuk drew a picture of the coming battle in his imagination. He will organize in a reverse arrowhead and catch the "enemy" in a so-called pincers. Judging from everything, the "enemy's" defense has a pocket nature. Although the traces of the equipment's movement and the engineer work were concealed under the snow, he detected with the help of his binoculars three black marks in the strong point. These were tanks which sat astride the only field road. The forward edge of the defense was immediately behind the taiga river; however is it really a barrier when a river is frozen over?

The officer reasoned this way or almost this way when making his decision for the battle. Soon the tanks rushed forward. There was just a little trifle left -- to rush across the river -- and the company would be in the "enemy's" strong point. However, one machine, another stood up On the bank of the river -- in sight of the "enemy". It turned out that where there was ice on the river yesterday, today an unfrozen patch of water gaped like a black abyss. They tried to bypass it but nothing came of it. The steep opposite river bank was inundated with water and the tracks of the machines skidded. The enemy had forced the tankers into a helpless situation.

As it turned out, everything was rather simple. During the night, the "enemy" had blown up the ice under the guise of an accidental artillery firing. The unfrozen patch of water had been formed and the bank inundated with water as a result of this. This made it inaccessible for the tanks.

Of course, it is possible to explain the company commander's error by the officer's inexperience. But was it only in this? Sometimes commanders completely fail to consider the seasonal factor in combat training practice and organize for battle the same way during winter and summer. But the conduct of combat operations is more complicated during the winter. Severe frost because of which standard diesel fuel thickens and becomes like chocolate syrup, for example; frequent snow falls; snow storms; and fogs--these are the rigorous and day-to-day realities which require commanders to carry out a series of additional measures when preparing personnel and combat equipment for battle.

On the other hand, these and other factors provide an opportunity to ensure tactical surprise. Therefore, one must be able to use the peculiarities of winter conditions in order to achieve success in battle.

Once, I had occasion to be present during a tactical exercise in a far northern garrison. The approaching night found the motorized riflemen in a place not very suitable for deployment -- on an enormous ice field, among boulders. It was possible to go around the ice which was more than a meter thick but no one knew where its borders were (ice fields here normally occupy areas large in size). Moreover, night falls swiftly on the earth and for many verst there is not a single light, not a single path. One can really orient himself only with a compass or by the stars. Sr Lt V. Granovskiy startled many with his unexpected conclusion: "It is dangerous to move further -- a blizzard will soon start."

The blizzard actually started and raged all night. It was good that the motorized riflemen had prepared to meet it in a timely fashion. Ditches had been hollowed out in the ice, the combat machines had been deployed so that the radiators and louvers were on the down wind side. Blocks of ice had been erected in front of the tents to protect them from the wind and snow. The commanders foresight played its part. The motorized riflemen continued the exercise all right in the morning.

How did Senior Lieutenant Granovskiy manage to determine the approach of the bad weather? He used the experience of the local population which had been acquired over the centuries. He had learned a lot from the old-time inhabitants. The configuration of clouds, the behavior of animals, changes in the external appearance and qualities of some local terrain features -- all this can help a knowledgeable individual to foresee changes in the weather.

I would like to direct one's attention also to the following minor details. Do you often see during an exercise, let us say, a dugout or a shelter set up according to all the rules of field living, including a stove made from available materials? Not often. The erection of snow ramparts; snow burrows; caves; road blocks; improvised shelters made of poles and brushwood; and huts made of blocks of snow, ice and frozen earth with heated interiors is practiced even less. These very simple shelters which were

often used during the years of the last war permitted fighting men to preserve their strength and combat capabilities. Why is this now at times buried in oblivion? Obviously, the fact is that the duration of exercises is usually not great. It is thought possible in this case to mana : with standard factory produced tents to warm the men. Of course, it is very simple to prevent cases of frost bite in this way. However, in actual combat you will not assemble everyone in tents, near a red-hot small iron stove. Subunits will often have to construct on their own very simple field structures for protection against the cold and bad weather and for preparing food, and set up shelters for the combat equipment and other items.

One must admit that individual officers have not been trained to make such structures and know about them only in a theoretical sense. The simplified approach to organizing the life and living conditions of personnel comes from this. Of course, it is possible in this case to cite the fact that a soldier is dressed warmly during each trip to the field. However, training and special tempering for operations under winter conditions are also needed in addition.

In the motorized rifle company which Sr Lt A. Palychev commands, they decided at one time to conduct an unusual experiment. The senior chief selected the company's movement route to the attack line off the road, over rugged and heavily snow covered terrain, and recommended at the same time that they run using skis and in order to speed up the movement to the attack line that they be towed by the combat vehicles. It really revealed which of the fighting men felt confident on skis and which didn't. Unfortunately, many fell on small obstacles. If this happened at the head of the column, fighting men moving behind also fell. As it turned out, they did not know the most elementary thing: if one stumbles -- throw the cable away and go to the side so as not to interfere with the others. As a result, the commander more than once and more than twice had to halt the combat vehicles and begin the towing again. A very great deal of time was spent on the move. But why? The soldiers had not been taught this before.

In his book "Khrabryye serdtsa odnopolchan" [The Brave Hearts of Brother-Soldiers], the commander of the Red Banner Far East Military District, General of the Army I. Tret'yak, recalling the way years, describes warmly the operations of a ski battalion, which was commanded by Captain N. Kostyrev, in the vicinity of the city of Chchatak. He writes that the skiers seemingly flew through the hail of fire on wings -- so swift was their rush forward. The battalion went deeper into the rear of the Hitlerites and occupied from the move the population center of Lysakino which was important from a tactical viewpoint. The battle lasted an hour and a half. The fighting men courageously and staunchly repulsed the attacks of the enemy who were hard pressed. When the ammunition ran out, the skiers used their bayonets and fought and died like heroes. They caused alarm in the enemy's rear area and attracted a significant portion of the enemy's forces to themselves.

A commander can borrow very much from front-line experience. For example, in order to improve the trafficability of combat equipment and wheeled vehicle transport, the front-line soldiers put on skid chains; anti-slip devices were made from available materials; the caterpillar tracks of the tanks were widened by half a track; treadway bridges, mats, and logs for self-extraction were prepared in advance. The tension of the caterpillar treads was decreased on the tanks and prime movers. Guns, mortars and heavy machine guns were mounted on dragharrows. Combat equipment and weapons were painted in white color for camouflage purposes. Is it really right to forget about these and other practical measures?

I will relate what occurred during one battalion tactical exercise. During the dynamics of the battle, there was no clear coordination between the motorised riflemen and the mortar battery headed by Capt A. Sudorkin. As long as the terrain was open, level and with little snow, everything went smoothly. However, soon, when the opportunities for maneuver became limited because of a deep snowdrift, coordination was broken and the mortarmen -- to put it simply -- did not advance behind the combat formations of the motorised riflemen.

Possessing equipment without the same high trafficability, they were not able to cross all the obstacles which were being encountered on the route, on their own. The motorized rifle battalion commander was able and was obliged to foresee this and attach -- even before the beginning of the battle -- engineers to the mortarmen, or detach a small group of motorized riflemen which would be able to eliminate quickly any complications which might occur. Unfortunately, the commander had not considered these important matters, which were dictated by the peculiarities of winter conditions, during the organization of coordination.

How is it best to use the advantages which winter gives for achieving success in modern combat? How is it more advisable to use the entrusted equipment and weapons, to ensure secrecy and surprise in operations? How should one preserve the strength and combat capabilities of subunits? The level of the men's field training and the performance of socialist obligations during competition depend to no small degree on how consistently and effectively these questions are solved.

8802
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CRITICISM: MISUSE OF PERSONNEL NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col L. Kulikov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent "A Prescription for .. a Cellar"]

[Text] It has long been known that medicine divides people into sanguine persons, choleric persons, phlegmatic persons, and melancholic persons. Sr Lt Med Serv V. A. Artyshuk has applied this classification of the human race to all his patients -- military construction workers who are being given treatment in the medical unit entrusted to him and has conducted his medical practice with a consideration for their physical and mental characteristics.

Let us say that Pvt I. Leshkovich, a sanguine person (a sanguine person is an individual who is noted for vivacity and quick excitability) was resting in bed in the warmth and comfort of the medical unit and that he has stopped having a temperature -- the detachment doctor has started up roughly the following conversation with him:

"Most likely you miss energetic muscular activity because of your emotional make-up."

"Exactly, I miss it", the builder readily responded.

"Then, Vanya, it is time to discharge you. You will be in my medical unit only one more day as a sick person. So that you won't be bored, go to this address with this pass. There, you will restore your health once and for all. So that it will be more enjoyable for you, take Ppts N. Mazur and A. Konoplev with you. They, in truth are both melancholic people, but under your leadership I think they will be stirred up"

And indeed, having arrived at the designated address and having been armed with pick-shovels, all three military construction personnel performed twice the norm during a work shift.

A deep voice rang out somewhere above the heads of the earth diggers when they straightened their aching backs at the end of the work day: "This I understand, is a pace!"

"Good lads! March to the medical unit. I will expect you again tomorrow...."

The deep voice belonged to Lt Col Med Serv Vladimir Nafodiyevich Shvedyuk. The garage, in which the military construction workers were digging a cellar so diligently, also belonged to him as personal property.

Then during the following days, the small cave was brought to the required cubic capacity, the walls in it were sealed and the floor cemented by other recovered inhabitants of the medical unit -- Pvts S. Grinyuk, N. Mikhel', A. Kostik, and N. Namok.

The work went swimmingly. Sometimes even Senior Lieutenant Artyshuk himself rolled up his sleeves and set an example of urgent work and truly choleric inspiration. Vladimir Nafodiyevich Shvedyuk only smiled broadly looking from above down onto the damp workers and said patronisingly:

"That's enough for today, I guess. You are tired, I see...."

At the same time, the garage and cellar owner's speech was interrupted and the far from idle question was asked: "In accordance with what article are these people working for the senior intern of the military hospital's therapeutic section, comrade Shvedyuk?" It turns out in accordance with the same article that he to some degree looks after the medical service senior lieutenant.

This same patronage is displayed in the fact that the detachment doctor is permitted to disregard medical practices in the vicinity of his medical unit and the military hospital. And also in the fact that therapist Shvedyuk shares his knowledge and experience with the young doctor. Of course, there is nothing bad here. However, all the damage is in the fact that these mutual relations are constructed according to the regrettably well known formula: "You -- for me, I -- for you." I for you -- knowledge and experience; you for me -- free manpower.

Let us add one other feature to the plot of our narrative: Comrade Artyshuk, the doctor in the military construction detachment which Lt Col V. Shkel'din commands, had also tried to improve his family life in a similar way. He decided to strengthen the floor and walls of the cellar in his quarters, which were located on the first floor of a two-story house, with brick which had been obtained in an unlawful way.

Lt Col Viktor Grigor'yevich Kolesnikov, the political section chief, pointed out during our meeting. "It is an exceptional case." He added: "We will examine this entire miserable story with a very high level of party principles."

Of course, such an intention is worthy of support and approval. It is necessary to do this irrespective of who has abused his service position -- a sanguine person, a choleric person or a melancholic person.

LININ ON SOURCES OF VICTORY IN THE CIVIL WAR

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(Article published under the heading "For the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin," by Merited Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Azovtsev: "V. I. Lenin on the Sources of Victory of the Soviet People and Their Armed Forces in the Civil War")

(Text) History credits V. I. Lenin with the fact that he not only determined the essence and nature of Russia's civil war,¹ but he also revealed, deeply and scientifically, the sources and causes of the young Soviet republic's victory over the combined forces of international imperialism and internal counterrevolution. His works contain models of comprehensive analysis of the most important sources of the Soviet people's victory, which may be boiled down conditionally to two basic groups--of internal and international nature.

How did the starving, weak Country of the Soviets, half-destroyed by imperialist war, defeat its numerous enemies, coming out on top over the armies of the White Guards and interventionists? Vladimir Il'ich explained the answer to this question several times.

Revealing the sources of the victory, V. I. Lenin emphasized that they were first of all contained within the supremely just nature of the war, which was a continuation of the political struggle for liberation of the laborers from the capitalists, for consolidation of Soviet rule at home, and for creation of a socialist society. This policy reflected the interests of the laboring people and enjoyed their broad support. The understanding the laborers and peasants had of the just goals of the war generated mass heroism and self-sacrifice in the rear and at the front, and the firmness and resolve to attain victory. V. I. Lenin noted that revolutionary war, when it really attracts and interests the oppressed laboring masses, when they know that they are fighting against exploiters, elicits energy and the capability for creating miracles.

In the savage struggle against interventionist and White Guard troops, the Red Army demonstrated combat aggressiveness, steadfastness, and mass heroism that were unprecedented in the history of warfare. Fifteen thousand soldiers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and more than 350 formations, units, and military training institutions earned honorary revolutionary Red Banners and combat orders. Red Army soldiers fought shoulder to shoulder with many volunteers. The reasons for the mass heroism, Vladimir Il'ich thought, lay in the fact that for the first time in the world an armed force was created which knew what it was fighting for. He emphasized many times in this regard that our army is the bearer of the ideology and politics of the working class.

Guiding itself by the leader's directives, the Communist Party created and persistently improved the system of political and military indoctrination of servicemen as conscious defenders of the achievements of Great October. The supremacy of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the socialist awareness of the Soviet people, and their deep conviction in the firmness of communist ideals, confirmed by the victory of socialism in the USSR, were among the sources of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War as well. Recent clear evidence of the party's untiring concern for the growth of spiritual potential, for formation of the new man, an active defender of the achievements of developed socialism, was the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Training," which clearly spelled out the tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces in this area as well. The main one is to impart, to the young generation, a feeling of responsibility for the fate of socialism, for the motherland's security.

V. I. Lenin emphasized many times that the most important source of victory of the Soviet Union over the interventionists and White Guards was the new, most highly advanced social and state structure, based on the firm union of workers and peasants. Indicating the tremendous, decisive significance the state structure of the Soviet republic--one immeasurably more democratic than any bourgeois parliamentary republic--had to the victory, he noted: "Had the popular creativity of the revolutionary classes not created the Soviets, the proletarian revolution would have been a hopeless affair in Russia...."²

Organizing the Soviet republic's defenses, the Communist Party made it its task to create a sound military-political union between the working class and the laboring peasantry. The experience of the masses themselves, which had come to know all of the horrors of the interventionists and White Guards, strengthened this union. "The civil war," V. I. Lenin stated, "welded the working class to the peasantry, and the guarantee of invincible power lies in this."³ The working class had the leading role in strengthening this union. It was precisely the class which carried the brunt of the struggle on its shoulders. With the help of its organs of rule--the soviets of worker and peasant deputies, the working class raised up the broad popular masses and organized the armed struggle against the interventionists and White Guards.

Basing himself on the experience of the civil war, in December 1919 V. I. Lenin derived the following law: "...historically, victory belongs to that class which is able to lead the masses."⁴ He reinforces this theoretical premise with the facts that an army of a new type was created, that the laboring peasantry was attracted to the side of Soviet rule, and that the army made use of the old specialists, without which it would not have been able to fight successfully.

Because the war was just, and because it was a war of liberation, it engendered other sources of victory as well. The sound foundation of the friendship of peoples in the Soviet Union, and the unity of all of the oppressed, was laid in the course of the civil war. This unshakable unity was proclaimed in the "Declaration of Rights of the Russian Peoples," adopted by the Council of Peoples Commissars in November 1917, and later it became embodied within the military-political union of the Soviet republic. On 1 June 1919 the RFSR All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the decree "On Unification of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic: Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorussia" with the participation of representatives of other republics. In addition to unity in military organization and military command, the decree foresaw unification of the national economic soviets and the commissariats of labor, finances, and rail transport control. The union of free republics, founded on the principles of Leninist national policy, insured equality and friendship of the peoples, complete interaction, and voluntary unification of the efforts to defend the achievements of October.

Only a state of a new type could complete the task of bringing the laborers together into a powerful combat union, creating a strong rear, and transforming the country into a single war camp. Without a strong rear, a victorious outcome for the civil war would have been impossible. "If we are to make war as we should," V. I. Lenin taught, "we would have to have a strong, organized rear."⁵ Under the guidance of the Leninist party, at a time when war was the main concern in the life of the country, the Soviet government managed to mobilize the manpower and equipment needed to insure victory. Guiding himself by the experience of 2 years of war, V. I. Lenin derived the following law: "...we are winning and we will continue to win because we have a rear, and because the rear is strong.... Peasants and workers...respond to every heavy blow with greater unity of strength and economic might...."⁶

This premise was also confirmed by the Great Patriotic War, in which the class basis of the power of the Soviet state--an indestructible union of workers and peasants--grew even stronger. This union and this friendship among the Soviet peoples were the most important sources of the victory over the fascist invaders. Lenin's ideas on military and economic cooperation of the Soviet republics found their embodiment during the postwar era in creation of a defensive union of countries in the socialist fraternity--the Warsaw Pact.

The Red Army's victory in the civil war was promoted by the farsighted domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Domestic policy promoted unification of laborers representing all of the country's nationalities, since it gave real substance to the liberty and true independence of peoples. Foreign policy was based on Lenin's warning that if victory were to be attained over the powerful enemy, the country would have to capitalize upon even the slightest possibility for obtaining for itself a major ally, even if the alliance is temporary, shaky, unstable, unreliable, and conditional. In October 1922 V. I. Lenin noted the special role played by Soviet diplomacy in attainment of victory over the interventionists in the Far East. "...here," he emphasized, "a role was played not only by the heroism of the Red Army and its forces, but also by the international situation and our diplomacy."⁷

V. I. Lenin distinguishes three sources of victory in foreign policy. He placed the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat against the intervention in first place, stating that on the international scale, the socialist revolution in Russia attracted all of the conscious masses to its side, such that the laborers of countries in the Entente turned out to be closer to us than to their own government. Acting resolutely under the slogan "Hands Off Russia!", the laborers of the capitalist countries held back and weakened the thrusts of the interventionists. "The workers of the leading countries are so much responsible for the course of the war that it would be impossible to wage war in opposition to their wishes," the leader of the revolution noted, "and in the end, they caused the war against us to fail through their passive and semipassive resistance."⁸ The Entente was unable to launch a significant quantity of faithful troops against Soviet Russia, since the soldiers and seamen had no desire to oppress their brothers. And those who did find themselves on Russian soil quickly became revolutionaries themselves, expressing sympathy for the laborers who had seized power in their own hands. "Through agitation and propaganda, we took the Entente's own troops away from it,"⁹ said V. I. Lenin.

V. I. Lenin felt the second foreign policy source of Soviet rule's victory to be its competent capitalization upon the acute conflicts existing among the bourgeois states, conflicts having deep economic roots and issuing forth from the very nature of imperialism, which generates irreconcilable differences in the economic interests of countries permitting private ownership of land and capital. In its foreign policy activities, the Soviet state strived to utilize these conflicts to the maximum, so as to make it difficult for the capitalist countries to agree among themselves, or at least to make such agreement temporarily impossible. A clear confirmation of the correctness of the chosen course can be found in the signing of the Brest peace. "Brest," noted V. I. Lenin, "is noteworthy in that for the first time on an enormously great scale, despite the vast difficulties, we were able to capitalize upon the conflicts among the imperialists, such that socialism was able to win out in the end."¹⁰

The third foreign policy source, and one of the factors promoting the Soviet people's victory, V. I. Lenin saw in the irreconcilable nature of

the interests of the large imperialist countries and the interests of the small countries. The governments of the Entente applied tremendous effort to force bourgeois states bordering on Soviet Russia to war against it with English, French, and American money. Moreover an attempt was made by W. Churchill to organize a campaign of 14 states with the goal of toppling Soviet power. But it suffered failure, despite the intense pressure the Entente imperialists imposed upon the small dependent countries. Not only the workers and peasants but even a sizeable proportion of the bourgeoisie refused to march against Soviet rule. This can be explained by the fact that in the short time of their independent existence, the peoples of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and other states came to understand that "we feel ourselves to be, if not allies, then more-reliable and more-valuable neighbors than the imperialists."¹¹ The Entente was unable to make the small countries move against Soviet Russia also because the former feared Kolchak, Denikin, and other Czarist generals, who fought under the slogan "A Unified and Indivisible Russia"--that is, for restoration of the Russian empire. The small states became persuaded that Soviet rule offered them independence, and that it decisively condemned oppression of other peoples. In V. I. Lenin's words, through its politics the Soviet state won the sympathy of all the world.

Lenin's policy of peace is the fundamental principle of the socialist state's foreign policy, its backbone. The Communist Party followed this policy consistently and unwaveringly from the first days of the existence of Soviet rule. This is persuasively confirmed by decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and by the untiring struggle to avert a new world war, being waged by the party Central Committee and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

V. I. Lenin treated the victory over international imperialism and the White Guards in the civil war as the greatest achievement of not only our country but also of all countries, of all mankind. "It was a victory not only on the Russian scale but also on the scale of world history."¹² But this victory would not come about automatically; it had to be organized, and it had to be prepared for. This is why, according to V. I. Lenin, guidance by the Communist Party was a decisive source of victory of the Soviet people and their Red Army over the combined forces of external and internal counter-revolution. Being the organized advance guard of the proletariat, the party was given the task of uniting the efforts of the working class and guiding its struggle for the victory of October.

During the civil war the party transformed into a warring party. It served as the collective leader, the organizer and commander, guiding the Soviet people toward a single goal--defeating the troops of the interventionists and their accomplices. Headed by V. I. Lenin, the Central Committee served as "the fighting organ of the fighting party in the era of civil war...."¹³ He found far-reaching solutions to literally all of the most important problems of the war, he defined its political goals and strategic concepts, he took steps to select and place top command and political personnel, to support combat operations, to create reserves, mobilize and distribute resources, and develop the partisan movement, and he insured the unity of

political and military leadership, the unity of politics and strategy. As was noted in the party Central Committee accountability report published in May 1920,¹⁴ problems associated with the country's defense were discussed on priority, and adopted decisions were immediately implemented. The following facts attest to the tremendous amount of work done by the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Orgburo. In 2 years--between the 8th and 10th party congresses--35 plenums, 95 Politburo meetings, 19 combined conferences of the Politburo and Orgburo, and 200 meetings of the Orgburo of the RKP(b) (Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)) Central Committee were held, during which military strategic, national economic, ideological, and foreign policy issues, and the objectives of Soviet, state, and military development were discussed. The party Central Committee maintained a constant influence upon the troops through the revolutionary military councils of the fronts and armies, the military commissars, and the political organs and party organizations. These were the cement that strengthened and unified armed forces personnel into a single warring collective. The inseparable ties of the Leninist party with the masses, and its unsurpassed ability for inspiring, organizing, and leading the people had a truly decisive significance to the victorious conduct of the civil war. The party deserves the principal credit for determining the most important objectives in each phase of the war, as well as the priorities and the methods for achieving its goals. V. I. Lenin noted proudly at the 9th RKP(b) Congress: "We must firmly remember that the source of the successes and miracles we encountered in military affairs lay in the fact that we always concentrated ourselves upon what was most important, upon what was fundamental...."¹⁵ In the most dangerous moments of the war the party concentrated its best forces in the Red Army. Almost half of its composition--about 300,000 members--were in the armed forces. Seventy thousand Komsomol members fought side by side with Communists.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that the bulk of the communists were sent to the Red Army, that political sections worked more extensively there, that the influences exerted by the best workers and the best peasants were greater upon the military machine, and that they were deeper and more systematic. Everywhere--in the rear, at the front, and in the underground--the RKP(b) was together with the masses, and at their head. The Leninist party is precisely what led the people to victory. "And only because the party was standing guard, because the party was most highly disciplined, and because the party's authority united all departments and institutions, because tens, hundreds, thousands, and, in the end, millions marched as one man in response to the Central Committee's urgings, and only because unheard-of sacrifices were made, the miracle that did occur could have occurred. It was only for this reason, despite the double, triple, and quadruple thrust of the imperialists of the Entente and imperialists of the whole world, that we found ourselves in a position to win."¹⁶

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and all subsequent development of the world revolutionary process confirmed that the Marxist-Leninist party's unshared leadership of the defense of socialism's achievements is the general and decisive law of countries in which the socialist revolution

has conquered. The role of the CPSU as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and its key position within the political system of developed socialism are clearly reflected in the USSR Constitution.

The experience of history confirmed the law, revealed during the civil war by V. I. Lenin, that a nation in which the workers and peasants were aware for the most part that they were defending their own rule, Soviet rule--rule by the laborers--is invincible.

The leader of the revolution knew deeply that the possibilities the Soviet structure had for victory over the enemy depended in the end on the armed forces and their military artfulness. Intervention by capitalist states and the civil war imposed upon the Soviet people necessitated persistent attention toward military science, and generalization of the experience accumulated in military development. V. I. Lenin was the first to theoretically demonstrate, from the positions of Marxism, that if the socialist state was to be defended, we would need powerful armed forces, and we would have to make a transition to "a regular army, such a transition being typical of any class that has consolidated power, to include the proletariat."¹⁷ With a strong Red Army, organized on a scientific foundation, he said, we would be invincible.

Special emphasis should be made on the fact that all of the multifaceted effort of organizing the armed forces and conducting the war in defense of the revolution's achievements was guided directly by Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. He directed the activities of the RKP(b) Central Committee, and he headed the government of the Soviet state--the Council of Peoples Commissars. The Council of Workers and Peasants Defense, which was later reorganized as the Council of Labor and Defense, functioned under his guidance. During the civil war Vladimir Il'ich wrote more than 600 letters and telegrams concerning the country's defense and the conduct of the armed conflict.

History credits V. I. Lenin with developing the grounds for the military program of the proletarian revolution, and for creating the teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland. In the new conditions he developed the Marxist teaching on war and the army, and he laid a sound theoretical and methodological foundation for the military science of socialism. V. I. Lenin is rightly recognized to be a great military theoretician and strategist. During the civil war there were no problems of Soviet military science and military strategy in which he did not reveal his guiding role. The leader of the party demonstrated great artfulness in his scientific prediction of the military events, in his choice of strategic actions (offense, defense), in massing men and equipment in the most important sectors, in determining which opponent was the most dangerous and which sector was to experience the main thrust, and in utilizing strategic reserves.

The correctness of Lenin's idea that every revolution must know how to defend itself was proven by our persuasive victory over the interventionists and White Guards. The Republic of the Soviets defended its right to existence,

and as the torchbearer of socialism it became an example to all laborers fighting for liberation from exploiters, and for social progress.

After the aggressive forces of imperialism were defeated in the civil war they began systematically resorting to the most insidious and sophisticated intrigues against the achievements of Great October. Predicting this turn in the politics of international imperialism, V. I. Lenin said: "We have endured an unusually great deal with great sacrifices, and we are aware of the woes and tortures a new attempt at war may cause us, and still we say that we will endure this once again, were you to even dare try again."¹⁸ In October 1920 he emphasized: "...after every attempt by our enemies we emerged stronger than before."¹⁹ The strike forces of world imperialism, assuming the countenance of German fascism, failed to reckon with this warning, and they were destroyed to the man on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. Only a country possessing fundamental advantages inherent to its social system could have won such a war. The sources of victory lay in the tremendous socioeconomic achievements of the people, in the ideological-political unity of Soviet society, in the indestructible power of the Soviet Armed Forces, in life-giving Soviet patriotism, and in the guiding, directing, and organizing role of the CPSU. And today the lessons of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland serve as a stern warning to military adventurists.

However, attempting to diminish the authority of the Country of the Soviets and its armed forces, bourgeois ideologists are diligently falsifying and distorting the events and lessons of the civil war in Russia. They intentionally conceal the class nature and the true causes of intervention, and they shed a false light upon the causes leading to the defeat of external and internal counterrevolution forces, forcefully pushing the fabricated thesis of "Red militarism." And in our days the aggressive forces of imperialism, which have become noticeably more active in recent times, are trying to create the notion of a threat from without. New plans for the arms race, highly dangerous to European and universal peace, are being covered up by hypocritical statements of "defending West Europe" against "the Soviet danger." Militarist circles have always resorted and still resort to such actions whenever they find it necessary to begin a new spiral in the arms race. The present Chinese leadership is acting in the same harness with the reactionary forces of imperialism. Beijing's leaders are conducting an unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, and they are forcing the country's militarization. These plans of international imperialism and Beijing adventurists will inevitably suffer failure.

The sources of the Soviet state's indestructible power in the present era lie in the socioeconomic, political, spiritual, scientific, and technical potentials of developed socialism. "Our country has never possessed such an enormous economic and scientific-technical potential. It has never been as strong, and its defense capabilities have never been so reliable,"²⁰ said L. I. Brezhnev. The aggressive forces of imperialism are now opposed by the international unity and power of the armies of countries in the socialist fraternity, which are standing an alert guard over socialism and peace in all the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, NO 4, 1979, pp 3-9.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 34, p 305.
3. Ibid., Vol 45, p 440.
4. Ibid., Vol 39, p 351.
5. Ibid., Vol 35, p 408.
6. Ibid., Vol 39, p 321.
7. Ibid., Vol 45, p 245.
8. Ibid., Vol 43, p 134.
9. Ibid., Vol 40, p 125.
10. Ibid., Vol 42, p 56.
11. Ibid., Vol 39, p 349.
12. Ibid., Vol 39, p 400.
13. Ibid., Vol 38, p 150.
14. IZVESTIYA TSK KP(b), 23 May 1920.
15. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, pp 284-285.
16. Ibid., Vol 40, p 240.
17. Ibid., Vol 38, p 267.
18. Ibid., Vol 45, p 7.
19. Ibid., Vol 41, p 356.
20. Brezhnev, L. I., "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (Standing Guard Over Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 534.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: AVIATION CREW REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES

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23 Jan 80 pp 10-15

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Candidate of Historical Sciences Lt Col A. Pervov: "Training Replacements and Filling Losses in Aviation Corps of the Supreme High Command Reserve"]

[Text] Guiding themselves by V. I. Lenin's formula that he who has the greater reserves wins in war, the Communist Party and the Soviet government devoted an extremely great deal of attention in the Great Patriotic War to creating and accumulating air reserves.

The Headquarters employed various air formations and even major formations (the air divisions of internal military districts, reserve, strike, maneuvering, and other temporarily organized groups, and the air armies of the RSHC [Supreme High Command Reserve]) as air reserves in operations of the first period of the past war.¹ These reserves played a positive role; however, air corps and separate divisions were recognized to be the most suitable organizational forms of SHC air reserves. From fall 1942 to the end of the war 30 such corps and 27 divisions were created.

This article examines the manning and combat training of SHC air corps, and replenishment of losses.

SHC air corps were organized on the basis of orders from the NKO (Peoples Commissariat of Defense). The Formation and Combat Training Directorate of the Soviet Army Air Force (UP i RP VVS SA) was headed by General A. V. Nikitin. He was subordinated to the commander of the Soviet Army Air Force, General A. A. Novikov, who received instructions on issues associated with air reserve formation and training from the HQ SHC and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee.

Air corps commanders were appointed from among the best trained, battle-experienced generals and officers. Thus generals Ye. M. Beletskiy, V. G. Ryazanov, and V. A. Sudets were appointed commanders of the I Fighter, I Ground-Attack, and I Bomber corps, which were created out of reorganized SHC air armies.

The Soviet Army Air Force commander posed missions to the air corps on the basis of directives from Headquarters, and he determined the order of their execution.² The commanders of the reserve air formations resolved all other issues with the UF i BP VVB SA. There as well they studied the plans for formation of their corps, as approved by the military council of the Soviet Army Air Force.³ After ascertaining the mission, the commanders left with their staffs to the place of forthcoming formation.

The directorates of RSHC air corps, and of divisions contained within them, were formed with personnel from the Main Personnel Directorate or the directorates of air divisions withdrawn from the front. Battle-experienced officers and generals were placed on the staffs of air corps and air division directorates in order to reduce the time required to form the units, and subsequently to improve the organization and conduct of combat activities. The places for formation were selected relatively close to the front line with the goal of permitting swift redeployment of air formations in their intended operational areas. As an example 8 out of 12 fighter air corps and 9 out of 11 ground-attack air corps formed during the war were committed to battle not more than 350 km from the places where they were formed, while the bulk of the bomber air corps were committed not more than 450 km from their formation areas.

Flying and technical personnel were sent to RSHP air formations from reserve air regiments consisting of formed units, or directly from flight schools and technical schools "piecemeal", while airplanes--only the new types--were supplied by enterprises of aviation industry.

The training level of pilots and navigators joining the air formations varied, which necessitated a differential approach to breaking them in. The flying personnel could be divided into three groups depending on training levels. The first group, (about 40 percent) contained those who had combat experience. They came from reserve air regiments in which they had been able to assimilate the new materiel following withdrawal from the front. The second group (about 30 percent) consisted of those who had graduated from flight schools and gained some experience aboard warplanes in reserve air regiments. On the average they had clocked from 30 to 20 hours in warplanes. The third group (about 30 percent) contained pilots and navigators coming straight from flight schools, having accumulated little flying time aboard obsolete airplanes, which required their retraining in the new materiel.

The formative period of each air formation--from the moment an NKO order for formation was received until the unit was sent to the front--was 60-90 days long. It can be divided arbitrarily into two stages. In the first, the directorates of the air corps and divisions were organized, and units were received and replenished by flying personnel and materiel. In the second, the units and formations were hammered together, and young flight crews were broken in.

The durations of these stages varied in every air corps. They depended on the time allowed by an NKO order for the corps to make ready for combat activities. But factors such as the following influenced whether or not this schedule was met: promptness of supplying personnel and materiel to the air units; presence of a reserve of trained aviation personnel to staff the air corps and division directorates; the training level of flying personnel; continuity of fuel supply; weather conditions in the formation area, and the distance of the formation areas from the reserve air regiments.

The duration of the first stage was an average of 20-30 days for ground-attack and bomber air corps, and up to 40 for fighter air corps,⁶ inasmuch as the formation areas of the latter were far away from the reserve air regiments. As an example air regiments for the III, IV, VI, and XIII fighter air corps (commanded by generals Ye. Ya. Savitskiy, I. D. Podgornyy, A. B. Yumashev, and B. A. Sidnev) had to come from Siberia.⁷ Moreover their redeployment was performed by rail. Following their arrival, the technicians began assembling the airplanes and the flight crews began breaking them in. Both of these functions required a great deal of time.

After the first stage some of the air corps were sent immediately to the front in view of the grave situation that had evolved (II Fighter Air Corps, III Composite Air Corps, XI Composite Air Corps, VIII Ground-Attack Air Corps, and I Composite Air Corps; the respective commanders were generals A. S. Blagoveshchenskiy, V. I. Aladinskiy, S. P. Danilov, V. V. Naneyashvili, and V. I. Shevchenko), which led to significant losses.

The bulk of the air corps (25 out of 30), meanwhile, got extra time to organize their units and formations and break in young pilots, so that the highest effectiveness would be insured in forthcoming combat activities and the losses of flight crews and airplanes would be minimized.

The second phase in formation of RSHC air corps lasted 40-60 days.⁹ Special attention was devoted in this phase to the following in combat training: practicing the piloting techniques and organizing the crews, subunits, and units; training the crews in combat tactics; organizing regimental, divisional, and corps staffs; studying the combat experience; providing operational-tactical training to command personnel. In 1942 the training of bomber crews coming from reserve air regiments consisted of 5-8 hours of flying time and 4-6 combat sorties, while in 1944 the figures were 8-14 hours of flying time and 12-16 combat sorties.¹⁰ Flight crews arriving directly from flight schools gained even stronger skills in the air corps.

Whenever fuel and ammunition were supplied to the air corps for combat training in adequate amounts and, what is very important, promptly, training quality remained high and it was always completed on time.

One of the principal issues in training was that of properly organizing redeployment to regions of varying distances away. Given favorable weather conditions, as a rule redeployment over a short distance was performed without the use of refueling airfields. When units had to be moved great

distances, intermediate airfields were employed, to which advance parties were sent 2-3 hours prior to the arrival of the flying echelon. To avoid concentration of several regiments at the refueling airfields, they were redeployed squadron by squadron at 20-minute intervals.¹¹

During their combat training the personnel practiced loading and unloading stores and equipment aboard various forms of transportation, while the flight crews learned to independently service their airplanes at intermediate airfields. Acquisition of these habits made it possible to significantly reduce the time required to redeploy RSHC air formations.

Lectures, conferences, tactical rallies, staff training sessions, and command-and-staff, tactical flying, and aviation exercises were conducted with the purpose of hammering the regimental, divisional, and corps staffs together and improving the operational-tactical skills of the command. In the course of these functions the personnel primarily studied and resolved the problems of organizing and conducting combat activities, of preparing for covert control of the troops and control of the units by radio, and maintaining such control.

The officer rallies often ended with practical demonstration of various tactics. Thus following theoretical discussion of the dynamics of aerial combat by ground-attack airplanes and enemy fighters, the I Ground-Attack Air Corps (commander General V. G. Ryazanov) attended demonstration aerial combat between IL-2 airplanes and YaK-1 and YaK-7b fighters,¹² which made it possible to reveal shortcomings in combat training and develop recommendations on assimilation of new tactics.

The goal of many of the tactical flying conferences conducted in RSHC bomber air corps beginning in summer 1943 was to study and generalize the experience of utilizing different types of combat formations, to include the "ring of bomber flights," which was used for the first time by Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel I. S. Polbin in the I Bomber Air Corps.¹³ Reforming into such a combat formation, the bombers successively struck the targets from different directions, diving as individual flights ("Polbin's revolving door").

Before being sent to the front, the air corps underwent summary aviation exercises. The readiness of the air units and formations to engage in combat was tested in them, and problems associated with controlling and organizing the interaction of different branches of aviation and the ground troops were resolved in integrated fashion. Special attention was turned in all aviation exercises to organizing and conducting corps redeployment.

Most instructive in this respect was the joint two-sided exercise of the I Bomber Air Corps, I Ground-Attack Air Corps, and I Fighter Air Corps (5-15 October 1942) at one of the practice ranges near Moscow. This exercise was attended by members of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee Politburo, and representatives of the HQ SHC, the General Staff, and the Air Force Staff. The exercise was led by Soviet Army Air Force commander Lieutenant General of Aviation A. A. Novikov.¹⁴ The exercise began

with a redeployment. Then the ground-attack airplanes and bombers performed actions in depth under fighter cover, and they repelled strikes by "enemy" bombers accompanied by fighters.

RSHC air corps conducted aviation exercises jointly with combined-arms (tank) formations and major formations in order to work out the problems of interaction with ground troops. Thus in May 1943 the VII Composite Air Corps (commander, Colonel P. P. Arkhangel'skiy), which was in the composition of the Steppe Front's 5th Air Army, conducted an exercise jointly with the 10th Tank Brigade prior to the beginning of combat activities;¹⁶ in fall 1944 the VI Fighter Air Corps (commander, Major General of Aviation I. M. Dvusov) in the 1st Belorussian Front's 16th Air Army exercised jointly with units of the 2d Guards Tank Army.¹⁷

The air corps of the RSHC continued with their combat training after being sent to the front as well, during operational lulls and in the course of combat activities. Every year each corps flew from 2,000 to 5,000 training flights. As before, analysis and generalization of combat experience, coordination with other branches of aviation and formations of the ground troops, resolution of problems associated with radio control, and meticulous study of the enemy and the area of combat activities remained in the center of attention.

Different ways were used to break in replacements with the goal of raising quality and reducing training time. Sometimes young pilots were brought together into corps or divisional groups, which were allocated one of the best airfields as far as possible away from the front line, combat and training airplanes, and instructors.¹⁸ In other cases they were immediately distributed among air units and broken in by their immediate commanders.¹⁹ When an air corps was to be assigned to one air army for a long period of time, the young pilots underwent training in the training air regiments of this air army.²⁰

As a rule crews trained in corps (divisional) groups whenever the number of replacements was significant (50 persons or more). This made it possible to successively break in the pilot without distracting unit and subunit executives from their responsibilities of organizing and conducting the combat activities. However, in this case the immediate supervisors and commanders never had enough time to acquaint themselves well with the arriving replacements. Thus it is no accident that the most frequent practice was to break young pilots in within the air unit in which they were to fight subsequently.

Much attention was devoted to studying combat experience. Meetings were often organized between "old," experienced pilots and young ones; in them, battle-seasoned soldiers described their tactics of aerial combat and the unique features of the enemy's actions. Major requirements were also imposed on assimilation of radio communication and radio navigation resources. A young pilot was not credited with fulfilling an exercise if he performed it without the use of radio resources.²¹

After they finished their training, the crews were given the possibility to fly combat sorties. This was the most critical phase. It demanded well-conceived and consistent actions. The first combat sorties were organized especially carefully: The missions were stated clearly, the tactics were spelled out, and the lead groups were selected and prepared thoughtfully. The combat activities occurred in areas poorly covered by enemy antiaircraft resources, so that they would end successfully, without losses or with minimum losses. The causes of the latter were meticulously studied and analyzed, and the appropriate recommendations were made on this basis.

In 1942 and the start of 1943 losses in air corps of the RVMC were replenished by personnel from air regiments that had suffered considerable losses, and by freshly drafted air regiments. However, this method had significant shortcomings. Experienced flying personnel of reserve formations, ones who had learned the enemy's area of combat activities well, were placed out of action for a long period of time. Regiments sent to the rear were often subjected to fundamental reorganization, in view of which they lost their combat traditions. Following their replenishment, they were sent to another air formation in another sector.

Prior to December 1944 Headquarters reserves were replenished with personnel and materiel either in the course of combat activities as single crews arriving from reserve air regiments aboard their own airplanes, or at the rear airfields of the air armies (military districts). Beginning in January 1945 and until the end of the war, RVMC air corps were replenished only during the time of combat activities, and as individual crews.

Owing to this system for replenishing the losses, the personnel retained and accumulated their combat experience, they carefully preserved the combat traditions of their units, and they gained a better knowledge of the situation in the area of combat activities. All of this made it easier to solve the problems of breaking in the replenishments, and on the whole it had a favorable effect on the missions.

It should be noted that the training air regiments of the air armies also played a major role in flight crew training and in replenishment of losses.

RVMC air corps were as a rule taken out of the composition of the air armies in periods of relative quiet on the front. As an example a month and a half before the Belorussian operation 13 of the 28 air corps were in the reserves, while at the beginning of the operation only 4 corps were left in the reserves. Eleven air corps were replenished on 1 November 1944. By the winter campaign of 1945 all 28 air corps were at the fronts.²²

Thus the Great Patriotic War demonstrated quite convincingly that formation of RVMC air corps was a very important and complex measure. It required an extremely great amount of time (from 1 to 3 months), which the air force command did not always have. Therefore we must attentively study the experience of the Great Patriotic War today when dealing with problems associated with reducing the time to form air reserves.

The practice of the past war shows that the time for formation decreased dramatically when well trained commanders and flight crews were available. This says that we must always have trained aviation personnel for the event of war.

Experience showed that when RSMC air corps were formed, it was important not only to supply them with flight crews and equipment but also to prepare them for combat activities--that is, hammer the crews, subunits, units, and staffs together. Only after this could they effectively engage in combat activities. On the other hand whenever air formations were sent to the front immediately after being manned, they suffered considerable losses and their battleworthiness quickly declined.

Serious attention was turned in combat training to breaking in young flying personnel and initiating their combat careers, to organizing and conducting tactical flying conferences and exercises, to redeploying over great distances, and to teaching the crews to prepare their airplanes for flights to intermediate airfields. The methods for studying, generalizing, and publicizing combat experience and the means employed for replenishing losses in the aviation reserves had a positive effect upon the results of combat activities.

FOOTNOTES

1. For greater detail, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1976, pp 20-35; No 2, 1977, p 94-100.
2. TsAMO SSSR (Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense), f. 1 gv. shak, op. 532229, d. 1, l. 15.
3. Ibid., f. 35, op. 11321, d. 94, l. 232.
4. Computed by the author from TsAMO materials (RSMC air corps data).
5. TsAMO, f. 35, op. 11321, d. 93, ll. 312, 315, 322.
6. Computed by the author from TsAMO materials (RSMC air corps data).
7. Computed by the author from TsAMO materials (RSMC air corps data).
8. TsAMO, f. 4 bak, op. 176358, d. 7, l. 25.
9. Ibid., f. 1 gv. shak, op. 517105, d. 1, l. 2.
10. Ibid., f. 6 gv. bak, op. 517096, d. 4, l. 1-8.
11. Ibid., f. 1 gv. iak, op. 517117, d. 1, l. 11.
12. Ibid., f. 4 bak, op. 176361, d. 5, l. 35.

17. Ibid., f. 6 iak, op. 142701, d. 24, l. 4-10.
18. Ibid., f. 1 qv. shak, op. 210122, d. 2, l. 20.
19. Ibid., f. 7 shak, op. 917133, d. 26, l. 5.
20. Ibid., f. 35, op. 11321, d. 698, l. 175-176.
21. Ibid., f. 6 shak, op. 529977, d. 1, l. 122.
22. Computed by the author from TsAMO materials (NSHC air corps data).

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MARTINE OPERATIONS: FRONT COMMUNICATIONS IN THE VISTULA-ODER OPERATION

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(Article, published under the heading: "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Col Gen Signal Troops (Ret) I. Bulychev: "Communications of the First Ukrainian Front in the Vistula-Oder Operation")

(Text) During preparations for the Vistula-Oder operation the command and staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front devoted much attention to troop command and control. It was decided to bring all control posts as close to the front line as possible. On 6 January 1945 the greater part of the staff (the advance echelon) was redeployed to the location of the new command post of the frontal commander--the population center of (Bikhuv-Dush). The main communication center was deployed here as well. The staff's second echelon remained in Demba together with communication resources. The frontal commander's observation post was set up near the combat formations of the troops in a (fol'vark) located 6 km west of Stassov. It possessed all communication and control resources Marshal I. S. Konev would need for maintaining dependable communication with the command posts of the army and corps commanders operating in the main sector.

Before the offensive began the frontal staff and its communications directorate¹ did a significant amount of work to prepare the control organs and communication resources for the operation, with a consideration for a proposed rate of advance for the troops of up to 25 km per day.

By the beginning of the operation the frontal communications directorate had about 50 communications units at its disposal, to include two signal regiments. Their availability of communication resources was rather high. All units had combat experience. As with all soldiers of the front, the signalmen were politically enthusiastic, and their morale was exceptionally high: All of them were certain of a swift and final victory over fascist Germany, and they tried to make their contribution to it.²

During preparations for the operation special attention was turned to the preparedness of communication resources and personnel for the operation, and to development of the telegraph-telephone network.

Considering that the enemy might destroy many communication stations and lines on the territory of Poland and fascist Germany, and that his sabotage groups might attack our line subunits, the frontal staff attached great significance to intensified preparation of radio operators and radio communication resources for the forthcoming actions. They had to support troop command and control in the most complex conditions, including in the absence of wire communication. This is why the problem of finding ways to insure the continuity of the work of radio communication throughout the entire operation and to raise its capacity faced the frontal communications directorate, as well as all signalmen in frontal and army units, with special gravity. This problem had to be solved both by implementing additional organizational measures and by assimilating new equipment reaching the front by the beginning of the operation. For the first time the front received Baudot-radio apparatus, which was to be utilized not only to maintain communication with the General Staff and the tank armies (as for example in the L'vov-Sandomierz operation) but also to communicate with the staffs of all of the combined-arms armies. This was qualitatively new in the organization and maintenance of communication, and it required specialists with higher qualifications.

A special training ground was created deep in the rear as a place to work out the problems of interaction, training, and coordination in the work of frontal and army radio specialists. Here, Engineer-Colonel Ye. I. Aleksovskiy, deputy chief of the frontal communications directorate, assembled the commanders and technicians for training in proper organization and maintenance of communication with printing radiotelegraphy apparatus (Baudot-radio). Retraining courses for radio operators were organized at the front's signal regiments and radio battalions; more than 700 persons underwent training in these courses, on the job and during short breaks. Paratrooper-radio operators were also trained in these units for every mobile group staff.

For the first time in the front the crews of radio stations belonging to the ground troops were trained to work with their planes in the air in order to insure better communication between ground troops and aviation. In compliance with an order of the front commander, about 100 vehicle-mounted and tank radio stations from the staffs of the armies, corps, and divisions were brought together at a training ground created at the location of the signal regiment of the 2d Air Army, in the vicinity of Kolbuszowa. The training for the crews of these radio stations was conducted by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Terskiy, the 2d Air Army's deputy chief of communications. The best-trained pilots and infantry radio operators were recruited for him as teaching aides for the ground crews.³

The frontal communications directorate took steps to utilize possible jamming by the enemy and eliminate mutual interference resulting from the work of a large number of radio stations in an extremely small territory. The problem was that just the troops located at the Sandomierz beachhead alone possessed about 10,000 radio stations of varying power. Thus the need arose for complying strictly with radio discipline and carefully distributing the radio frequencies with a consideration for simultaneous operation of all radio stations.

Much work was done by line signal units to build wire communication lines. Thus prior to the start of the operation they built 700 km of new aerial telephone-telegraph lines. Moreover individual signal battalions and companies restored 1,060 km of high-capacity aerial telephone-telegraph lines, they suspended 2,160 km of wire on existing lines, they repaired 1,789 km of communication lines, and they set up hundreds of control and testing points and telephone control stations, while frontal and army signal regiments outfitted and deployed dozens of communication centers at command and observation posts. We can gain an idea of the total volume of just the line work done during the preparatory period from the following data: A total of 2,538 km of communication lines were placed into operation, and 462 km of underground cable and 22 km of aerial cable were restored.⁴

Considering the great suitability of making use of the underground cable communication network on German territory, the frontal communications directorate formed nonorganic cable companies and manned them with specialists, gathered from the frontal units, who had experience working with underground cable before the war.

Under the guidance of Colonel V. V. Svenigorodskiy, the front's first deputy chief of communications, line specialists underwent retraining at assemblies and special exercises, where they learned to build lines quickly at night, to suspend copper wire, and to dig holes for telegraph poles in frozen ground using explosives. In all, about 400 officers and 3,000 sergeants and enlisted men underwent retraining.

Because radio communication was the principal resource of troop command and control in the Vistula-Oder operation, it was given the main role in the planning of the command's communication.

The frontal staff had three channels of radio communication with the General Staff, two of which were serviced by printing apparatus; it maintained communication with the forward post of the frontal commander's directorate by two channels (one of them being a printing channel), and it communicated with the army staffs by three radio channels serviced by STar, Sever, and RAF radio sets.

Communications directorate liaison officers furnished with radio resources (radio link officers) were appointed to maintain communication between the frontal staff and the staffs of the individual corps. Radio communication was maintained with the staffs of neighboring fronts through networks and radio links organized by the Red Army Main Communications Directorate.

In addition to a frontal radio network, a number of special radio networks were created to support troop coordination; the radio stations of the staffs were included in these networks together with those of the operating major formations and formations. Communication was coordinated between the ground troops and aviation through liaison officers from the latter.

There were 40 receivers and 30 transmitters at the frontal staff's main communication center and at the center deployed at the commander's command post to support the planned radio networks.⁵

Experience acquired in other operations conducted earlier by the 1st Ukrainian Front was utilized to solve the problems of organizing multichannel radio communication. But there were innovations as well. For the first time, printed communication was maintained with the staffs of the combined-arms armies, using Karbid attachments to RAP-KV-5 radio sets.

The radio-telephone was the principal form of radio communication at the army and corps levels, at which low-power radio sets were broadly employed.

As far as organization of wire communication is concerned, the plan foresaw construction of a main artery and auxiliary frontal arteries of 12 conductors each, and 3 frontal four-conductor lateral lines. Up to 30 conductors were to be used for communication with the General Staff, the staffs of the 2d Air Army, the rear, and armies on the front's left wing, and with neighboring fronts.

The arteries servicing the armies were to have a capacity of five to six conductors for high frequency communication and for communication with their rear services and the frontal staff. The communication centers of the tank armies and separate corps were to be based on the arteries of the combined-arms armies.

Deployment of wire and radio communication centers for the frontal staff was fully completed by 5 January 1945. The centers were meticulously outfitted in engineering respects, and camouflaged. In the period from 7 to 12 January the frontal command covertly regrouped its troops in their forming-up places for the offensive, where the wire telegraph-telephone communication network was rather well branched. The communication centers in Bikhuv-Duzhi and Demba as well as small communication centers deployed for the frontal commander, the artillery commander, and the commander of the 2d Air Army in the vicinity of the fol'vark west of Stassow were tied in together to make up a single system. Therefore if need be, the frontal commander could use any of these communication centers. Army switchboards supported the communication needs of the corps and divisions.⁶ Thus before the offensive the frontal staff had the following forms of communication: with the General Staff--HF, telegraph, and radio (Baudot apparatus); with the army staffs--HF, telegraph (Baudot apparatus and SP-35), two telephone channels, three radio channels, and mobile resources (liaison airplanes); with the staffs of the separate corps--two channels of telegraph and telephone communication, and liaison airplanes; with the staffs of the neighboring fronts--HF, telegraph, radio, and liaison airplanes.

The wire communication between the command posts and observation posts of commanders was also dependable. Much attention was turned to providing

stable communication between the combined-arms and tank armies, and the tank and mechanized corps, as well as ground troops and aviation. As an example the 13th Army had telegraph and telephone communication with the staff of the 4th Tank Army and telegraph communication with the 2d Air Army's air corps (II Ground-Attack Air Corps and II Fighter Air Corps).⁷

After the front went over to the offensive on 12 January, wire communication remained stable for the first days of the operation, and radio communication was left almost completely unused at the operational levels. Construction of the main frontal communications artery, which had begun earlier, proceeded successfully. By as early as 17 January it was ready for operation in the Stassow-Chmelinik-(Yendsheyuv) section. Also by this time, construction and restoration of the front's first lateral line from Yendsheyuv north to Kielce (9 conductors) and south to Nieschow (8 conductors) was completed. Three days after the operation began, the frontal commander's communication center in the vicinity of Stassow was packed up. On 18 January the frontal staff moved to the vicinity of Yendsheyuv, which permitted the frontal command to establish dependable wire communication with the army staffs and the staff of the 1st Belorussian Front. By this time our troops, having defeated the main forces of the enemy's Army Group A, went over to swift pursuit of the enemy, which would not cease day or night. On certain days the rate of advance of the front's combined-arms armies attained 30-45 km, while that of the mobile troops reached up to 70 km. The army staff moved in jumps of 40-50 km.⁸ This made the work of the signalmen much more complex, and they were not always able to build the communication lines in time. The difficulties were also aggravated by the fact that due to absence of a continuous front of advancing troops, signalmen working on the lines were forced to repel attacks by large enemy groups attempting to penetrate West. Thus one of the companies of the 443d Separate Signal Battalion boldly went into combat with a large group of enemy infantry and tanks in the vicinity of (Kolybino). Despite the fact that the fascists had the larger forces, the Soviet soldiers would not let them pass.

It should be noted that the high rate of advance required accelerated construction of the communication routes. A decision was made to utilize the reserves of builders, and to reduce the number of conductors on each route. Experience showed, however, that this would not solve the problem. The frontal communications directorate issued an order to maintain communications along arteries, deploying auxiliary communication centers together with intermediate radio centers on these arteries at their intersections with lateral lines.

On 23 January the frontal staff moved to the vicinity of Czestochowa, where a communications center had already been deployed for the forward control post. Because the army staffs had advanced significantly and were 120-150 km away from the frontal staff, in a few days the need arose for redeploying the latter once again. On 31 January it was moved to the vicinity of (Shenval'd) (9 km north of (Kraytburg)). Discussing the stability of wire communication with the staffs of the major formations, I should emphasize that communication was nevertheless interrupted occasionally due to the high rate of advance of the armies. Although the efforts of all frontal and army signalmen

were mobilized to support this communication, the state of affairs did not improve. Examples of this may be found in the interruptions of communication with the staffs of the 3d Guards and 4th Tank armies.

There also were significant interruptions in direct telegraph communication with the General Staff. The posts of the Red Army Main Communications Directorate, which were located 20-25 km apart, were unable to promptly correct the damage. This is why special-purpose communication centers were even used for communication. Out of all of the wire communication resources, HF communication was the only type that worked dependably. Radio communication operated faultlessly throughout the entire operation. The Baudot-radio was the principal resource for exchanging operational information. Two such apparatus maintained uninterrupted communication with the General Staff. On some days the load handled by Baudot-radio apparatus attained up to 40,000-50,000 groups. Excellent radio communication was maintained with the 3d Guards Tank Army during its well-known maneuver in the rear of the enemy's Silesian grouping.

We can say in conclusion that the Vistula-Oder operation was one of the greatest and fastest operations of the concluding period of the war. It was distinguished by complexity of control, which stemmed primarily from the extensive use of mobile troops and aviation while pursuing the enemy at a high rate. In 23 days of combat activities, our troops advanced more than 500 km. The average rate of advance of the troops during pursuit of the enemy was 25 km per day for combined-arms armies and up to 40 km per day for tank armies. In this connection the army staffs had to move every 1-2 days. During the operation they changed their deployment areas 10-15 times. The frontal staff moved an average of every 5 days.

The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front and his forward control posts were always in front, organizing coordination and maneuvering major mobile formations in the enemy's defenses at operational depth. The commander had stable communication with the frontal staff, with the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and with the army (formation) staffs.

Understanding the full complexity of problems associated with organizing communications, the commander and the chief of staff rendered all assistance to the signalmen, frequently making note of their good work. It was on their recommendation that signalmen of the front, of a number of armies, of individual units, and of HF communications troops who had distinguished themselves the most were given honorable mention in orders of the Supreme High Command.¹⁰ Some signal units were awarded the honorary titles Czestochowa, Cracow, Katowice, Piotrkow, Kielce, and Dombrow by orders of the Supreme High Command for liberation of those Polish cities.

The following promoted successful execution of the missions of providing dependable communication to troop command and control in a complex combat situation: selfless devotion of soldier-signalmen to the motherland, their burning hatred of the enemy; the tremendous combat experience they acquired

In previous operations; availability of a large quantity of radio resources in the frontal signal troops. While the 1st Ukrainian Front had about 7,000 radio stations in 1943, there were more than 12,000 of them by the beginning of the Vistula-Oder operation. Moreover the attitude staff commanders and officers had toward radio resources changed. They could no longer even imagine working without radios. Introduction of the latter at the strategic and operational levels of control raised the stability of communication immeasurably, increased the traffic capacity of the radio channels, and dramatically reduced the time required to enter into communication.

We cannot fail to note the great significance of HF communication, which works with practically no interruptions at all. The efforts of not only special line communication units but also frontal and army signal units were directed at supporting its stability.

Communications in the course of the Vistula-Oder operation significantly reflected the experience of the large number of operations conducted by the 1st Ukrainian Front. Analysis of this experience will permit us to determine the state of signal troops in the last stage of the war, and determine the ways to develop the equipment further and improve troop training and communication organization methods.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the period described here the author of the article, I. T. Bulychev, was chief of the 1st Ukrainian Front's Communications Directorate.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 236, op. 2706, d. 278, l. 15-20.
3. TsAMO, f. 236, op. 2706, d. 278, l. 9.
4. TsAMO, f. 236, op. 2706, d. 278, l. 18, 19.
5. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1965, p 44.
6. TsAMO, f. 236, op. 2706, d. 279, l. 43.
7. Ibid., l. 44.
8. Ibid., l. 55.
10. Orders No 219, 220, 225, 227, 230, 237, 248, 251, and 261 of the Supreme High Command.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: MANCHURIAN OPERATION PREPARATIONS

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[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Lt Col Yu. Loskutov: "From the Experience of the Regrouping of the 292d Rifle Division in the Period of Preparing for the Manchurian Operation"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War provided us with highly rich, instructive experience in the regrouping of troops over great distances within short time. At the tactical level, the formations, units, and subunits performed marches to mass their men and equipment on the axis of the main thrust, when the direction of attack changed, when they reached the start lines for counterblows and counterattacks, when proceeding from one form of combat activities to another, for example from offense to defense, when committing their second and third echelons to combat, and so on.

Timely arrival of troops in the appointed area and in full combat readiness was always the main requirement of regrouping. It was satisfied through meticulous planning and competent organization of the marches, the high training level of the personnel, all-out support, dependable air cover, and continuous and firm control of men and equipment.

During the preparations for the Manchurian offensive operation, on the night of 8 July 1945 the 292d Rifle Division¹ (commander--Major General N. I. Polyanskiy, chief of staff--Lieutenant Colonel P. Ye. Solovey, chief of political affairs--Colonel S. D. Ivanov) received an order from the commander of the II Rifle Corps, Lieutenant General A. I. Lopatin, to perform a 300-kilometer march. The division was told to begin moving at the onset of darkness on 8 July, and to reach the concentration area by the morning of 19 July.²

Having received the mission, the division commander clarified it, brought it to the awareness of his deputies, sent a reconnaissance group out to reconnoiter the route to Khadabulak, issued preliminary instructions to the chief of staff on determining the time for organizing the march and preparing the units for movement, and he began on his estimate of the

situation. Personnel of the 292d Rifle Division were well prepared for actions in the Transbaykal, but they had no combat experience. As of spring 1945 more than 40 percent of its soldiers were engaged in logging, in the construction of supply dumps and in other jobs on front orders within a radius of up to 1,000 km.³ By this time the division staff had started taking steps to bring the personnel together, but due to overloading of rail transportation it was unable to fulfill its march orders at the moment it received them.

The division had its authorized quantities of combat equipment and armament. Motor transportation was in a worse situation. The vehicles were old and worn, having been operated previously in the national economy. Out of the 45 vehicles allowed by the equipment tables, the motor vehicle supply company had only 11. This is why the division command was forced to recruit many operational vehicles to move cargo. Mechanized traction of the artillery regiment consisted of 45 Nati tractors, which had a short range; the trailers were not furnished with pneumatic tires, and their cross-country performance was low.⁴ Cavalry was in satisfactory condition. The division was equipped with short but strong horses of a Mongolian breed, unpretentious and adapted to Transbaykal conditions.

The route the division was to take passed over a hilly, unforested plain with meager grass cover and a small number of water sources (rivers and streams disappearing into the steppes). Chains of hills (knolls) up to 1,000 meters high alternated with broad depressions. The climate was severely continental (hot days and cool nights, even at this time of the year). June was dry, and the grass on the hills was dry. Torrential rains fell in July. In summer 1945 they lasted an especially long time, and in some areas the roads became poorly passable. The lack of tree cover, save for sparse, low-growing brush, made it difficult to conceal the troops and provide fuel to prepare food.

The division commander meticulously analyzed all information (on the state of his troops, the routes, the nature of the terrain, and so on). In the time during which he estimated the situation and made his decisions, the unit and subunit commanders prepared their men and equipment for the march, replenished their ammunition, and fueled and lubricated their vehicles on the basis of the initial instructions they received. The personnel inspected the combat and transport vehicles, turning special attention to the condition of the brakes, running gear, and control mechanisms, and to the presence of trench-digging tools in the vehicles. Weapons, gas masks, and light camouflage, signaling, and communication resources were checked just as meticulously. Devices to brake vehicles and guns and to assist in surmounting steep ascents and descents, as well as various signs to mark cliffs and other dangerous places were prepared on priority in the subunits.

The preparations were made with a consideration for the fact that the march was to proceed over mountainous steppe-covered desert terrain. In the mountains atmospheric pressure drops, and the intensity with which water evaporates

from the cooling system of a motor vehicle and electrolyte evaporates from storage batteries rises. For this reason a reserve water supply was created for each vehicle, and the technical maintenance echelons of the subunits carried a reserve of electrolyte to insure normal engine operation during the march.

After estimating the situation and calculating the march parameters, the division commander wrote up his plan and allocated the missions to the units.

In view of the absence of parallel roads, the formation had to travel along a single route. The march formation was organized as follows: separate reconnaissance patrol, advance party consisting of a rifle company, followed by an advance guard consisting of a rifle battalion, the main forces of the rifle regiments, the artillery regiment, the rear guard, and the division's rear services. The main forces had to pass through the start point at 2200 hours. The entire route (300 km long) was divided into nine sections (30-35 km each--the length of the day's march). The average rate of movement was set at 4 km/hr for rifle regiments traveling on foot, and 20 km/hr for motor transportation. Movement was planned only for night-time in order to maintain covertness. The places of major and minor halts, the day's rest areas, and the traffic control points were determined.⁵

The division commander gave combat orders for the march covering only one marching day at a time. The regiments received the following missions: The 1,007th Rifle Regiment (commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Mironenko) traveled at the head of the division's column of march. The advance party and advance guard were allocated out of his forces, and the regiment's main forces traveled 4.5 km behind the advance guard. The division commander and staff followed this regiment; behind it, the 1000th (commander, Lieutenant Colonel I. S. Alyayev), and 1011th (commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Klimenko), rifle regiments and the 833d Artillery Regiment (commander, Major A. I. Pavlychenko) followed at 1-km intervals. All motor vehicles in the division were brought together in a separate column, taking their place behind the 833d Artillery Regiment. Two kilometers behind it traveled the rear guard represented by a rifle platoon from the 1011th Rifle Regiment, and the division's rear services traveled 10 km behind the latter.⁶

Due to a shortage of vehicles and the resulting impossibility of delivering all of the materiel and stores required by the forthcoming combat activities to the concentration area in a single trip, the division commander decided to leap-frog the supplies, utilizing all transportation centrally, to include the operational vehicles of the 861st Separate Tank Destroyer Battalion and the mortar batteries. Cargo unloading and temporary storage points were organized every 90-100 km of the route. This march formation and march schedule satisfied the evolved conditions and guaranteed timely execution of the mission.

After giving his orders the division commander spelled out the tasks of party-political work and issued thorough directives on march support. The formation staff wrote out the march plan, in which it devoted special

attention to particular forms of troop combat support such as reconnaissance (to include engineering), camouflage, engineering, rear, and technical support. A platoon-strength separate reconnaissance patrol was to be advanced 5 km ahead of the advance party. Combat engineers, chemists, and medics were assigned for specific tasks to subunits performing reconnaissance. The separate reconnaissance patrol had to acquire information on the terrain and on the condition of mountain roads, find poorly passable and dangerous sections of the route, seek out ways to detour them, find places for halts and for the day's rest, discover local resources and materials for road repairs, and determine the usability of water sources.

Much attention was devoted to troop camouflage and air defense. The open, treeless terrain made troop camouflage difficult. Therefore it was decided to march only at night, to make maximum use of the concealing properties of the terrain (depressions, gullies), and of organic and, especially, improvised resources for camouflaging the combat and transport vehicles, to comply strictly with sound and, especially, light camouflage, and to operate radio resources only in reception mode.

The units and subunits were covered against aerial enemy strikes by an anti-aircraft machinegun regiment, the platoons of which were attached to the rifle and artillery regiments. Air raid warning signals were established, continuous ring observation was organized in each column, and subunits and fire weapons were assigned to provide cover against low-flying targets. These subunits were brought together at the places of halts and the day's rest.

Engineering support to the march included conducting engineering reconnaissance, removing obstacles from the route, preparing cross-country tracks and keeping them passable, guiding troops through poorly passable road sections, and repairing bridges and roads. Moreover commanders of all ranks prepared timbers, boards, wheel track planks, mats, and netting to raise the passability of the equipment.

During the march preparations all materiel was fully replenished, the units were provided a five-day reserve of food and forage, and the vehicles and armament were subjected to technical maintenance. A technical maintenance echelon was created for the division's travel formation in order to repair and recover vehicles in distress; this echelon consisted of repair and evacuation resources, medical personnel, and vehicles carrying fuel and lubricants.

Trucks and tractors were to be refueled at places of minor halts and the day's rest. In order to increase the range of the equipment, each vehicle was to carry additional containers of fuel and oil, consumption of which increased significantly when crossing over hills and thawing ground. But due to a shortage of barrels in the division and little time to organize the march, this could not be done, and so the POL was carried by two or three vehicles, and the trucks were refueled directly.⁷

Traffic was regulated by control posts at the start point, at travel control points, and at places of halts and the day's rest. Road signs and markers painted white were broadly employed. Poorly passable road sections were marked by the simplest improvised signs showing the cross-country tracks and the route of travel. Guides knowing the terrain well and specially trained navigators were present at the head of each column and in the reconnaissance and security subunits.

The purpose of party-political work in the period of preparations for the march was to explain to the personnel the importance of employing all the forms of camouflage while present within the day's rest area, and of complying with the strictest secrecy in preparations for travel. All soldiers were mobilized for swift and competent maintenance of equipment, for organized travel of the subunits to the start point, and for a well organized march. In the morning of 8 July political affairs chief S. D. Ivanov held an orientation meeting for political workers and active party and Komsomol members, during which he stated and explained the main tasks of party-political work during the march. On that same day, party and Komsomol meetings were held in the regiments.

The drivers were prepared meticulously. Prompt arrival in the appointed regions depended in many ways upon them. The rules of driving in columns and compliance with light camouflage were worked out, and the unique features of the route were studied with them.

As a result of all of the steps taken by the commander, the staff, political workers, and all officers, the formation's personnel as well as its equipment and armament were prepared well for the march.

The division's units and subunits reached their start point on time, and they passed it at the time set by the order. The first section of the route, which was 35 km long, had a large number of ascents and descents, and it was one of the most difficult sections. The separate reconnaissance patrol and the advance party began moving somewhat earlier in order to achieve the required separation from the main forces. The columns moved only on the right side of the road, leaving the left side for the motor column carrying the cargo. The established speed and interval between subunits and vehicles were complied with strictly. In order that the established interval could be maintained, the vehicles were outfitted with lights illuminating the ground beneath each vehicle, while wagons carried specially manufactured devices (boxes bearing internally lit numbers, white panels), making it possible to see a column or vehicle up to 100 meters in front.

Vehicles in distress stopped on the right shoulder of the road, and after the problem was corrected they resumed their places in the column only at halting places. The first short halt, 30 minutes long, was scheduled to occur 2 hours after the march was initiated. By this time the column had extended itself out, and the subunits at the end of the column had to increase their speed to catch up with the lead vehicles. This took up to 20 minutes,

and personnel in vehicles lagging behind were unable to rest well or to complete all equipment inspections.

By 0800 hours on 9 July the division arrived at the area of its day's rest, where it remained until 2100 hours. The subunits and units dispersed themselves and deployed in a formation permitting them to leave the area quickly to continue the march. The personnel immediately began servicing, repairing, and fueling the equipment, eating, and resting.

During this time the reconnaissance groups of the units and subunits went out to scout the subsequent route of travel, the halting places, and the area of the next day's route. Each group contained a staff officer, one liaison officer from each unit (subunit), a chemical reconnaissance detachment, and combat engineers. Every reconnaissance group carefully studied the route, determined the places for halting or resting, and specified the location of combat and rear services subunits within them, and the approach routes and exits of these areas. The division staff organized the provost service for the next segment of the route during this time.

It should be noted that march discipline turned out to be inadequate during the first day's march. There were up to 150 persons lagging behind; these did not reach the day's rest area until 1400 hours. This was explained to a significant extent by the tiredness of the personnel, since a large number of them had already traveled 35-40 km during the day, just before the march began. In the second half of the day Major General N. I. Polyanskiy held a meeting of the unit commanders, in which he demanded better organization and assigned the missions to the regiments for the following day's march. The second day's march proceeded in more-organized fashion, and the number of persons falling behind dropped to 26.⁸

On 11 June at 0600 hours the division concentrated in its next rest area, where it remained for a day and a half. There were only 12 persons falling behind in the third day's march, and on subsequent days there were none at all. By this time the formation's units had already traveled more than 100 km, but some of the cargo was still in the old place. The shortage of motor transportation, which operated at maximum load, began to have its effect.⁹

Later the motor column carrying the cargo became more and more stretched out, and the vehicles worked harder and harder. Worn materiel failed, and in the absence of spare parts it broke down completely; the drivers were exhausted. Despite these difficulties the units continued to travel strictly according to schedule. As they moved forward the terrain became less familiar, orientation became more complex, and it became harder to find water sources. The planned day's rest areas had to be adapted depending on presence of water. Then began torrential rains, which ruined the road. Under these conditions the subunit commanders and the drivers were given instructions not to allow several vehicles to travel the same rut, and they were told to surmount poorly passable sections of the cross-country track evenly, at the same speed, without jumps and starts.

Because the terrain was monotonous over significant distances and offered few landmarks noticeable at night, difficulties arose in keeping the march oriented in the required direction. Under these conditions the subunit commanders had to carefully measure and record, on their maps, the distances to readily visible landmarks along the route (road intersections, population centers, rivers, and so on), while the vehicle crews (the drivers or vehicle chiefs) always knew from their speedometer readings how many kilometers they had traveled. This method of orientation made it possible to determine one's location precisely at any time (which was especially important in a night march).

The division commander and staff traveled in the column of the advance guard. To maintain covertness, control was based on light and sound signals. Commands (light signals) were quickly transmitted along the column from one subunit to the next, and they were executed immediately and precisely. Mobile communication resources (automobiles, motorcycles, mounted messengers) were extensively employed to transmit various sorts of instructions and to deliver reports. They were outfitted with special identifying marks, and they were permitted to overtake columns. A telephone network was deployed at every day's rest area. Throughout the entire march the division commander and staff successfully led the units and subunits, which passed through the traffic control points precisely on schedule, observing the established speed and order of travel; promptly at 0500 hours on 19 July 1945 they reached the concentration area at Urulunguy.

The narrow depressions and gullies north of Urulunguy provided good concealment from ground observation. These rather narrow gullies, flanked by high rocky ridges, each contained water sources sufficient to supply the troops. The division deployed itself compactly within them, and at the same time with sufficient covertness. Wire communication was set up between the division staff and the regiments, trenches and shelters for personnel and horses were dug, and camouflage measures were implemented. The shortcoming of the selected concentration area was that it was a significant distance away from the planned border crossing--the frontier village of Staro-Tsurukhaytuya. Therefore the units were advanced to the city of Chenotuy (45 km from Staro-Tsurukhaytuya) a day before the start of combat activities, and on the night they crossed the border they had to complete a forced march of 45 km, which exhausted the soldiers and subsequently reduced the rate of advance.¹⁰

Thus the division completed a march of 300 kilometers in organized fashion and on schedule, at night over roads ruined by torrential rains in mountainous steppe-covered deserts. The march was successful because the personnel had been prepared well for the several days' march. The soldiers learned to create shelters in the ground and camouflage horses and materiel quickly at halting places and at day's rest areas, officers and staff acquired the habits of organizing and planning lengthy marches, and they began managing their units and subunits more efficiently and competently, and utilizing a minimum quantity of transportation.

The division's experience in conducting a long march in the Transbaykal showed that the open nature of the terrain predetermined the choice of night-time for the march. In this case it was necessary to make sure that on arriving in the concentration area, there was enough time to dig shelters and trenches, so that the personnel and equipment would be dependably covered by daytime, and concealed from aerial and ground observation by the enemy. The numerous narrow depressions and gullies should also be used to conceal the troops. The entire disposition of the troops must be periodically inspected to reveal camouflage shortcomings.

When marching through desert-steppe and through unforested terrain over bad roads, special attention should be turned to maintaining the battleworthiness of the subunits and units, and keeping the vehicles in good technical condition. In order to keep the vehicle engines working reliably, the air cleaners must be rinsed and felt seals must be lubricated more often. When fueling and lubricating the vehicles, special attention should be turned to keeping dust and sand out of fuel tanks and out of the most important units and parts.

The experience showed that maximum traffic safety must be insured when marching in mountainous terrain. With this purpose the personnel should be moved faster when approaching a steep ascent, and the vehicles should descend without heeling or turning, so as to avoid slipping and upsetting of the equipment. On downgrades of up to 25 degrees, vehicles should be braked only by their engines, while steeper downgrades would require use of both the engine and the brakes.

It would be suitable to allocate infantrymen to each battery to render assistance to artillery and mortar subunits traveling roads through complex terrain. If vehicles (guns, mortars) must be halted on a steep ascent or descent, chocks (wedges, blocks, trail spades, or beams) carried aboard the vehicles must be placed beneath the wheels.

Night marches are typified by orientation difficulties; therefore to the extent possible it would be desirable to reconnoiter the route and organize the provost service beforehand, to furnish each column with guides and good navigators, to consider the presence of water sources when planning the march, and to scout these sources out. The march of the 292d Rifle Division showed that the Mongolian horses were well adapted to the Transbaykal; being unpretentious in their diet, they easily found food for themselves, even on sun scorched hills.

The experience of preparing the 292d Rifle Division for the march and the conduct of the march itself demonstrated that the effectiveness of the march depends on clear organization, planning, and control of the troops, prompt implementation of camouflage measures, strict observation of camouflage, and meticulous organization of reconnaissance, air defense, the provost service, party-political work, and traffic control. This experience is still valuable today.

FOOTNOTES

1. The 292d Rifle Division contained the 1007th, 1009th, and 1011th rifle regiments, the 833d Artillery Regiment, and special subunits. It was within the II Rifle Corps, 36th Army.
2. TsAMO USSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 1592, op. 1, d. 10, l. 2.
3. Ibid.
4. TsAMO, f. 1592, op. 1, d. 10, l. 1.
5. TsAMO, f. 1592, op. 1, d. 10, l. 4.
6. Ibid.
7. TsAMO, f. 1592, op. 1, d. 10, l. 30.
8. TsAMO, f. 1592, op. 1, d. 10, l. 4.
9. Ibid.
10. TsAMO, f. 1592, op. 1, d. 10, l. 5.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: PARTISAN ACTIONS AGAINST GERMANS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 29-35

(Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Candidate of Historical Sciences N. Azyasskiy: "On the Contribution of Partisans in the Rout of the Army Group 'Center'")

(Text) The assessment made in Soviet military historical literature of the contribution of partisan forces to the victory is often limited to the losses they inflicted upon fascist German troops in combat itself or in the course of sabotage activities, and it is not always completely revealed that concurrently with this, the partisans contained large forces of special troops, as well as regular units and formations intended for action at the front. I will attempt to fill in this omission to some extent, and demonstrate how the fascist German command was forced to remove men and equipment to protect lines of communication and military objectives, as well as to conduct special operations aimed at suppressing the partisan movement in the rear of Army Group Center.

As we know, the all-people's struggle in the enemy rear began literally in the first days of the war. According to data of Hitler's command, in just the first 3 months of the war the partisans destroyed 447 rail bridges, to include 117 in the rear of Army Group Center.¹ Moreover their aggressiveness increased, which troubled the fascist German command a great deal.

Describing the grave situation of rail transportation due to partisan sabotage, P. Halder, chief of general staff of the Wehrmacht's ground troops pointed out the "disastrous shipping situation" at the end of January 1942. Moreover an operational summary of Army Group Center dated 14 August of the same year stated: "According to reports from the 9th Army the situation in the vicinity of Rzhev is evolving unfavorably.... Communication with the army group's rear services is being complicated by partisan actions; presently rail traffic has been disrupted in all sections in the group's rear, except one. Some of the governor-general's troops will have to be brought in to fight the partisans."²

In order to better organize security of rear objectives and lines of communication the fascist German command divided the occupied Soviet territory into two zones. The territory from the forward edge of the front to the rear boundaries of the army groups was said to be the theater of war of the ground forces, which was in turn divided into operational zones and rear areas of the armies and army groups. The rest of the land was named the military administrative zone of occupation.

In the rear areas of the armies and army groups, all authority belonged to the corresponding command levels. The army and army group commanders had administrative organs and security troops at their disposal. The commandant of the army rear area was subordinated together with field and garrison commandant's staffs to the army commander, while the chief of the army group's rear area was subordinated to the army group commander together with the field and garrison commandant's staffs as well as security divisions and other special-purpose troops.

An analysis of German operational documents would show that the depth of the army rear areas does not exceed 200 km. All security, police, and other troops subordinated to the commandant of the army rear area made up the so-called rear corps (Koruck). There were four of them in Army Group Center by the end of 1942, one in each army. The corps composition varied. Thus the rear corps subordinated to the 2d Tank Army (Koruck-532) had, for example, three infantry divisions (German 707th, Hungarian 102d and 108th), two regiments (the 38th Infantry Regiment and the Dessa Military Police Regiment), two groups, three separate security battalions, and two armored trains. By mid-October 1942 security was being maintained in the rear army areas of Army Group Center by four divisions, 23 separate security battalions, an artillery battalion, and a number of artillery, combat engineer, and transport subunits.

The rear area of Army Group Center, which embraced a strip 200-300 km deep behind the army rear areas, and the lines of communication were protected and partisans were fought by four security divisions (201st, 203d, 221st, and 286th) and troops subordinated to the Smolensk commandant (501st Security and 13th Military Police regiments) and to the commander of the SS troops, and military police (1st Motorized SS Division, 14th Military Police Regiment, and four security battalions). The strength of the security division (three to five security or infantry regiments) attained 9,000-12,000 men.

However, this was clearly not enough men and equipment to insure the security of the rear areas. In the beginning of September 1942 representatives of the quartermaster-general of Army Group Center's ground forces command reported: "Limitations and interference in rail traffic elicited by partisan sabotage activities have attained such proportions that continuation of the present supply of all types of food to the army group is being placed under question." They suggested, as an extraordinary measure, to use personnel of rear units in the main command's reserve, and in rear services quartered along the Minsk-Smolensk rail trunkline.

At the tactical level (corps--division) forces were also allocated both to fight the partisans and protect rear objectives. These functions were basically performed by motorized battalions, cavalry squadrons, security companies, and other subunits contained within organic formations. As an example in mid-October 1942 19 companies were assigned to this work from the composition of the 4th Army's XII and XLIII army corps and the LVI Tank Corps.

The great scope of partisan sabotage activities on the railroads forced Hitler's leadership to transfer, in October 1942, two field training divisions (the 390th and 391st) from Germany to the commander of Army Group Center. In addition to performing training tasks, some of these formations protected rail lines of communication and participated in the "pacification" of occupied areas. On instructions from the Wehrmacht's supreme high command, reserve divisions and air force training and reserve units began to be used to some extent in the protection of the railroads.

In February-March 1943 the quantity of security formations within Army Group Center increased in connection with inclusion of the 2d Field Army, in the composition of which the Hungarian 1st and 201st security divisions and the 105th Light Infantry Division operated.

Viewing all security measures as passive methods of the fight against the partisans, the invaders tried to free some of the troops for active offensive actions against the partisans by making engineering improvements on fortifications and strongpoints in the rear areas, and other measures. Initially the fascist German command tried to make do with just forces allocated specifically for this purpose. However, it soon had to commit significant numbers of additional troops to combat, use of which had not been planned formerly. Thus in May-June 1942 Hitler's command conducted two major operations east of Smolensk against partisans and Soviet Army units in the rear of Army Group Center: operation Zeidlitz against units of the I Guards Cavalry Corps and partisan formations operating together with it, and operation Hannover against units of the IV Airborne Corps and partisan detachments. Six infantry and two tank divisions took part in the former, and the XLVI Army Corps and the XIX Tank Division took part in the latter.⁸

In the end, the fascist formations managed to push Soviet troops and partisan formations out of the occupied areas, but this was achieved by distracting major forces and resources from the front.

The struggle against partisans was officially made the responsibility of the ground forces general staff beginning in August 1942 by decision of the fascist German leadership. A directive from Hitler dated 18 August stated: "The chief of general staff of the ground troops bears the responsibility for fighting the bands⁹ within the zone of combat activities of the ground troops. Not only units allocated by the command of the ground troops but also police forces within the zone of combat activities are to be transferred to the appropriate troop commanders for these missions."¹⁰ Thus the fight against the partisans transformed from that time on into an independent and

inseparable part of the combat activities of Army Group Center. By as early as August and the first half of September 1942, the staff of Army Group Center planned and conducted 19 punitive operations, in which a sum total of about 50 battalions specially trained in the tactics of partisan warfare participated.

Development of the mass partisan movement in occupied regions forced the fascist command to devote increasingly greater attention to the security of rear services and lines of communication. Plans for a number of punitive operations were written by the group staff and by subordinated staffs. Thus from 25 January to 8 February 1943 the staff of the German 9th Army performed operation Sternlauf ("Star Run") against the Vadinskiy brigades--one of the main groupings of the Smolensk partisans (five partisan brigades and several separate detachments with a total strength of about 2,600 men), based in the forest west of the Durovo-Vladimirskiy Tupik railroad.¹²

The commander of the XLI Tank Corps led the punitive actions. An SS cavalry division and four operational groups were included within the grouping; the operational group consisted of rear security units, and field units and subunits removed from the front.¹³ As a result Hitler's command was able to weaken the scope of the partisan struggle in the vicinity of Vadinskiy Forest for only a short time; commitment of regular units to the operation, meanwhile, weakened the enemy grouping on the Rzhev-Vyaz'ma salient.

In January-February 1943, during the time of intense combat in the Orel and Kurak sectors, the command of Army Group Center, troubled by the situation in the rear areas, was forced to use part of its forces in operations against other partisan groupings. During this period, for example, the following operations were conducted: Klette-II (Burdock-II) against partisan detachments in Kletnya Forest, Eisber (Polar Bear) against Kurak partisans in the rear of the 2d Tank Army, and Schneehase (Snowshoe Hare) and Waldwinter (Winter Forest) against Belorussian and Kalinin brigades fighting in the rear of the 3d Tank Army.

In operation Klette-II (in distinction from sternlauf), the fascist German command tried to make do with the forces of just security and military police troops, but it did make extensive use of artillery, and of reconnaissance and of bomber aviation. Units of the 707th Infantry and 221st Security divisions, the 727th Security Regiment, two separate security battalions, three artillery battalions, the subunits of two air regiments, and a number of military police formations were committed¹⁴ against the three Kletnya brigades, the 5th Vorga Brigade, the Chernigov formation, and several separate detachments and groups (up to 8,500 men in all).¹⁴

However the partisan detachments, which would not commit themselves to protracted combat with a numerically superior enemy, managed not only to maintain their battleworthiness but also do significant damage to the punitive forces. The fascists lost more than 1,700 enlisted men and officers just killed alone.

The struggle against the partisans attained its highest pitch during preparations by the Germans for Operation Citadel, upon which they laid high hopes. In order to insure successful conduct of the offensive in summer 1943, the fascist German command conducted a number of preliminary punitive operations in the vicinities of Bryansk, Vitebsk, Bobruysk, and Mogilev.¹⁶ The largest was an operation with the code name "Gypsy Baron" (17 May--8 June) against partisan forces deployed in the forests of Bryansk (see diagram).

The Germans strengthened defenses along the Desna and created security screens along the Bryansk-Lokot' railroad and the Revna and Navlya rivers using units of the Hungarian 102d Infantry Division, the 221st Security Division, the 4th Tank Division, and the 442d Special-Purpose Division.¹⁷ Units removed from the Orel and Komarichi sectors participated. In mid-May they concentrated in the vicinity of Navlya. In addition to the formations named above, the 7th and 292d Infantry, 10th Motorized, and 18th Tank divisions, a composite regiment from the 137th Infantry Division, and the 459th Infantry Regiment of the 251st Infantry Division took part in the operation; on 17 May they occupied their forming-up place along the line of railroads connecting Bryansk, Navlya, and Lokot', south of the edge of Bryansk Forest.¹⁸ In sum total, the Germans concentrated up to nine divisions--that is, essentially an entire army group--against the Bryansk partisans. Moreover, aviation was called in.


The fascists attacked partisans operating in the forest south of Bryansk with all of these forces. The partisan grouping consisted of 11 brigades, a tank battalion, 2 artillery battalions, and a flight of PO-2 airplanes (about 14,000 men). They were led by the Combined Partisan Brigade Headquarters (chief of staff, D. V. Yemlyutin).¹⁹

According to data of the central staff of the partisan movement, following operation Gypsy Baron the enemy lost 3,952 men killed, wounded, and captured. The partisan losses (killed, wounded, and missing in action) were 2,096 men.²⁰

The major operation against partisans in the Bryansk Forest ended generally unsuccessfully for the enemy, since the main objective--annihilating them--remained unsatisfied. The staff of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command was forced to admit this in its report.²¹

In addition to operation Gypsy Baron, the staff of Army Group Center planned and implemented, almost simultaneously, operations Nachbarhilfe (Aid Th; Neighbor) against Kletnya partisans (see diagram) and Freischutze (Free Marksman) against Dyat'kova partisans. To conduct these operations, in the second half of April 1943 the staff of Army Group Center hastily removed two infantry divisions (the 6th and the 98th) from the front of the 4th Army, and sent them to fight the partisans after replenishing and making brief preparations.

The command of the 2d Tank Army used the 6th Infantry Division, part of the forces of the 5th Tank and 707th Infantry divisions, and the 455th Separate



Plans of the fascist German command to defeat partisan forces in the vicinity of Bryansk: Operations Gypsy, Baron, Aid Thy Neighbor, and Free Marksman (May-June 1943)

Key:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Legend | 4. Line of enemy strongpoints |
| 2. Deployment areas of main partisan groupings | 5. Direction of thrusts in the first phase of the operation |
| 3. Forming-up places of enemy divisions, regiments, and regimental groups prior to the operation | 6. Direction of thrusts in the second phase of the operation |

Special-Purpose Regiment in operation Freischutze against the Rognedin, Dyat'kovo, Bytosh' brigades and several detachments (more than 3,000 men in all) operating in the forest north of Bryansk. The Germans launched the 98th Infantry Division and part of the forces of the 221st Security and 707th Infantry divisions against the Kletnya partisans (about 5,000 men).²² Seven regimental groups were created out of these troops; by their simultaneous actions, the enemy hoped to encircle and annihilate the partisans in an area 15-20 km southwest of Kletnya. Aviation was also called in for the operation (it lasted until 22 June).

Operation Nachbarhilfe ended in complete failure. About two enemy divisions chased about the Kletnya Forest for a long period of time without results, thousands of mortar and artillery shells were fired at deserted areas, and hundreds of tons of bombs were dropped on the forest and population centers, inflicting insignificant losses upon the brigades. In the course of combat, regular Reich units suffered serious losses in men and equipment on forest trails and roads. Nor did operation Freischutze produce the desired results.

Partisans made a great contribution to the defeat of Army Group Center in summer 1944.

The actions of national avengers in the rear of Army Group Center were predominantly offensive in nature during this year. By summer there were almost 150,000 partisans on Belorussian territory. They controlled a significant part of the republic. The partisans struck mainly the enemy's lines of communication. A brilliant example can be found in the operation conducted by Belorussian partisans to demolish rails on a major scale on the eve of the offensive of our troops in June 1944. During June, Soviet patriots derailed 230 enemy trains carrying troops and combat equipment, and they destroyed dozens of enemy garrisons and unit and formation headquarters.

The fascist German command was forced to allocate sizeable forces to the fight against the partisans, and to maintain the security of its lines of communication. Thus out of 11 divisions in the reserve of Army Group Center and its armies, most were contained by the struggle against the partisans.^{22a} Moreover the army and corps commands had to allocate individual units to protect lines of communication and fight Soviet partisans. All of this weakened the enemy grouping in Belorussia and facilitated the actions of our regular troops.

Thus the actions of partisans in the rear of Army Group Center significantly influenced the course and outcome of combat on the front. Utilizing various forms and methods of combat, the partisans systematically inflicted significant losses upon fascist German troops, weakening their forces and reducing their battleworthiness.

To insure security in rear areas, at the beginning of the war the fascist German command allocated nine security divisions, of which Army Group Center

received three. However, this was found to be not enough, and the command of Army Group Center was forced to commit more and more new forces into the fight against the partisans. As early as mid-October 1942 nine divisions, three regiments, and 27 separate battalions (about 12 percent of the group's combat strength) were operating permanently in the rear of Army Group Center and in the rear areas of armies contained within it. In spring 1943, during intense preparations for the offensive in the vicinity of Kursk, the number of troops called in to fight the partisans attained its greatest size. In all, there were 13 divisions²³ and several separate units permanently protecting lines of communication and fighting partisans in the rear of Army Group Center; this was about 15 percent of the quantity of standard divisions within Army Group Center. Moreover troops intended for action in the Kursk sector--parts of four infantry divisions (6th, 7th, 98th, 292d) and four tank and motorized divisions (4th, 5th, 10th, 18th)--periodically participated in punitive operations.

The failures of punitive operations against partisans and the continually increasing scope of the partisan struggle had a negative effect upon the morale of the fascist German troops. General H. Guderian, former chief of general staff of Germany's ground forces, subsequently wrote that "as the war assumed a protracted nature and the fight on the front became more and more stubborn, the partisan war became a true scourge, severely influencing the morale of the soldiers on the front."²⁴

A fuller illumination of the contribution made by partisan forces to the defeat of fascist German troops on occupied Soviet territory would help us to better reveal the well known premise that the struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear was an all-peoples struggle, and that it had important operational-strategic significance.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hesse, E., "Der Sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg 1941-1944," Gottingen, 1969, p 84.
2. "Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940-1945" (referred to hereinafter as KTB/OKW), Vol 2, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1963, p 587.
3. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1961, pp 483-484.
4. On Himmler's instructions, beginning in July 1942 partisan detachments were referred to in official documents as bands.
5. "Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht," Frankfurt-am-Main, 1962, p 203.

12. Partarkhiv Smolenskogo obkoma KPSS, [Party Archives of the Smolenskaya Oblast CPSU Committee], f. 8, op. 1, d. 370, l. 2.
13. TsAMO [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 6598, op. 12454, d. 3071 (chart).
14. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945," Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1964, p 474.
15. TsAMO, f. 6598, op. 12454, d. 615 (diagram).
16. Ibid., d. 3144 (chart).
17. Ibid.
18. TsPA IML [Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism], f. 69, op. 1, d. 109, l. 98.
19. Bryanskii partiynyy arkhiv [Bryansk Party Archives] (subsequently referred to as BPA), f. 1650, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 313-315.
20. TsPA IML, f. 69, op. 1, d. 71, l. 32 ob.; d. 790, l. 176.
21. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], Vol 7, Voenizdat, 1976, p 311.
22. TsAMO, f. 1650, op. 12454, d. 3144 (chart).
- 22a. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945," Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1962, p 167.
23. These included six security divisions (German 201st, 203d, 221st, and 286th, and Hungarian 1st and 201st), three Hungarian light infantry divisions (102d, 105th, and 108th), two field training divisions (390th and 391st), the 442d Special-Purpose Division, and the German 707th Infantry Division.
24. "Itogi vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Results of the Second World War], translated from German, Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1957, p 126.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: VISTULA-ODER OPERATIONS REVIEWED

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(Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials," by Col S. Alferov: "The Vistula-Oder Operation")

(Text) The Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation (12 January--3 February 1945), conducted by Soviet troops jointly with the Polish 1st Army (commander, General S. G. Poplavskiy), resulted in the liberation of considerable Polish territory, to include Warsaw, and part of Czechoslovakia, the crossing of a number of water obstacles including the Oder, and attainment of a line 60 km from Berlin. As a result the conditions were created for capturing the capital of fascist Germany. Thirty-five enemy divisions were annihilated and 25 suffered severe losses (50-70 percent of the personnel and armament) in the operation.

The offensive of the Soviet Army on the Vistula rescued the Anglo-American troops from total defeat in the Ardennes. Acting in cooperation with troops of the left wing of the 2d Belorussian Front (commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. K. Rokossovskiy) and the right wing of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander, Army General I. Ye. Petrov), the fronts participating directly in the combat activities--1st Belorussian (commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian (commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev)--surmounted seven lines of defense prepared by the enemy, disposed to a depth of 500 km and including many cities and fortresses made ready for prolonged defense.

The operation was typified by great scope: The troops advanced in a wide swath to a depth of up to 500 km at an average rate of up to 25 km per day. The forces participating in it included 2.2 million men supported by 33,500 guns and mortars, 7,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 5,000 airplanes. Even P. Mellentin, one of Hitler's generals, declared: "It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe had never witnessed anything similar since the fall of the Roman Empire."¹

The brilliant preparations for and conduct of the Vistula-Oder operation were a great contribution to development of Soviet art of war. The command managed to conceal the concept of the operation, the quantity of men and equipment, and the time the fronts were to go over to the offensive from the enemy, thus attaining surprise in the first strikes. This became possible owing to competent implementation of operational camouflage measures. Three days before the beginning of the Vistula-Oder operation Hitler declared the following in this regard: "...I do not believe that the Russians would attack at all."¹

A high degree of massing of men and equipment on the axes of the fronts' main strikes was achieved in the operation: more than 75 percent of the combined-arms and up to 90 percent of the tank and mechanized major formations and formations; from 75 (1st Belorussian Front) to 90 percent (1st Ukrainian Front) of the artillery.² All of these forces and resources were utilized in breakthrough sectors, which made up 15 percent of the frontal zones; a tenfold superiority over the enemy in infantry, artillery, and tanks was attained in these sectors, and 230-250 and more guns and mortars and 80-115 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in each kilometer.³

A high rate of penetration of the tactical zone of the enemy's defenses was typical of the operation: over 20 km per day for the 1st Belorussian Front, and from 15 to 20 km per day for the 1st Ukrainian Front. Such impressive results were the result of the high effectiveness of artillery fire, good maneuverability of men and equipment, powerful strikes by infantry and tanks, and close and continuous interaction among all arms and services. In general, the rate of advance in the operation was 25 km per day, sometimes attaining up to 45 km in combined-arms formations and 70 km per day in mobile troops. In 5-6 days the armies executed their missions to a depth of 150-180 km, advancing in combat up to 30 km per day and pursuing the enemy to the Oder without pauses. The pursuit was waged on individual axes along a broad front, and around the clock. The decisive role was played in this case by the swift and resourceful actions of forward detachments, which were responsible for the capture of subsequent lines of defense, the crossing of water obstacles on the move or after brief preparations, the blockade of major garrisons, and the defeat of the enemy in parts.

Extensive maneuvering of the troops was another typical feature of the operation. The goal of maneuvering was as a rule to foil the counterstrikes being prepared by the enemy against the flank and rear of the front (army), and to reach the enemy rear and create the threat of encirclement of major enemy groupings. An instructive example of maneuver can be found in the 3d Guards Tank Army's attainment of the west border of Polish Silesia, which forced the enemy to hastily retreat through a corridor intentionally left open between our troops, and to surrender the industrial region.

The command placed its main emphasis in the tactics of combined-arms combat upon raising the striking power of the troops. This was attained mainly by reducing the size of the zones (sectors) of advance on the axes of the main

strikes (down to 500 meters for a rifle battalion, 0.7-1.0 km for a regiment, 1.2-2.5 km for a division, and 2.5-3.0 km for a corps)⁴, and by disposing the combat formations of the units and formations in several echelons. Reconnaissance in force on the day of the general offensive and support of rifle battalions earmarked for action by a single moving barrage were tactical innovations differing from the tactics of 1944. This intensified the element of surprise and created favorable conditions for penetration of the tactical zone of enemy defenses throughout its entire depth. Tank brigades and companies were now broken down into companies (formerly they had been used en masse) which were attached to rifle battalions for their support throughout the entire depth of the enemy defenses. Self-propelled artillery regiments were broken down into batteries, which operated behind the tank companies. Such use of tanks and self-propelled guns made it possible to establish closer interaction between them and infantry, and it imparted greater independence to rifle subunits in the execution of their missions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Melentin, F. O., "Tankovyye srasheniya. 1939-1945 gg." [Tank Engagements. 1939-1945], Moscow, 1957, p 280.
- 1a. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], Vol 10, Voenizdat, 1979, p 65.
2. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1959, p 160.
3. "Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Wars and the Art of War], Voenizdat, 1970, p 314.
4. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе 1941-1945," Vol 4, p 163.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: RESULTS OF EAST PRUSSIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 44-46

[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials," by M. Alekseyev: "The East Prussian Operation"]

[Text] The East Prussian strategic offensive operation was conducted from 13 January to 25 April 1945 by troops of the 2d and 3d Belorussian fronts and part of the forces of the 1st Baltic Front in cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The 2d Belorussian Front was commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy, the 3d Belorussian Front was under the command of Army General I. D. Chernyakhovskiy and, as of 20 February, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, the 1st Baltic Front was commanded by Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was commanded by Admiral B. F. Tributs. The operation had great military-political significance. Soviet troops captured East Prussia and liberated part of the northern regions of Poland, thus supporting military activities on the Berlin axis from the north. With the loss of East Prussia, fascist Germany was deprived of one of the important economic regions of the country. Twenty-five fascist divisions were annihilated, and 12 enemy divisions suffered heavy losses. The basing conditions for ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet improved, the enemy's marine lines of communication were totally interdicted, and it became extremely difficult for him to supply his Kurland grouping blockaded in the northern Baltic.

From the standpoint of the development of Soviet art of war, our forces gained experience in planning, organizing, and conducting a strategic offensive by groups of fronts, naval forces, and aviation on a maritime axis. In addition to creating powerful strike groupings, the necessary forces were allocated with the goal of broadening the offensive on the flanks. Completion of the breakthrough and its exploitation were assigned not only to army reserves and mobile groups but also to the second echelon of the 3d Belorussian Front--the 11th Guards Army (commander, Lieutenant General K. N. Galitskiy). As a result of this, the daily rate of advance attained 15 km and more for rifle formations and 22-36 km for tank formations.

Also deserving of attention is the experience of encircling the enemy with a pincer movement with the goal of pressing him against the Baltic Sea and the bays in the vicinity of Konigsberg. The encircled groupings were annihilated in succession. Actions by our troops aimed at liquidating each of them made up separate operations fitting within the overall concept of the strategic offensive. These operations were preceded by meticulous preparations lasting from 3 to 19 days. In this case much attention was devoted to troop regrouping. Thus five combined-arms armies were regrouped in the short time preceding annihilation of the Konigsberg grouping; of these armies, three marched distances from 100 to 160 km in 3 to 4 nights.

Long-range aviation operated in daytime for the first time in the assault of Konigsberg.

In the East Prussian operation our troops acquired experience in surmounting highly reinforced, deeply disposed zones of defense, and in assaulting cities.

One of the documents generalizing the experience of using assault groups is presented below.

From a Short Summary Generalizing the Experience of the 47th Army
in February 1945, "...Actions of Assault Groups"

...army troops tried to create assault groups of small size, though increasing their fire and striking power. Assault groups consisted of 15-20 riflemen, a group of flame operators (three or four pack flamethrowers), one or two self-propelled guns, two 76-mm regimental or 45-mm guns, one or two 76-mm divisional artillery guns, and a group of combat engineers (four or five men)....

Assault groups used the following tactics in the street battles of Schneidemuhl: Before the attack began, the assault group's artillery subjected houses containing gun positions to direct fire. Under the cover of artillery fire, riflemen rushed the houses, broke into them, and annihilated the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, clearing the houses out and moving forward.

The actions of the assault groups were covered by fire from light, medium, and antiaircraft machineguns mounted in house attics and building rooms; their fire was concentrated on the enemy's communication trenches and observed embrasures.

The assault groups were given strictly limited missions--capturing an individual house, and in some cases several houses.

Assault groups consisting of five to seven riflemen and one or two combat engineers justified themselves completely...in the blockade and capture

of the enemy's earth and timber pillboxes and permanent strongpoints. The tactics of the small assault groups boiled down to the following: The route of movement to the gun position was studied in daylight hours, and with the onset of darkness or by concealed approaches in daylight, the group crawled to the pillbox unnoticed by the enemy. Combat engineers carrying high-explosive charges advanced to the embrasure, two riflemen carrying grenades reached the door of the pillbox, and the rest observed the latter, ready to repel the enemy, should he appear.

Laying a high-explosive charge in the embrasure, the combat engineers detonated it, causing the pillbox garrison to rush for the exit; as soon as the door opened, the riflemen tossed their grenades into the pillbox and annihilated the resisting Germans....

Lieutenant Colonel Borokin,
Deputy Chief of the Operations Section, 47th Army Staff.

Lieutenant Colonel Khomenko,
Chief, Division for Utilization of War Experience,
Operations Section, 47th Army Staff.

12 March 1945

Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, f. 233, op. 2356, d. 23,
ll. 474, 480-485.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: SAKHALIN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 46-48

[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials," by Capt 1st Rank V. Sologub: "The North Pacific Flotilla in the South Sakhalin Offensive Operation"]

[Text] During the war with imperialist Japan, the North Pacific Flotilla (commander--Vice Admiral V. A. Andreyev, military council member--Major General of Shore Service G. P. Zaytsev, chief of staff--Rear Admiral I. I. Baykov) was within the composition of the Pacific Fleet, and in operational respects it was subordinated to the 2d Far East Front. It coordinated its actions with the LVI Rifle Corps, 16th Army (corps commander--Major General A. A. D'yakonov) in the offensive operation to liberate South Sakhalin.

The North Pacific Flotilla had within its composition the escort vessel "Zarnitsa", 3 minelayers, 49 torpedo boats, 18 minesweepers, 9 submarines, 3 large and 4 small submarine chasers, and a large number of small vessels (inshore minesweepers, patrol boats, etc.), several batteries of coastal artillery, and the 365th Separate Marine Infantry Battalion. Its air arm contained more than 250 airplanes. The main forces were at the main base. As early as on 28 June 1945 the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command worded the principal mission of the 16th Army in its Directive No 1 to the troop commander of the Far East Front (beginning 5 August 1945 it was called the 2d Far East Front): "...stubbornly defend the island of Sakhalin, prevent Japanese invasion of our territory on the island, and prevent the landing of Japanese troops on the coast of Sakhalin....".

In the morning of 11 August the 16th Army went over to the offensive, and the South Sakhalin operation began. The North Pacific Flotilla participated actively in it. Back in the night of 10 August the flotilla's aviation (commander, Major General of Aviation G. G. Dzyuba) reconnoitered a number

* Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, f. 3, op. 11556, d. 18, l. 178.

of points on South Sakhalin and bombed the ports of Toro and Esutoru. During 11, 12, and 13 August aviation increased the power of its strikes against military objectives on South Sakhalin. Surmounting growing resistance by Japanese units, amphibious troops landed and captured several population centers. The battle for the city of Yama-Sigay, which lasted about 4 hours, was especially fierce. Following artillery preparation, the amphibious forces swiftly broke into the city and engaged in street combat. The Japanese lost more than 130 enlisted men and officers in the battles. On 17 August our troops liberated Yama-Sigay, advanced swiftly toward Esutoru, and occupied it on the same day. Thus having captured a significant beach-head in the Toro-Esutoru area, the North Pacific Flotilla cut all of the enemy's lines of communication on the west coast of Sakhalin. Soviet troops were now able to exploit the offensive more successfully.

Data published below from Operation Order No 07/op dated 18 August 1945 attest to the good organization of the assault landing at the port of Macka, which was performed in an extremely complex meteorological situation (thick fog) in the face of intense enemy counteractions. On 20 August the city and port of Macka were taken, the city of Putomata was occupied on 23 August, Khonto was occupied on the 24th, and Otonari was taken on the 25th.

Instructions to ships of the assault force participating in the amphibious assault, published below, helped the ship commanders to execute their missions. The North Pacific Flotilla made its preparations for the amphibious landing at ports of South Sakhalin. According to the plan, the first assault party was to be landed at the port of Esutoru, after which it was to cut off the road along the island's west coast. But the flotilla staff did not possess sufficient intelligence on the enemy's defense system and forces at the port. Reconnaissance by aviation and ships was extremely difficult due to the perpetual fog and low cloud ceiling. Therefore the flotilla command decided to land the assault party not at Esutoru but at the closer port of Toro.

On 18 August the flotilla's ships landed the 365th Separate Marine Infantry Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 113th Rifle Brigade at the port of Toro. The landing was commanded by Captain 1st Rank A. I. Leonov, and the commander of the amphibious assault force was Lieutenant Colonel K. P. Tavkhutdinov. The landing was unique in that the ships had to cross the sea in the presence of up to 5-point winds and a visibility of less than 1 cable. The amphibious landing was covered and supported by the flotilla's aviation (80 airplanes). The assault landing commander was aboard the escort vessel "Zarnitsa."

Unique features of the amphibious assault conducted during the time of the South Sakhalin operation were: short preparation time; significant separation of ships and aviation from their bases and airfields; complex weather conditions during the crossing (winds up to 5 points, fog, visibility less than 1 cable); intense enemy counteractions during the landing.

The success of the amphibious forces was promoted by well conceived preparation of men and equipment, meticulous planning of their combat activities,

detailed writing of combat documents, and well organized coordination of ground troops, ships, and aviation.

Excerpt From Operation Order No 07/op
Headquarters, Amphibious Landing Commander

18.50 hours, 18 August 1945

Escort Vessel "Zarnitsa"

...2. The troops of the 16th Army have reached the vicinity of Keton. The flotilla's amphibious forces have captured a beachhead in the Toro-Esutoru area, and they are holding it.

3. The amphibious landing commander has been given the following mission: Begin landing the first wave of amphibious forces with small and large submarine chasers right at the port and at the south basin of Macka at 0450 hours on 20 August 1945. Capture the port, and begin landing the first and second echelons of the amphibious forces at the port and at the southern basin.

The details of the mission are: Cross the assault landing ships from Sovgavan' to the port of Macka in the period from 0700 hours, 19 August to 0450 hours, 20 August, and begin landing the amphibious forces at the port and at the southern basin of Macka starting at 0450 hours, 20 August, with the following support:

Artillery fire from ships of the fire support detachment are to suppress enemy gun positions....

The port and basin are to be captured by the first wave of amphibious forces landed by small and large submarine chasers at the port and at the southern basin of Macka; these forces are to prepare the beachhead for the landing, after which subsequent echelons of the amphibious forces are to be landed.

Orders:

A. Commanders of ships in the fire support detachment are to suppress enemy gun positions by high-power artillery and machinegun fire, and support the landing of the amphibious forces on the shore, followed by their support on the shore.

B. The commander of the security detachment is to provide cover to the assault landing ships against the enemy's light forces and submarines during the crossing and at the landing places. During the amphibious landing the ships of the assault force are to be isolated from the fire of coastal batteries by a smoke screen, but in such a way as to avoid covering the roadstead with smoke.

C. At 0450 hours on 20 August the commander of the 1st Amphibious Detachment is to break through to the port of Maoka aboard the first group of boats, to include large submarine chasers No 311 and 314, and small submarine chasers No 34, 35, and 63, break through to the south basin of Maoka aboard the second group of boats consisting of small submarine chasers No 29, 31, 33, and 35, and land the first wave of the amphibious forces to create a beachhead and support the landing of subsequent echelons of the amphibious force. Enemy gun positions on the shore are to be suppressed and the advancing amphibious troops are to be supported by artillery and machinegun fire.

D. The commander of the 2d Amphibious Detachment is to enter the port of Maoka and land troops of the second echelon right at the port of Maoka immediately behind the first group of boats of the 1st Amphibious Detachment. Operating enemy gun positions are to be suppressed by artillery and machine-gun fire.

E. The commander of the 3d Amphibious Detachment is to occupy his place in the planned disposition after the landing of the second echelon, and land the third echelon of the amphibious forces right at the port of Maoka.

F. The commander of the 1st Landing Craft Detachment is to ferry troops of the third echelon from the steamships "Izmail" and "Krabolov No 3" to the port of Maoka.

G. The commander of the 2d Landing Craft Detachment is to ferry troops of the third echelon from the steamship "Vsevolod Sibirtsev" to the south basin of Maoka.

H. The commander of the amphibious landing base and his group are to land together with the 2d Landing Detachment at the port of Maoka, provide hydrographic support to the approach of the assault landing ships to the landing places, organize traffic control of the assault forces on shore, and insure dependable electric line communication with the assault force commander, and visual communication with me aboard the escort vessel "Zarnitsa".

I. Command of the fire support ships is to remain with me.

All officers of the naval service are to explain to the petty officers and Red Navy seamen that bold, resourceful, and decisive actions are the main prerequisite for success in the operation.

4. My flag bridge is to be aboard the escort vessel "Zarnitsa."

My second deputy will be Captain 3d Rank Tsipnik, commander of the 3d Landing Detachment.

Amphibious Landing Commander

Captain 1st Rank Leonov

Amphibious Landing Chief of Staff

Captain 3d Rank Kochetkov

Central Naval Archives, f. 307, d. 25755, l. 13

Instructions to Assault Landing Ships for the Amphibious Landing

1. If the enemy offers fire resistance to assault landing ships at the moment of landing, small and large submarine chasers are to decisively penetrate to their appointed landing places, land their forces, and simultaneously maintain intense artillery and machinegun fire against visible centers of enemy resistance.
2. The principal mission of the minelayer "Okean" is to suppress the enemy's shore batteries.
3. Whenever visible enemy positions not contained by fire from our ships are discovered, the escort vessel "Zarnitsa" is to suppress the fire of the discovered points with artillery and machinegun fire.
4. Torpedo boats are to lay a smoke screen with the goal of isolating the assault landing ships from the fire of enemy batteries, cutting off the fire of enemy shore batteries causing the greatest hindrance. The commander of the covering detachment is to carry two torpedoes set for surface running to demolish boom defenses. Torpedo boat commanders must remember that incompetent laying of smokescreens (covering the area of movement of friendly ships with smoke) may cause the operation to fail.
5. When boom defenses are detected at the port of Maoka, the salvage vessel "Tel'man" is to break through the booms at full speed and create a passage to the port in response to a signal consisting of "three red flares," launched from the large or small submarine chaser that detects the booms.
6. Assault landing ships are to use artillery fire during the time of the amphibious landing only against visible targets; transporters are to maintain artillery fire for self-defense.
7. The assault forces are to be landed energetically and swiftly according to plan, without delays and interference. Commanders of all ships are to

remember that no other instructions will be provided. Ship commanders must also remember that tardy actions would be highly detrimental during the amphibious landing.

Amphibious Landing Chief of Staff
Captain 3d Rank Kochetkov

Central Naval Archives, f. 307, d. 25755, l. 17

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ADMIRAL GORSHKOV

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[Article by NSU Flt Adm V. Kasatonov: "Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov (On His 70th Birth Anniversary)"]

[Text] USSR Navy Commander in Chief, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, Hero of the Soviet Union, Admiral of the Soviet Navy S. G. Gorshkov numbers among Soviet military officials raised and nurtured by the Communist Party who played a significant role in strengthening the army and navy in the prewar years, in leading combat activities in the Great Patriotic War, and in improving the armed forces in the postwar era.

Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov was born 13 (26) February 1910 in Kamenets-Podol'sk to the family of a high school teacher. In 1927, while a student of the physico-mathematics faculty of Leningrad State University, S. G. Gorshkov volunteered for and was enrolled in the Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze, from which he graduated successfully in 1931. After finishing the school Lieutenant S. G. Gorshkov was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, where he was appointed to the post of watch chief and navigator of a destroyer. His performance report of those days read: "Capable. Exacting toward himself and subordinates. Excellent naval qualities. Remains calm in a difficult situation, sufficiently willful."*

In 1932 S. G. Gorshkov was sent to the Far East together with other Black Sea Fleet seamen. Here he served as navigator aboard the submarine mine-layer "Tomsk," commander of an escort vessel, and later a destroyer, and chief of staff and commander of a destroyer brigade. He devoted all of his effort to raising the combat readiness of the ships.

In June 1939 Sergey Georgiyevich was returned to the Black Sea, and exactly a year later he was appointed commander of a cruiser brigade in the Black Sea Fleet. He was at this post when the Great Patriotic War began. S. G. Gorshkov took an active part in the combat activities of the fleet forces,

* From S. G. Gorshkov's personal file.

exhibiting high organizational capability, aggressiveness, initiative, personal bravery, and courage. In September 1941, during the heroic defense of Odessa, Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov* led the amphibious landing of the first marine assault forces on the Black Sea in the vicinity of Grigor'yevka, which insured a successful counterstrike by troops of the Odessa Defense Area.

In October 1941 Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov was appointed commander of the Azov Naval Flotilla, which participated in the Kerch'-Feodosiya amphibious landing operation in December 1941. During it, Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov displayed creative initiative in control of the forces. A storm raged over the Sea of Azov when five detachments of the flotilla's ships and vessels set out to sea with an assault landing force consisting of units of the 51st Army, and steamed to the landing areas. The assault landing forces were able to capture a beachhead only on the north coast of Kerch' Peninsula in the vicinity of capes Zyuk and Khroni. The detachments were unable to reach the other landing sectors. It was in this situation that Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov decided to land all detachments in the vicinity of the capes, which made it possible to increase the strength of forces on the occupied beachheads and permitted our troops to dig in securely on shore. The actions of the flotilla in many ways promoted the success of the Kerch'-Feodosiya operation, as a result of which the Kerch' Peninsula was liberated.

An important event in the life of S. G. Gorshkov occurred in 1942. He became a member of the CPSU. Communist Gorshkov continued to fight the hated enemy of the Soviet motherland with doubled energy.

In summer 1942 the Azov Flotilla stubbornly defended the coast of the Sea of Azov under the command of Rear Admiral Gorshkov, and it actively helped Soviet troops restrain the onslaught of superior enemy forces. Between 11 and 24 August the flotilla's forces steadfastly defended Temryuk Naval Base, subjected to the offensive action of up to 20,000 enemy soldiers and officers supported by tanks. In August 1942 Sergey Georgiyevich was appointed deputy commander of the Novorossiysk Defense Area and took part in the city's defense. Seamen of the Azov Naval Flotilla fought steadfastly together with troops of the 47th Army on land lines of the Novorossiysk Defense Area.

In February 1943 S. G. Gorshkov was once again given the command of the Azov Flotilla, which successfully supported ground troops of the North Caucasian Front in their offensive battles of 1943 to liquidate the enemy's Taman' grouping.

Participation in the Kerch'-El'tigen operation at the end of 1943, which resulted in the liberation of Kerch' Peninsula, was a brilliant page in the battle biography of Rear Admiral Gorshkov.

In April 1944 Rear Admiral Gorshkov was appointed commander of the Danube Flotilla, the forces of which operated actively in the Iassi-Kishinev

* S. G. Gorshkov was promoted to rear admiral on 16 September 1941.

operation. The flotilla's ships supported the crossing of the Dneestr drowned river valley by troops of the 46th Army, 3d Ukrainian Front, broke through to the Danube delta and, after landing the amphibious forces, seized a number of ports and bases. Under S. G. Gorshkov's command the flotilla supported troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts in the Belgrade and Budapest operations, it participated in the liberation of the capitals of Yugoslavia and Hungary, and it landed tactical amphibious forces, it provided shipboard artillery support, and it ferried troops and cargo.

Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov was given command of a squadron in the Black Sea Fleet in January 1945, after which he was appointed chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, and in August 1951 he assumed the post of fleet commander. He successfully managed operational, combat, and political training, devoting special attention to raising the combat readiness of the fleet's forces, studying new weapons and combat resources, and developing new tactics for them.

In July 1955 Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov was appointed first deputy commander in chief of the navy, and in January 1956 he assumed the combined post of commander in chief of the navy and USSR deputy minister of defense. S. G. Gorshkov assumed this responsible post after having mastered deep knowledge in naval affairs and gained a considerable amount of combat experience in command and staff work.

While at this important government post, S. G. Gorshkov persistently directed all of his knowledge and experience at the tasks of developing the Soviet Navy, posed by our party and government.

Creation of our nuclear missile fleet, one capable of executing strategic missions in the oceans, was an outstanding event that scattered the illusory hopes of imperialist aggressors that they would maintain total supremacy at sea.

The scientific-technical revolution in military affairs contributed many new things to naval art of war and to development of the forms and methods of application of naval forces. S. G. Gorshkov devoted unweakening attention to these issues. The military reader is well acquainted with his works: "Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva" [The State's Naval Power], "Razvitiye voyenno-morskogo iskusstva" [Development of Naval Art of War], "Voyenno-Morskiye Floty v voynakh i v mirnoye vremya" [Naval Fleets in Wars and in Peacetime]. He is the editor in chief of the third volume of the "Morskoy atlas" [Marine Atlas]. S. G. Gorshkov is meticulously working as a member of the main editorial commission on the preparations of the "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945] and the Soviet Military Encyclopedia; he personally participates in the writing of manuals and instructions.

Sergey Georgievich has been involved in a great deal of party and government work. In 1956 he became a candidate and in 1961 a member of the CPSU Central

Committee, and he served as a deputy to the fourth through tenth convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The party and government gave a deserved assessment to S. G. Gorshkov's services and contributions to raising the defense capabilities of our motherland. He has been awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title, five orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Ushakov, 1st Degree, the Order of Kutuzov, 1st Degree, the Order of Ushakov, 2d Degree, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Degree, many medals, orders and medals of foreign states, and an honorary weapon.

Sergey Georgiyevich celebrates his 70th birthday at the peak of his creativity. We wish him good health, happiness, and success at his important post for the good of our great motherland.

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COMMENTS ON REORGANIZATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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(Article, published under the heading "In Foreign Armies," by Col (Res) N. Nikitin and Candidate of Military Sciences Col S. Petrov: "The Secret War of U.S. Imperialism")

(Text) In January 1978 U.S. President Carter signed an order reorganizing the American intelligence service. This measure was elicited by scandalous revelations of criminal acts performed by the USA's intelligence organs, which had cast an espionage net over the entire globe. Formally, the order's purpose was to centralize control over national intelligence. However, its true purpose could not be concealed: On one hand it was to pacify the opinion of the public, troubled by the uncontrolled, illegal activities of American intelligence services, and on the other hand it was to raise the aggressiveness of their work in behalf of the ruling class of the USA. This article reveals the structure of the USA's intelligence organs, the basic orientation and scale of their activities, and the methods and resources they use to achieve their goals.

Describing the structure and missions of intelligence organs of the USA, we should emphasize that the USA has created a branched network of intelligence services and organizations called the "intelligence community," employing more than 200,000 persons. Its annual budget is up to \$10 billion. Intelligence organs are present in different state departments and agencies, having a tremendous influence upon the country's domestic and foreign policy. They include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), intelligence organizations of the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Administration for Energy Research and Development (prior to 1976 the Atomic Energy Commission--AEC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others. The numerous intelligence services of the Pentagon occupy an important place in the American "intelligence community." Military intelligence organs are the implement of aggression and interference in the domestic affairs of other states.¹ The activities of services within the "intelligence community" are managed by their supreme military-political organ--the National Security Council (NSC), organized in 1947.

The CIA was created in 1947. Presently it has more than 100 home offices and research bases. Thousands of its colleagues are scattered over the entire world as diplomats, businessmen, reporters, and so on. In addition to its own machinery, it also makes use of personnel from other departments.²

In its activities, the CIA shuns no means of subverting and overturning progressive regimes in developing countries, and in all places it serves the goals of reaction and performs the role of organizer of counterrevolutionary groupings.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which poison the airways with lies, slander, and various fabrications directed against the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist fraternity, are the sordid offspring of the CIA.

Military intelligence has an important place in the system of American intelligence services. Its organs include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which manages the intelligence staffs of the branches of the armed forces--army, navy, and air force, the National Security Agency (NSA), and various staffs.

Created in 1961 with the goal of unifying the activities of armed forces intelligence staffs, the DIA is the supreme organ of military strategic intelligence in the USA. Its composition consists of a staff, an administration for coordination with other intelligence organs and branches (military attaches and military counterintelligence), a financial service, and executive organs located throughout the world. Defense Department attaches are accredited in more than 100 countries.

The U.S. Army's intelligence staff--G-2--mainly collects information on the military potential, deployment, and armament of foreign armies, primarily the Soviet Army, on weapon production, topography, and so on. G-2 is responsible for the collection of information on the enemy with communication and radio reconnaissance resources, and for insuring the security of communications and radio resources in its ground troops. G-2 monitors the trustworthiness of American soldiers through a special counterintelligence service. Its principal activity is to acquire information through agents and compile strategic maps.

The U.S. Navy's intelligence staff--the CNA--mainly collects intelligence on foreign navies and armament, on the weapon systems of the probable enemy and the prospects for their development, on ship building, marine aviation, coastal fortifications, harbors and ports, their locations and freight turnover, and other questions. The CNA tries to keep ships of the Soviet Union, submarines especially, under special observation.

The intelligence staff of the Department of the Air Force--A-2--gathers intelligence on the air forces and the aerospace equipment of the probable enemy, and on production of warplanes and missiles. The chief purpose of A-2 is to support strikes against enemy territory in the event of war; this

is why much attention is devoted to collecting data on key military, industrial, and administrative centers, and evaluating their relative vulnerability to an aerospace attack.

A-2 possesses more than 20 squadrons of reconnaissance airplanes. Its radar tracking stations, which are used to observe missile tests in foreign states, are scattered over many points of the globe. It performs reconnaissance with the help of artificial satellites. During the Arab-Israeli war A-2 supplied operational data on the armed forces of the Arabs to the Israeli aggressor.

The National Security Agency (NSA) was created after World War II. This top secret institution not only engages in secret collection of foreign radio intelligence, but it also organizes covert surveillance of U.S. citizens. The NSA performs reconnaissance on land, at sea, and in the air. Its colleagues listen in on telephone conversations and intercept radio signals in the most important regions of the world, including the Soviet Union. As the events in Iran demonstrated, the densest network of electronic espionage against the USSR was organized by the USA in the north of this country.

Intelligence is handled in the State Department by its Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The FBI, the Treasury Department, the Administration for Energy Research and Development, and other American cabinet departments and agencies possess an extensive intelligence net.

Thus the USA's intelligence services possess a tremendous number of employees and enormous resources permitting them to conduct their criminal activities in different directions and in a great scope.

Imperialism actively employs all ways and means to fight socialism. American imperialists constantly try to broaden the role of intelligence and subversive activities in their state policy, and to direct these activities mainly against the Soviet Union, countries in the socialist fraternity, and against the national liberation movement in all the world.

The USA's intelligence services gather information on the military-economic potential of countries in the socialist fraternity, on deployment of their strategic and other important military objectives targeted for nuclear strikes and on the most advantageous moment for a surprise attack and for initiating a thermonuclear or local war. Special significance is attached to reconnaissance aimed at acquiring information on the USSR's nuclear missile potential. Evidence of this can be found in many government documents.

American intelligence also collects information on the military-economic potential of developing countries, neutral capitalist states, and even allies of the USA. In this case the entire national defense complex of each of these countries is studied attentively: the possibilities for

mobilizing, and utilizing, in behalf of the USA, the military-strategic resources, strategic regions, and naval and air bases of these countries with the goal of deploying military equipment and troops of the USA and its allies there.

Conducting their foreign policy course, the USA's ruling circles are intolerant of surprises and ignorance of future international events. This is why one of the tasks of American intelligence is to promptly reveal crisis situations developing in various regions, and thus creating advantageous conditions for subsequent actions by American imperialism there.

Imperialists of the USA view the historic victories of the world revolutionary movement as a direct transgression upon the positions of American monopolies, upon the "national" interests of their country. Therefore the efforts of American intelligence are being directed at subverting and disintegrating communist and all revolutionary movements from within. Much significance is attached in this case to discriminating against communist and workers parties, causing conflicts between them and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and thus retarding the latter's increasingly greater international influence, causing dissension in the ranks of the socialist fraternity, compromising the defensive Warsaw Pact and Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, and weakening the international relations the USSR and other socialist powers have with the developing states of Asia, Africa, and America, and with countries in the capitalist system.

American imperialism is trying to achieve its strategic goals wherever it can. The subversive activities of American intelligence services are directed against democratic political regimes in developing and capitalist countries, against the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries, against all manifestations of antiimperialism and anti-Americanism, and against growth of democratic forces at home.

Intelligence organs of the USA are consciously and systematically involved not only in the collection, evaluation, and analysis of all acquired intelligence having a bearing on the foreign and domestic political, military, economic, scientific-technical, ideological, and cultural activities of foreign countries, chiefly socialist, but also in interpreting this intelligence in a way advantageous to imperialist politicians.

For practical purposes the extensive information acquired is utilized in all spheres of the USA's international relations and in many areas of its domestic life; it is used in the development of foreign political and military strategy advantageous to the ruling class, and in the planning and solution of political, economic, military, and other domestic problems.

The worldwide scale and all-embracing nature of the subversive activities of American intelligence are a concentrated expression of the policy of modern imperialism, including American imperialism. Broadening the scale of military preparations, fanning the arms race, and increasing the re-

of mass destruction weapons, monopolistic circles of the USA are trying to get the most diverse information on all countries of the world, but mainly the Soviet Union and states in the socialist fraternity. For these purposes American intelligence utilizes the most diverse methods and resources: subversive actions, sabotage, border violations, espionage, diversion, assassination, kidnapping and murder, bribery and blackmail, recruitment of dissenters, misinformation, encouragement of offensive actions by one nation against another, capitalization upon expanding scientific, cultural, and tourist exchange among countries, monitoring of telephone and radio conversations, ideological sabotage and propaganda, and so on.⁴

The supreme manifestations of unlawfulness--conspiracies, going as far as murder--occupy a special place in the arsenal of American intelligence. Quite recently the (Mondadori) Publishing House (Italy) published the book "A Dirty Affair" by the progressive Italian writer (Roberto Paynets). It tells the story of numerous cases of gross interference by the CIA in the internal affairs of various countries, about the way conspiracies and attempts on the lives of political officials were organized, and about other acts of the American espionage agency. The author cites documents attesting to the CIA's attempts at organizing the assassination of Fidel Castro, the CIA's complicity in the murder of Patrice Lumumba, and the crimes of the "silent Americans" during the Vietnam aggression. He devotes a special place to a description of the actions of the USA's espionage agency against the government of S. Alende in Chile. Paynets was able to establish, for example, that the CIA planned the assassination of Salvador Alende, and that it financed political organizations hostile to his government. The book cites a document written in the early 1960's showing the true face of the present presidential assistant for national security. In it, Z. Brzezinski, who is aligned with the human rights cause today, suggested that the territory of people's Cuba be bombed. The book presents sensational materials on attempts by American reactionary circles to split the leftist parties of Italy, and about the CIA's financing, through oil corporations, of some socialist party officials in order to guide the actions of the socialists against the Communist Party.

American intelligence is also the subject of the book "Activities of the CIA" by (Y. Lindfors) and (Yu. Rislakki). Former CIA agent Phillip Agee, who wrote the Foreword to it, took part in a press conference with the authors. The events described in the book cover the last few decades. The authors reveal CIA activities in Italy, Cuba, and in Latin American and other countries.

In its time the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES published an article by (N. Khorrok) on the CIA's invasion into the scientific world of the USA, "Agents Recruit Spies in the World of Science." The Central Intelligence Agency, it said, now uses several thousand scientists who, in addition to providing recommendations and advice, and sometimes bringing agents together with people they need, from time to time write books and other works used for propaganda purposes abroad. These scientists are working in a little more than 100 American colleges, universities, and associated institutions.

The American public has now known for more than a decade that the CIA maintains contacts with the scientific world. An article published in the journal RAMPARTS in 1967 initiated an investigation during which it was established that the CIA secretly financed the National Students' Association, various scientific research programs in the most diverse areas of science, and numerous educational institutions.

The USA's intelligence organs actively participate in the preparation and conduct of ideological sabotage as a specific form of subversive activities by reactionary forces of imperialism against the principal revolutionary detachments of modern times. Ideological sabotage often anticipates and accompanies foreign policy actions that are most important to the American imperialists, causing confusion, dissension, and uncertainty in the camp of the opposing side.

In the USA, where following World War II anticommunism was elevated to the rank of state policy, ideological sabotage occupies a prominent place in the activities of the NBC. The CIA, the UMB (not further identified), military intelligence and counterintelligence, and other organs involved in subversive activities and anticommunist propaganda abroad take part in the development and implementation of methods, resources, and forms of ideological sabotage. As an example the USA has about 200 specialized scientific research ("brain") centers providing services to anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaigns.

Recently the book "The Fourth Weapon" by C. Crukshank was published in England, in which the author writes that there cannot be effective propaganda without meticulously organized intelligence.⁵

Describing the activities of American intelligence in the organization of ideological sabotage today, we should emphasize that it is aimed at undermining relaxation, and at creating an anti-Soviet, anticommunist uproar and twaddle on imaginary Soviet military superiority in order to camouflage the imperialist policy of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The present activities of ideological saboteurs is yet another piece of evidence supporting V. I. Lenin's sagacious directives, in which he stated: "...if they cannot attack us now with weapons in hand, they will march with the weapons of lies and slander...".⁶

Thus we would have to conclude that the more difficulties the aggressive course of American imperialism encounters, the more hopes it lays in achievement of its political, military, economic, and ideological goals, on the secret methods of war, on the "knights of the trenchcoat and dagger." To achieve these goals, the USA has created a branched net of intelligence organs and espionage agencies scattered all over the world. And all of this is directed against the socialist countries.

In a situation complicated by the policy of the USA, which relies in many ways upon its intelligence organs, the Soviet Union invariably pursues a

course toward relaxation of international tension and development of benevolent mutual relationships with all countries and peoples of the world. The Soviet Union truly has "powerful modern armed forces. However, the might of the Soviet Armed Forces is not a threat to anyone. They have never been used to seize foreign territories, or to enslave the peoples of other countries. Our army is maintained and improved exclusively in the interests of defending socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Soviet state. Soviet soldiers, well aware of their responsibility for the fate of the motherland, are standing an alert guard over socialism and peace in a single combat formation together with soldiers of the fraternal armies of the socialist countries."⁷

The need for this is confirmed by international events that occurred in late 1979 and early 1980. In Europe, the USA imposed a decision upon its NATO allies to deploy new nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries. In Iran, Washington is exerting military pressure upon that country's revolutionary people, bringing a naval armada armed with atomic weapons into the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Persia. Imperialist and Beijing circles have initiated a savage campaign of slander against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The grounds for this campaign were the fact that the Soviet Union, true to the principles of internationalism, satisfied an urgent request by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to render emergency political, moral, and economic aid to Afghanistan, to include military aid, on the basis of a Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Neighborly Relations, and Cooperation, as well as the UN Charter. "To have done otherwise," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in an interview by a PRAVDA correspondent, "would have meant allowing imperialism to tear Afghanistan apart... The Soviet people and our friends abroad may be assured that the Leninist foreign policy course is unshakeable.... This course unites a consistent love of peace with firm repulsion of aggression."⁸

FOOTNOTES

1. NEWSWEEK, 22 November 1971, pp 28-35; ZARUBEZHNAYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 4, 1977, pp 10-11.
2. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 2 February 1973; NEWSWEEK, 13 January 1975, p 25.
3. ZARUBEZHNAYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 4, 1977, pp 10-17.
4. The methods of American intelligence are described in detail in the book: Tsvigun, S. K., "Taynyy front" [The Secret Front], Moscow, Politizdat, 1973.
5. ZARUBEZHNAYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1979, pp 14-16.

6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 42, p 366.
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INSTRUCTOR GUIDE FOR LECTURE ON GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 69-74

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information" as "An Aid to Teachers of Military History," by Merited Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Maj Gen Tank Trps I. Krupchenko: "Methods of Lecturing on 'Military-Political Results of the Great Patriotic War'"; This article provides methodological advice on the first lecture on the topic "The Military-Political Results of the Great Patriotic War. Development of Armament and Tactics of the Branches of the Armed Forces and the Arms and Services"]

[Text] The typical training program for the discipline "Military History" allocates 6 hours to the study of this topic in military schools, to include 4 hours of lecture time and 2 hours of seminar.

In my opinion the first lecture should examine the military-political results of the Great Patriotic War. The second lecture must be devoted entirely to an analysis of the development of the arms and tactics of Soviet troops during the war.

During the first lecture, which we will discuss in the present article, it would be suitable to analyze the following problems: the world-historic significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War; the decisive role of the Soviet Union in attainment of victory in World War II; the sources of the might of the Soviet Union and its armed forces. Twenty to twenty-five minutes should be devoted to each problem, and 10-15 minutes should be allocated to the introduction, conclusion, and answers to questions.

The introduction should explain why this topic is important, demonstrate its close ties with the present international situation, and emphasize its significance to assimilation of all previous material in the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole.

Victory was attained in World War II through the efforts of many freedom-loving peoples. However, our country made the decisive contribution to the aggressor's defeat.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union was the most important, most decisive part of World War II. It was the greatest collision between socialism and the strike forces of imperialism. Our motherland waged a just war of liberation.

Discussion of the first problem should begin, in my opinion, with a presentation of the political and military results of the war. Special emphasis should be laid on the fact that the Great Patriotic War ended with the Soviet Union's victory. The fascist empire, which Hitler boastfully named the "Thousand-Year Reich," fell under the powerful blows of the Soviet Armed Forces. Having started total war for world dominion, Hitler's Germany suffered an astounding defeat.

Following fascist Germany, its ally militarist Japan was also defeated. The Soviet Armed Forces crushed the Kwantung Army, thus accelerating the end of the Second World War in the East.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War immeasurably raised its authority in the international arena. Now, not a single problem in international relations can be successfully solved without the USSR's participation.

The grandeur of our victory and its world-historic significance lie not only in the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces, having defeated the aggressors, defended their motherland and their socialist fatherland. Faithful to their international duty, they honorably completed their great mission of liberation, relieving many peoples of Europe and Asia from the yoke of fascism and militarism, and promoting restoration of their national independence. Over 7 million Soviet soldiers fought abroad for over a year.

This liberation was achieved at a high price. The total losses of our troops abroad were over 3 million men. Of these, more than a million soldiers were left to lie forever in the soil of the countries they liberated. The peoples of Europe and Asia will never forget the heroism of the Soviet soldier, which was never equaled in history. Thus a message of greetings from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the occasion of Victory Day states: "Our people will always remember this memorable day with unlimited love and gratefulness to the great Soviet Union, to the glorious Soviet soldiers, who shed their blood on the soil of our motherland in a savage struggle to rescue mankind and to liberate our motherland. It will always remember this day with unlimited love of and gratefulness to the invincible Soviet Army of Liberation."¹

Many Soviet generals, officers, and enlisted men were awarded orders and medals by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and other countries. Laborers in liberated countries hold their memory of the Soviet soldiers sacred. Monuments have been erected in honor of the Soviet Army of Liberation in Budapest, Warsaw, Sofia, Bucharest, Belgrade, Vienna, and many other cities. A grand monument to Soviet soldiers towers in Berlin. It is a

representation of the Soviet Union's world-historic victory over fascist Germany, and of the Soviet Armed Forces mission of liberation.

The victories the Soviet Army enjoyed in the course of the war inspired the peoples of Europe and Asia to fight the invaders. As a result of the defeat of Germany and Japan, as well as of reactionary forces supporting the invaders, extremely favorable conditions evolved for further struggle by the people for liberation from the capitalist yoke. It was precisely owing to the victories of the Soviet Union and the war that the peoples of many countries in Europe and Asia were able to cast off the chains of capitalism and begin building socialism. Capitalism's sphere of dominance shrunk dramatically. The ratio of forces in the world arena changed fundamentally in favor of socialism.

The defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan was also responsible for a powerful upsurge in the national liberation movement in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the people of which, having broken the chains of colonial slavery, assumed a course of independent development.

Going on to discussion of the second problem, the instructor should turn the attention of the students to the fact that the Great Patriotic War was the main event of World War II. This is why the victory of the Soviet Union, which destroyed the main forces of fascist Germany and militarist Japan, was a decisive contribution to the victory of all freedom-loving peoples in World War II. Contrary to the deceitful assertions of bourgeois falsifiers of history attempting to diminish its role in the defeat of the aggressors, the Soviet-German front was the main front, the decisive one of World War II.

The Soviet-German front was the main, decisive front in relation to all of the most important characteristics: spatial scope, quantity of forces committed by the warring sides, the intensity and duration of the struggle and, finally, the results of the struggle. We can cite the following persuasive evidence in confirmation. The length of the Soviet-German front varied in different periods of the war from 3,000 to 6,200 km, while the length of the fronts in Italy and North Africa did not exceed 300-350 km, and those of West Europe did not exceed 800 km.²

During the entire war fascist Germany and its allies--Finland, Romania, and Hungary--had the overwhelming share of their armed forces at the Soviet-German front. Here, within a zone from the Barents to the Black Sea, from 190 to 270 enemy divisions fought in the period from June 1941 to mid-1944, while in 1941-1943 only from 9 to 20 divisions fought against Anglo-American troops in North Africa and from 7 to 26 divisions fought in Italy.³ Following the opening of a second front in Europe in summer 1944, the Soviet Army engaged from 240 to 195 divisions of German and satellite troops, while the Anglo-American troops were faced by from 81 to 106 fascist divisions. Consequently even after Allied troops were landed in northern France, the main forces of the German ground troops were still on the Soviet-German front.

The fascist German command employed the bulk of its aviation (four air fleets out of five) and all aviation of its satellite countries, all large surface ships, and a significant proportion of its submarines and coastal shipping against the Soviet Union, which could not but have an effect on the nature of the struggle in the Atlantic, where only the German Navy's submarines were operating.

The intense and savage engagements on the Soviet-German front not only drew in major forces of Germany and its allies, but they also absorbed them with unimaginable swiftness. In all, 607 divisions of the fascist coalition (to include 507 German divisions) were annihilated or captured here, while Anglo-American troops destroyed and captured only 176 enemy divisions in North Africa, Italy, and West Europe. Out of total German losses (killed, wounded, captured) of 13.6 million men in World War II, the losses at the Soviet-German front were 10 million men.⁴

Soviet troops annihilated and captured more than 75 percent of the enemy's weapons and military equipment.⁵

It should be noted that during the war, the West's greatest political and military officials recognized and often emphasized the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in achieving the final victory over the aggressor. Thus U.S. President F. Roosevelt wrote the following in a message dated 23 February 1943: "The Red Army and the Russian people quite certainly compelled Hitler's armed forces to assume the road to final defeat, and they have won the admiration of the people of the United States for a long time to come."⁶

English Prime Minister W. Churchill, who himself admitted that he never abandoned the thought of strangling the Soviet state, wrote the following in February 1945: "The Red Army celebrates its 27th anniversary with a triumph that elicited the unlimited admiration of its allies, and which decided the fate of German militarism. Future generations will recognize their debt to the Red Army as unconditionally as we do today, having survived to witness these great victories."⁷

Following World War II, however, as a service to imperialist circles and contrary to historical facts, bourgeois political and military officials, historians, and writers tried to diminish the Soviet Union's role in World War II, to represent the Soviet Army and its art of war in a false, consciously distorted form, while at the same time exaggerating the contribution made by imperialist states, especially the USA and England, in the defeat of fascist Germany and its allies.

However, attempts by imperialist ideologists to distort the events of World War II and belittle the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Hitler's coalition and militarist Japan suffered failure, as being unfounded. All fabrications by Western writers of false history are being refuted by authenticated, persuasive facts.

Presentation of the lecture's third problem should begin with substantiation of the thesis that the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War was not a chance occurrence. It can be explained not only by natural and geographic factors, which bourgeois falsifiers of history often cite, and not by mistakes and omissions made by the enemy command, though many were made. Our victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism was a product of history: it possessed deep social roots.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was prepared for by the entire previous course of socialist development. The country's industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution, and reinforcement of fraternal friendship among the peoples of the USSR had decisive significance to growth in the economic and defensive power of our Motherland.

The Great Patriotic War confirmed the ultimate viability and superiority of the Soviet Union's planned socialist economy over the capitalist economy. It demonstrated that the socialist structure is not only the best organization by which to elevate society economically in years of peaceful development, but it is also the best form for mobilizing all forces and resources for defeat of the enemy in wartime. The national economy had to be switched to a war footing in extremely complex and difficult conditions. In the initial period our country lost its most important economic regions. The Germans carried the hope that the Soviet Union would be unable to organize military production, and that it would suffer defeat. But this did not happen. Capitalizing on the advantages of the socialist structure, the Communist Party and Soviet government reorganized the economy in accordance with the war's requirements in maximally short time. In the course of 6 months, 1,322 industrial enterprises, mainly war enterprises, were redeployed to the country's eastern regions, and more than 10 million persons were evacuated together with them. What essentially happened was that an entire industrial power was picked up and moved thousands of kilometers. The evacuated plants were put back into operation and new enterprises were built in record time. Many factories and plants which had formerly produced civilian products were retooled for production of various types of armament.

As a result the Soviet Union, which possessed a lesser industrial base, produced one and a half times more military equipment and arms during the war than did fascist Germany and its satellites. During the war, Soviet industry produced 137,000 airplanes, 104,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 408,000 guns.⁶

Our armed forces pounded the enemy with domestically produced combat equipment, with domestically produced weapons.

The kolkhoz structure also endured the trials of war and demonstrated its viability. Despite the loss of a large quantity of farmland and the best-working and skilled portion of the rural population, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes managed to supply food to the army and raw materials to industry.

WORKERS IN the Soviet rear committed a true act of labor heroism, without which our victory would have been unimaginable.

The fight of the Soviet people against Hitler's Germany was not only a military and economic duel. It was also a struggle between two opposing class ideologies: the most humane of mankind's history--socialist, and the most inhumane--fascist.

Imperialist aggressive ideology of German fascism was opposed by Marxist-Leninist socialist ideology reflecting the fundamental interests of the working class and all laborers, an ideology of equal rights and friendship of peoples, of proletarian internationalism.

During the war, Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was a powerful spiritual weapon of the Soviet people, emerged victorious over the misanthropic, fanatic ideology of fascism. In an hour of great trials, the ideological conviction of the Soviet people, their love for the motherland, and their faith in the triumph of communism revealed themselves to the fullest. It was precisely because of this that they were able to defend the socialist fatherland and communist ideals, and perform their patriotic and international duty to the end, sparing neither energy nor life.

The Soviet state's foreign policy played a tremendous role in the victory of the Great Patriotic War. Being socialist, class-oriented, and international in its content, it was aimed at promoting the aggressor's defeat and establishing a democratic postwar peace. One of the most important achievements of Soviet foreign policy was formation of the anti-Hitler coalition. Its creation promoted consolidation of the combat union of all peoples fighting against fascism, it amplified the international isolation of the aggressor countries, and it assisted in the struggle against the common enemy.

The Great Patriotic War was truly a popular war in defense of socialism. The people were the main force of this war. Under the guidance of the Communist Party, they gained a military, political, economic, ideological, and diplomatic victory. Throughout the entire war, the front and the rear were part of a single war camp.

Limitless faith in the justice of our goals, boundless devotion to the fatherland, and flaming Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism were the most important moral-political factors responsible for the unprecedentedly high morale of our army and people. The motherland's defenders crowned themselves in immortal glory in the armed struggle against the enemy. More than 11,000 soldiers were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title in the war. More than 7 million persons earned orders and medals. During the war 17 armies, 80 corps, 211 divisions, 259 brigades, and a large quantity of separate units of the ground troops, the air force, and the national air defense forces, as well as 17 divisions, brigades, and battalions of ships and 34 warships of the navy earned the Guards title.⁹

The partisan struggle in the enemy rear, which assumed unprecedented scope during the Great Patriotic War, was a clear example of the international nature of the war against the hated enemy. None of the cruel measures of Hitler's invaders were able to suppress the Soviet people's will to resist.

The results of the war demonstrated the superiority of our military organization over the military organization of capitalism.

Created on the basis of Lenin's principles of military development, and trained and indoctrinated in the spirit of Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland, the Soviet Army endured the harshest trials in its duel against the strongest army of the capitalist world, and it annihilated it. The war also demonstrated the superiority of Soviet art of war, one of the important factors of our victory.

The Leninist Communist Party was the inspiration and the organizer of our victory. Long before the war, the mighty economic, moral-political, and military potential of the Soviet state was created under its guidance. Following V. I. Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland, when the war began the CPSU wrote out a far-reaching, concrete program for the struggle against the enemy, and it mobilized all of the material, physical, and moral forces of the Soviet people for victory. The party constantly remembered the leader's warning that "once war becomes the only solution, everything must be subordinated to the interests of war, the country's entire internal life must be subordinated to war, and even the slightest vacillation in this regard would be impermissible."¹⁰ The Communist Party boldly assumed the entire responsibility for the fate of the fatherland. It concentrated its main efforts on leading the armed forces and managing the war economy.

It was precisely the Communist Party that raised and organized the popular masses for the just Patriotic War, and united and guided the efforts of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear toward a common goal--the enemy's defeat. Through all of its domestic and foreign policy the CPSU once again demonstrated that it is the tested leader of the Soviet people. "The great heroism of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War," said L. I. Brezhnev, "was inseparable from the multifaceted, purposeful activity of the Party of the Communists. Its Central Committee was the headquarters from which supreme political and strategic leadership was provided to the military actions. It was precisely the party that organized and unified the tens of millions of people, guiding their energy, their will, and their activities toward a single goal--toward victory."¹¹ During the war the Communist Party was truly a warring party. In this case as well, it guided itself by V. I. Lenin's teaching that in war, "the warring party is the ideal party of the proletariat." Up to 60 percent of the party's membership was in the army and navy. About half of the membership of its Central Committee and thousands of republic, kray, and oblast party executives were assigned to work in the military. In just the first half year of the war 1.1 million communists joined the USSR Armed Forces.¹² Many members of the party Central Committee

and many oblast and city committee secretaries were appointed military council members in the fronts and fleets and in the armies and flotillas, and many were appointed chiefs of political organs. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev was among them as well. Leonid Il'ich said in his book "Malaya zemlya" (The Little Land), "political workers became the spirit of the armed forces."¹⁴

In conclusion the lecturer should once again turn the attention of the audience to the fact that the victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism is significant on the scale of world history. The defeat of Hitler's Germany and militarist Japan marked not only the defeat of their armies. This was the defeat of the political structure and ideology of fascism and militarism. The defeat of Germany and Japan was a serious blow to imperialism as a whole. The general crisis of capitalism deepened further. The victory over the strike forces of world imperialist reaction was a powerful catalyst of the world revolutionary process that began with the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The results of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War persuasively demonstrated that there are no forces in the world which could destroy socialism or subjugate a people faithful to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, devoted to the socialist motherland, and united about the Leninist party. These results are a stern warning to imperialist aggressors, a severe and unforgettable lesson of history. They attest to the fact that any military adventures by imperialism against the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries would suffer total failure. The USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity are the undefeatable bastion of peace and security of nations. Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and with the guidance of their communist parties, they are confidently marching on the road of successful development of socialism and communism.

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BOOK REVIEW: SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOLUME SEVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 77-79

(Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by NSU, Army Gen A. Getman: "On Publication of Volume Seven of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia")

[Text] Among major works on military theory published in recent years, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia,* published by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, is eliciting the growing interest of the scientific and military public. And this is no accident. In it, the reader can find accurate and succinct responses to many questions in diverse areas of military knowledge. The volume discusses, on the basis of the creative method of Marxism-Leninism, the multifaceted topics of military affairs--the theory and history of military science, art of war, military equipment and weapons, and military events in domestic and world history, especially the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. It also contains articles on troop commanders, military leaders, heroes of battles and engagements, the combat history of the fronts, fleets, flotillas, major formations, and formations, and other aspects of military affairs.

The volume demonstrates, from party and class positions, the guiding role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in strengthening the defensive power of the USSR and the entire socialist fraternity, and the significance of their just military policy, which has its theoretical grounds in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland.

"...without science, it would be impossible to build a modern army..."**--this premise, stated by Lenin, is fully confirmed in the conditions of developed socialism. The modern methodology of Soviet military science permits us to optimize solution of the problems it faces associated with

* "Sovetskaya Vojennaya Entsiklopediya" (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol 7. "Radio Control--Tachanka." Chairman, Main Editorial Commission, Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov. Vojenizdat, 1979, 687 pp.

** Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch. [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 11

developing and training the Soviet Armed Forces in such a way as to keep them from falling qualitatively behind the armed forces of our probable enemies. The volume provides the scientific grounds for premises of Marxism-Leninism embracing both military science and the practical aspects of military affairs, as well as the development and implementation of the military policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, from the victory of Great October to the present days. All of this strengthens the ideological-theoretical arsenal of Soviet military personnel.

The revolutionary-transforming activity of the CPSU, including in the military area, is Marxism-Leninism in action. This thought is supported by numerous materials contained within the volume. The revolutionary teaching of the proletariat, the historic achievements of socialism, and its victories in confirmation of the new society are deeply and thoroughly illuminated in the articles "Revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia," "Revolutionary Army," in works by the classicists of Marxism-Leninism (V. I. Lenin's "The Russian Revolution and the Civil War," "Socialism and War," and his speech on military questions at the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), Engels' "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany," etc.), and in a major essay devoted to our great motherland.

Communist ideals are enjoying increasingly greater practical embodiment in the achievements of socialism. Defense of revolutionary achievements against the transgressions of imperialism is insured by the combined armed might of the countries of the socialist fraternity, represented by the military Warsaw Pact Organization--presently a powerful, effective factor of peace and stability in international relations, in neutralization of the aggressive forces of imperialism.

An example of creative Marxist-Leninist development of the theory and history of the art of war in the volume reviewed here is the article "Strategy, Military" by Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov. This is essentially an entire scientific essay on the development of strategic thought, answering the questions associated with the genesis of the art of war, and the fundamental stages of its development since ancient times. The author clearly defined the object and tasks of strategy of the highest level of the art of war, embracing the theory and practice of preparing the country and its armed forces for war, and planning and conducting a war and strategic operations.

Being a system of scientific knowledge, the theory of strategy deals with the laws and strategic nature of war, as well as the means of its conduct. In practical terms, strategy involves the following: solution of problems associated with determining, within the concrete conditions of a war, the strategic missions of the armed forces and the men and equipment necessary for their execution; preparation of the theaters of war and the country's economy and population for war; the planning of the war and strategic operations; organization of the deployment of armed forces, and leadership of the latter during strategic operations; analysis of the potentials of the probable enemy.

The author demonstrated the mutual relationship strategy has with politics and economics, and the priority of Russian military strategic thought in the Northern War of 1700-1721, the Patriotic War of 1812, and other examples. The article thoroughly illuminates Lenin's fundamental principles of Soviet military strategy and its superiority over reactionary bourgeois strategy, which revealed itself to the fullest during the Civil War and Great Patriotic War. Noting the outstanding role of V. I. Lenin in the development of Soviet military strategy, M. V. Frunze wrote: "Comrade Lenin provides brilliant models of strategic and tactical art for us and for the future generation of revolutionaries."^{*}

The article reveals the modern strategic conceptions of the USA and other NATO countries, and their imperialist aggressive nature. It emphasizes that Soviet strategy is an alloy of a struggle for peace and the readiness to decisively repel aggression, to dependably defend the independence and socialist achievements of the Soviet people and the peoples of the entire socialist fraternity.

The premises and conclusions of Soviet strategy concerning the nature and unique features of a modern war (were imperialists able to initiate one) have fundamental significance. A special place is devoted to maintaining the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, which is viewed in the strategic aspect: "...as at a focal point, the tremendous efforts and material outlays of the people to outfit the army, the consciousness, combat skills, and discipline of all servicemen, the artfulness of the command in troop command and control, and much else is concentrated in troop combat readiness. It is, in the end, the crowning glory of the combat proficiency of the troops in peacetime, and the key to victory in war."^{**}

The article on tactics deserves a positive evaluation from the standpoint of the art of war; tactics are viewed as an inherent part of the art of war, embracing the theory and practice of preparing subunits, units (ships) and formations belonging to different branches of the armed forces, branches of troops (arms), and special troops for combat and leading them in combat. In addition to presenting the history of the subject, the article discusses the main premises of the modern tactics of ground troops, the air force, the navy, and the national air defense forces. The article clearly presents the history of tactical development in close association with development of socioeconomic formations, and with the arisal and improvement of weapons and military equipment, from the moment armies came into being to the present day.

Substantial discussions are provided in the articles "Strategic Missile Troops," "Ground Troops," and "Missile Troops of the Ground Troops."

* Frunze, M. V., "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Collected Works], Voenizdat, 1977, p 254.

** Brezhnev, L. I., "leninskii kurs" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol. 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 49.

The progressive nature of the Soviet art of war and its superiority over the art of war of the Wehrmacht in World War II are discussed in the articles "Smolensk Engagement 1941," "Battle of Stalingrad," "Defense of Sevastopol' 1941-1942," "Bandoniers-Silesia Operation 1945," and "Tank Armies," as well as in articles about fronts and fleets, combined-arms armies, corps, and divisions, and about troops commanders and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War. They include K. K. Rokossovskiy, P. A. Rotmistrov, P. S. Rybalko, V. D. Sokolovskiy, and others.

Articles on the history of wars and the art of war, mainly on the history of the Russian Army and Navy, have great academic significance to military personnel: "Russian Army," "Russian Navy," "Svyatoslav's Campaign 964-972," "Northern War of 1700-1721," "Russo-Turkish Wars of the 17th-19th Centuries," Russo-Swedish Wars of the 17th-19th Centuries," "Seven Years' War 1756-1763"; on Russian troop commanders and naval commanders--A. V. Suvorov, P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunayskiy, P. S. Saltykov, D. N. Senyavin. These and other articles on military history reflect the progressive traits of Russian military and naval art, and they demonstrate the priority of Russian military theoretical thought in solution of many problems associated with the art of war and with military affairs as a whole. There are also substantial articles about foreign military history and about military officials of foreign states. The military geographic descriptions are of a high level.

The scientific-technical revolution in military affairs caused the arises of a large number of new concepts (see the articles "Radar," "Missile Weapons," "Nuclear Weapons," etc.). These concepts reflect the swift growth in technological sophistication of military science and the art of war, and of all military development, especially units of command and control associated with troops and with complexes of armament and equipment in the army, aviation, the fleet, and in the country's air defense forces.

Modern problems in the development of the art of war are being solved more quickly in connection with the growth in the role of science and technology in military affairs. It has now become possible to utilize the achievements of many sciences more effectively, in the process of their differentiation and integration in the interests of creative military theoretical thought. This can be seen distinctly in the art of war. The role of scientific forecasting has risen especially today. Its grounded conclusions and recommendations are broadly employed to evaluate modern war and the means of its conduct, to develop and prepare the armed forces, and to train and indoctrinate military personnel.

Much attention is devoted in the volume to revealing the aggressive nature of imperialism. This is especially evident in the article "United States of America." It uses authenticated facts from history to graphically and persuasively demonstrate the aggressive nature of the USA's foreign policy. Since the moment the USA was formed as an independent state (1776), the article notes, American ruling circles initiated more than 200 wars and

other armed actions against foreign countries and peoples. They created more than 2,000 military bases (facilities) on the territory of 33 countries, to include over 300 large bases, of which more than 150 are located in Europe. About 500,000 American servicemen are present on all continents outside the USA, to include more than 300,000 men in Europe. The USA is engaged in daily preparations of the armed forces for a global nuclear missile war, as well as for limited wars and aggressive operations.

The militarist program promoted by U.S. President J. Carter and the NATO decision to deploy about 600 new medium-range American missiles in a number of countries of West Europe are evidence of intensifying aggressiveness of imperialism, and mainly of the United States of America.

It should be noted in conclusion that publication of Volume Seven of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia will become a real contribution to development of Soviet military science and art of war, to the training and indoctrination of soldiers in the army and navy, and to improvement of their scientific-technical knowledge. It also performs an important ideological function in military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the Soviet people, and especially the young, in the spirit of the combat traditions of our heroic people and their armed forces, and it deals a mortal blow to bourgeois falsifiers of military history.

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EDITORIAL MAILBAG FOR 1979 REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 82-83

[Article]

(Text) The administration and the party and trade union organizations of the Moscow Curtain-Lace Production Association wrote a letter of gratitude to the editorial board for publishing an article on a former worker of the Factory imeni E. Tel'man--Hero of the Soviet Union V. K. Lovchev (No 4, 1979), and it asks all who personally knew V. K. Lovchev to send information they have on him to the factory's museum of combat and labor glory.

War veteran I. M. Pritupa (Sibiryak Sovkhoz, Safakulevskiy Rayon, Kurganskaya Oblast) writes that he read B. Shcherbakov's article "Logistical Support to the 4th Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation" (No 6, 1979) with great agitation. It describes the military labor of the 36th Separate Motor Transport Battalion, and it mentions the name of its commander, Captain Pugachev, and the name of the letter's author. Pritupa requests help in establishing communication with soldiers that had served with him.

"I will forever remember our separation from the armed forces," writes Great Patriotic War veteran A. K. Timofeyev (Zheleznodorozhnyy, Moscow Oblast). "The city's military commissar warmly thanked us for our soldierly service and the peace we won. Each of us recalled this instance and the frontal roads we traveled, as well as the postwar years." Former Sergeant N. Shishkanov, a tank crewman, received his record of service with its final notation. He slowly lowered the record into his pocket and, turning to the military commissar, he said: 'Comrade Colonel, whatever happens, do not forget us.... We are experienced, after all....' These were not just the thoughts of Sergeant Shishkanov alone; they were shared by all of us--former frontliners."

This was followed by meetings with future defenders of the motherland. Veterans being photographed with them transmitted their wishes to them. "Can one really forget this?!" writes the veteran. Of course not.

The editorial board receives a considerable amount of correspondence on published articles. Readers not only state their opinions on particular materials, but they also supplement individual premises, offer clarifications, improve content, and point out inaccuracies and errata made by the authors and the editorial board. Thus for example N. M. Vil'khovchenko (Belousovo, Kaluzhskaya Oblast) noted an inaccuracy in material carried in the "Heroes of the Civil War" department (No 2, 1979, p 72). The 91st Rifle Regiment, the military commissar of which was I. P. Zhigalov, was in the 31st Rifle Brigade, 11th Rifle Division, and not in the 16th.

"In his article 'Development of the Ground Troops in the Postwar Period' (No 5, 1978)," writes I. A. Kurach (Riga), "for some reason the author failed to point out that Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov also served as commander in chief of the ground troops, and that Army General M. S. Malinin was chief of the main staff of the ground troops. G. K. Zhukov did not in fact occupy this post very long, while M. S. Malinin occupied his for a longer period of time. The author should have mentioned them in his article as well."

Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) N. A. Kalyuzhnny (Novograd-Volynskiy, Zhitomirskaya Oblast), a participant of the defense of Peremyshl', turned his attention to the fact that the combat activities of the 99th Rifle Division in the first days of the war were not described entirely accurately on page 58 of the first volume of "Ukrainskaya SSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynye Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The Ukrainian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union] (Kiev, 1975). "The regiments of our division were 3-5 km from the border," he writes, "and it was in the very first hours of the war (and not at the end of the day) that the division's subunits advanced to their lines of defense on the border and went into combat."

Engineer-Captain 2d Rank (Reserve) G. L. Bachevnikov (Leningrad), Captain (Reserve) A. A. Neypol'skiy (Leningrad), Engineer-Captain 3d Rank (Reserve), V. I. Vishnyanov (Moscow), and others indicated a mistake made in the article "The Parade of Victory" (No 6, 1979, p 42). Colonel A. L. Bondarev began the war not as commander of the 8th Army, but as commander of the 168th Rifle Division. In October 1941 he was promoted to major general, and mid-November 1941 he was appointed commander of the 8th Army. He subsequently commanded the XVII Guards Rifle Corps, and it was not until after that that he was given the command of the CI Rifle Corps.

RFSFR Distinguished Scientist, Professor, Doctor of Military Sciences V. S. Shlemin (Leningrad) and V. I. Dmitriev (Leningrad) writes that a mistake was made in the department "Chronicle of the Development of the Soviet Armed Forces" (No 2, 1978, p 119). The Council for Labor and Defense adopted the decree "On the Program of Naval Development in 1933-1938" not on 11 June but on 11 July (Central State Archives of the USSR Navy, f. 4-1483, op. 1, d. 201, l. 69; f. 441, op. 8, d. 84, l. 1). The archives also contain a note written by Comrade Orlov to K. Ye. Voroshilov on 5 July 1933, which discussed only the draft of this decree.

Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) S. N. Stankov (Orel), chairman of the veterans council of the 58th Guards Rifle Division reports that he and his fellow servicemen received and read the document review "Meeting on the Elba" by A. Fayzulin and P. Dobrovolskiy (No 4, 1979) with great interest. At the same time, the reader notes, an error was apparently made in documents stored in the archives at the time they were written. The name of the commander of the machinegun platoon of the 173d Guards Rifle Regiment of their division was Sel'vashko, and not Sil'vashin.

"A mistake was made in the No 10 issue of this journal for 1979 (p 74, the 25th line from the top)," writes N. N. Chuyev (Moscow). This line should read: "Order of the White Lion 'For Victory'."

Colonel (Reserve) D. V. Pankov (Podol'sk), a participant of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, reports that the answer given to G. V. Pestovskiy (p 85) in No 9, 1979 concerning the fate of General S. D. Akimov was incorrect. "Lieutenant General Stepan Dmitriyevich Akimov, deputy commander (and not the commander) of the 43d Army was in charge of the army's operations group in October 1941, and it was before my eyes," the war veteran writes, "that he was seriously wounded on 18 October in the village of Korsakovo, not far from Tarutino, and he died from his wounds on 28 October 1941 in a Moscow hospital."

Comrade Pankov is right. It was revealed that an error was made in the reference book published in 1968 by the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Personnel (which the editorial board used in preparing the answer).

V. M. Lur'ye (Leningrad) who has been one of our readers for a long time, writes the editorial board often. In his well-wishing letters he notes what he believes to be the best articles, as well as the successes or shortcomings of authors and the editorial board. Thus, he writes, there was an inaccuracy on p 118 in the article "Army General V. F. Margelov" (No 1., 1978). V. F. Margelov commanded the airborne troops from May 1954 to March 1959, and then from July 1961 to December 1970. In the period from March 1959 to July 1961 the airborne troops were headed by Colonel General I. V. Tutarinov. The article "The II Guards Tank Corps in the Belorussian Operation" (No 6, 1979), V. M. Lur'ye notes, gives the wrong initials for the commander of the 3d Belorussian Front's armored and mechanized troops. In the described period, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Georgiy Semenovich Rodin was undergoing treatment in the hospital. A person with the same last name--Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Aleksey Grigor'yevich Rodin--fought in the 3d Belorussian Front. Furthermore, the reader continues, the author of the article "The 35th Anniversary of Establishment of Ushakov and Nakhimov Orders and Medals" (No 3, 1979) does not provide complete information on those who have been awarded these orders. Detailed information was already published in the journal (No 2, 1969).

The editorial board expresses its gratefulness to all authors submitting articles, responses, and letters, it thanks them for stating their proposals and opinions concerning specific military-historical problems, and it hopes that the creative ties existing between the editorial board and the journal's readers will grow stronger and broader in the new year.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MARSHAL CHUYKOV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZhURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 88-90

(Unattributed article: "Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov (On the 80th Anniversary of His Birth)")

(Text) The Great Patriotic War demonstrated with full persuasiveness how rich our socialist society is in military talent, and it revealed the leadership qualities of many prominent troop commanders who were wholly devoted to the Communist Party. Occupying a worthy place among them is twice-awarded Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiliy Ivanovich Chuykov, now 80 years old, a communist for 60 years, who as a youth selected a most honorable profession--that of protecting the motherland.*

Many works of various sorts have been written about the battle of Stalingrad. The bravery and steadfastness of the defenders of Volga soil, who vowed: "Beyond the Volga there is no land for us," have been perpetually inscribed in the history of the Great Patriotic War. And among those who held back the fascist hordes clawing their way toward the Volga, who opposed the savage enemy with their valor and heroism, high military proficiency, decisiveness, and full faith in victory, we rightfully include the warriors and commanders of the legendary 62d Army commanded by Lieutenant General Vasiliy Ivanovich Chuykov. It was precisely here, in the greatest engagement of World War II, that the commander revealed his decisiveness and boldness, his great artfulness in managing the troops, his unshakable will to achieve a set goal, his confidence in victory, and his ability to transmit his faith to others. And troops of the 62d Army not only survived the mortal fight with the hated enemy, but, having worn him out with aggressive defense, they themselves successfully participated in the division and annihilation of the enemy's encircled Stalingrad grouping.

* V. I. Chuykov: born 12 February 1900. In the Soviet Army from 1918. CPSU member since 1919. Civil War participant. Graduate of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. Participated in the defeat of White Chinese on the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the liberation of western Belorussia, and the Finnish-Soviet armed conflict (for greater detail, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZhURNAL, No 2, 1970).

Following the battle of Stalingrad the 62d Army, which was reorganized as the 8th Guards Army on 16 April 1943 for the bravery and heroism of its soldiers, was placed within the composition of the Southwestern Front, and in summer 1943 it occupied defenses along the right bank of the Northern Donets, north of Slavyansk. But the defensive battles did not last long. By as early as July the 8th Guards Army participated under Lieutenant General V. I. Chuykov's command in the Isayev-Barvenkovo offensive operation, and in August-September it participated in the Donets Basin operation. In these operations the army commander planned and conducted the crossing of the Northern Donets with great artfulness, seized a bridgehead, and soon the army's troops overran the enemy's strategic defenses, inflicting great losses in men and equipment upon the fascists.

In winter and spring 1944 the 8th Guards Army participated actively as part of the 3d Ukrainian Front in the defeat of fascist German troops in the right-bank Ukraine. The fact that this army always advanced in the direction of the front's main thrust during this period attests to the army's aggressiveness. This was so in the Nikopol'-Krivoy Rog, Beresnegovatoe-Snigirevka, and Odessa offensive operations. Actions of an army on the axis of a front's main thrust create unique features in the activities of the commander planning and conducting the operation. They impose additional difficulties upon him, compelling him to study the evolved situation more meticulously, to very carefully seek out the weak or most vulnerable points in the enemy's defenses so that the mission could be completed quickly, with minimum losses, maneuver men and equipment decisively and boldly, and creatively introduce the most progressive and effective concepts of strategy into combat practice. All of these qualities were reflected in V. I. Chuykov's unequalled military talent, which placed him among the greatest Soviet military leaders. Daring maneuvers during the spring thaw in the Beresnegovatoe-Snigirevka operation, and swift, devious attainment of the enemy's lines of communication and the blockading of his troops from the rear in the Odessa operation earned for the commander of the 8th Guards Army the glory of a decisive and willful master of the offensive.

In summer 1944 the 8th Guards Army was transferred to the composition of the 1st Belorussian Front and advanced to the Kovel' sector. In July-August its troops participated in the Lublin-Brest operation, after which they crossed the Vistula south of Warsaw and captured the (Magnushov) bridgehead. In these engagements, the talent of Colonel General V. I. Chuykov, who creatively utilized the art of modern combat activities, revealed itself in a new way, and his outstanding capabilities in troop leadership displayed themselves. In this operation, Colonel General Chuykov was one of the first to conduct reconnaissance in force with forward battalions on the day of a general offensive by the army's main forces. As a result the enemy's defenses were successfully penetrated. This effective tactic was successful because the army commander himself keenly sensed the pulse of the battle, had a full awareness of the enemy's psychology and tactics and, selecting the most important moment, he was able to impose his will and initiative upon the enemy.

When the army reached the Vistula V. I. Chuykov made a bold and out-of-the-ordinary decision on his own initiative: to cross the large water obstacle on the move, without allowing the enemy to recover or waiting for the front's ferry units. The Vistula was crossed in short time on improvised resources, and the army troops seized the Magnushov bridgehead. During this time, further south troops of the 69th Army seized a bridgehead in the vicinity of Pulawy. These bridgeheads were held and widened for more than 5 months. "The German command, admitting the significance of the bridgeheads captured by Soviet troops on the Vistula, committed significant forces against units of the 8th and 69th armies, to include the Herman Goering Tank Division. Bloody battles were fought for the bridgeheads, but no matter how many savage attacks the enemy made, they were all fought off by Soviet troops, with great losses to the Germans. Credit should be given to the commander of the 69th Army, General V. Ya. Kolpachik, and the commander of the 8th Guards Army, General V. I. Chuykov. They led the engagements for capture and retention of the bridgeheads on the Vistula with great artfulness and decisiveness."^{*} And with the beginning of the Vistula-Oder operation the Magnushov and Pulawy bridgeheads became the principal springboard for swift advance by troops of the 1st Belorussian Front across all of Poland to the Oder.

During the offensive that started from the bridgehead on 14 January 1945, the 8th Guards Army liberated the major industrial city of Lodz, and on 29 January it entered German territory, crossed the Oder on the move, and assumed its position for an attack on Berlin. There was a strong enemy center of defense in its way--the fortress of Poznan.

The assault on the strongholds within this citadel, which contained a garrison of more than 40,000 enemy enlisted and officers, was conducted for more than 3 weeks by part of the forces of the 8th Guards Army, as well as of the 69th and 1st Guards Tank armies. During this time V. I. Chuykov had to simultaneously take part in two complex missions: capturing a bridgehead on the west bank of the Oder, and liquidating the Poznan garrison, which remained for practical purposes in the army's rear. Moreover he needed not only indefatigable energy but also the talent of a troop commander if he were to complete these missions successfully. Army General S. M. Shtemenko wrote the following about V. I. Chuykov in his memoirs: "...I would like to note yet another trait of this outstanding person--his incessant, bubbling energy, owing to which he was capable of doing several things simultaneously; he could work day and night, and as need be, many days and nights, until such time that his work was finished. V. I. Chuykov contrived, for example, to simultaneously manage the assault of Poznan and control troops widening the bridgehead on the Oder; consider this in the light of the fact that it was a little more than 160 km from Poznan to the Oder. And yet he managed to be in both places when needed."^{**}

^{*} Zhukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" (Memoirs and Deliberations), Moscow, APN, 1969, p 572.

^{**} Shtemenko, S. M., "General'nyy shtab v gody voyny" (The General Staff During the War), Book 2, Voyenizdat, 1973, pp 484-485.

In the Berlin operation--the final operation of World War II in Europe--Colonel General V. I. Chuykov's 8th Guards Army operated together with other armies from the Oder bridgehead, and once again at the spearhead of the 1st Belorussian Front's main thrust. The Guards soldiers displayed military proficiency, bravery, and heroism in their assault of the (Beylovskiy) Hills, which German propaganda referred to as the "castle wall of Berlin," and in the liberation of the cities of Munchenberg and (Bal'gomin). Following savage battles, the heroes of Stalingrad captured the capital of the "Thousand-Year Reich" together with other armies. It was symbolic that General Weidling, chief of the Berlin garrison, signed the order to German troops to immediately halt resistance at 1030 hours on 2 May 1945 at Colonel General V. I. Chuykov's command post.

The 8th Guards Army traveled a glorious battle road from Stalingrad to Berlin. Two hundred thirty-three of its valorous soldiers earned the Hero of the Soviet Union title, more than 100,000 were awarded orders and medals of the Motherland, and 145 units and formations received orders and honorary titles. The glory of the Guards soldiers was shared by their commander, Colonel General V. I. Chuykov. For competent leadership of the troops, personal heroism, and bravery, he was twice awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title and he received eight orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four orders of the Red Banner, three orders of Suvorov, 1st Degree, the Order of the Red Star, many medals, and foreign orders and medals.

In the postwar era Vasiliy Ivanovich Chuykov held responsible posts as commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, troop commander of the Kiev Military District, concurrently the commander in chief of the ground forces and USSR deputy minister of defense, and chief of USSR Civil Defense. Since 1972 he has served as general inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense Group of Inspector-Generals. While serving at these posts, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov made a worthy contribution to raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and strengthening the Soviet state's defense capabilities.

V. I. Chuykov combined his active work in the armed forces successfully with party and public activity. He was a delegate to the party's 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d congresses, and he has been elected deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet since the Second Convocation.

Having emerged from the crucible of the engagements of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, Soviet Armed Forces veteran Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiliy Ivanovich Chuykov celebrates his 80th birthday in the ranks of the defenders of the country of victorious socialism, in which he indefatigably transmits his experience to young officers and generals, and actively engages in military patriotic work with the youth.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ARMY GENERAL VASYAGIN

Moscow VOVZHENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 91-93

(Article by Army Gen Ye. Mal'tsev: "Army General S. P. Vasyagin (On the 70th Anniversary of His Birth)")

[Text] Workers of the Komsomol Central Committee's publishing house, "Molodaya gvardiya," once asked Semen Petrovich Vasyagin if political workers had special rights, and what they were. He replied that their rights are the same as those of all communists: to always be in the forefront, where victory is being forged, where military proficiency is improved, where the success of the fight for greater combat readiness is decided, and where personal example must inspire the people and carry them along.

Army General S. P. Vasyagin, a military council member and chief of the Ground Forces Political Directorate, adheres to this principle without deviation. It has now been over 40 years that he has served in the Soviet Armed Forces, doing the noble job of indoctrinating competent and courageous defenders of our motherland, wholly devoted to the motherland, the party, and the people.*

In the 1930's, while in the army, S. P. Vasyagin was elected secretary of Komsomol bureau, and he served as political work instructor, assistant chief of the political section for Komsomol work, and senior instructor of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of Frontier and Internal Troops.

* S. P. Vasyagin was born 15 February 1910 in the village of Belyayev (presently of Kimrskiy Rayon, Kalininskaya Oblast). He began working when 14 years old. He worked as a laborer and construction worker. Later he managed a primitive library, he helped to eliminate illiteracy in the countryside, and he actively participated in the collectivization of agriculture. He joined the party in 1932. In that same year he was called up into the army. He graduated from military infantry school, a communist university, and political personnel retraining courses at the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin.

At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War S. P. Vasyagin was sent to the operating army as a battalion commissar. From the first to the last days of the struggle against the fascist German invaders he fought in the fronts: Western, Kalinin, 1st Baltic, and 3d Belorussian. He participated in defensive battles at the approaches to Moscow, in the liberation of Kalinin, Velikiye Luki, and many cities and towns of Belorussia and the Baltic republics, and in the assault of Königsberg. He was wounded. This happened at the eve of the new year, 1942, west of Kalinin. Semen Petrovich was then in charge of the political section of the 252d Rifle Division, which was fighting savage battles on the Rzhev axis. The physicians prescribed hospitalization. But Semen Petrovich insisted that he be left with the division.

Heading the political section of the 252d, and later serving as commissar and chief of the political section of the 381st Rifle Division, Communist Vasyagin proved himself to be an energetic, resourceful, and courageous political worker. Often visiting the subunits and units, he knew their status, the state of affairs in each sector, and the morale of the soldiers well. This afforded him a possibility for solving many local problems and effectively assigning tasks to the personnel. Under his guidance the political workers successfully performed their responsibilities, and as a rule they were always present wherever things were tough, where their words of encouragement, practical help, and personal example were needed most of all. And Semen Petrovich himself on occasion raised the soldiers to the attack in especially critical situations.

S. P. Vasyagin ended the war as chief of the political section and deputy commander for political affairs of the 60 Rifle Corps. Here are excerpts from performance reports written by different chiefs at various times: "Showed himself to be a courageous and valorous political worker, competently organizes party-political work in a combat situation"; "Was present in the regiments and battalions during the Velikiye Luki operation, inspiring the warriors by personal example. Behaved courageously and boldly in combat"; "Concerned, tactful, demanding of himself and subordinates. Acts courageously in a combat situation." All of these excerpts quite accurately emphasize those qualities which distinguished S. P. Vasyagin at the front.

Following the war Semen Petrovich participated in the Parade of Victory in a composite regiment of the 1st Baltic Front. In all of his subsequent activities at posts entrusted to him by the party, S. P. Vasyagin always remained true to a firm rule--serving the motherland devotedly, selflessly, with full commitment of spiritual and physical strength. From May 1953 to October 1957 he was in the Far East, where he headed the political directorate of the Far East troops, and later served as a member of the military council of the Far East Military District. These were years associated with postwar reconstruction of our armed forces, creative conceptualization and assimilation of the highly rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, and qualitative changes in the combat equipment of the troops. Working in close contact with the command, Semen Petrovich successfully led the activities of the political organs he headed.

Serving for a number of years concurrently as military council member and chief of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, S. P. Vasyagin penetrated deeply and knowledgeably into the activities of the political organs and party organizations, guiding their efforts toward better ideological work and political indoctrination among the personnel, at assimilating new combat equipment, at initiating socialist competition and conducting military-technical propaganda; he was forever concerned about improving party-political work at troop and command-and-staff exercises. S. P. Vasyagin devoted a great deal of attention to strengthening the friendship between soldiers of the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) and the laborers of the German Democratic Republic, as well as the personnel of its army.

There are unique features to political work in troops located abroad. Soldiers of the GSFG are performing their patriotic and international duty in direct contact with the most powerful and aggressive military-political grouping of imperialism--the NATO bloc. Thus the military council of the GSFG and S. P. Vasyagin's political directorate did much to make sure that troops temporarily located on the territory of the German Democratic Republic would be a strong link in the Warsaw Pact system, that they would be maximally alert, and that they would be in constant readiness to offer a worthy repulse to all adventures of the imperialist aggressors.

S. P. Vasyagin's outstanding capabilities as an organizer of party-political work and his excellent personal qualities revealed himself most fully at his post as concurrent military council member and chief of the Ground Forces Political Directorate, presented to him by the party in 1967. It would be difficult to think of a garrison or training institution which he had not visited in these years to analyze the organization of the training process and the content of party-political work, and in which he did not discuss urgent problems with young political organ chiefs and party committee secretaries, or fail to interest himself in the material and personal well-being of servicemen and their families.

Communist Vasyagin is typified by valuable qualities--vital activity, a capability for determining what is most important today and tomorrow, the ability to see the future clearly, and acquaintance with the true state of affairs of the troops at all times, in all situations. All of this helps him to solve all problems, both large and small, promptly, from party positions, in a principled way. He is distinguished by high exactingness toward subordinates and himself. Unity of word and deed are for him a law.

S. P. Vasyagin has been a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet for five convocations. He was elected a member of the Central Inspection Commission at the 13th through 25th CPSU congresses. One of the prominent political workers of the armed forces, he enjoys deserved authority. Through his total devotion to the party, his deep ideological conviction, his adherence to party principles, and his creative approach to organizing party-political work, he has earned the deep respect of all who have worked with him, and all who deal with him now.

Here is an excerpt from one of the many letters received by S. P. Vasyagin.
"I warmly thank you for your attentive attitude toward my request. Such tactful, quick solution of the problem on your part touched me to the very depth of my soul.... Please accept, Semen Petrovich, my profound mother's gratefulness for your sympathy. I wish you good health and many years of life for the good of the Soviet people.

"With deep, sincere respect, T. P. Shulet'yeva, Kirov."^{*}

The peoples deputy justifies the high trust placed in him with honor. Proposals made by his electors and approved by them enjoy broad support in the union and republic ministries.

Workers, kolkhoz chairmen, and party and soviet organ executives can be found in the offices of their deputy in Moscow and in the rayons of Kirovskaya Oblast, which he visits from time to time. He receives letters from veterans of labor and war, old production workers, agricultural laborers, and teachers.

"Today's leader," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "must organically unite, within himself, adherence to party principles and deep competency, discipline and a resourceful, creative approach to work. At the same time, wherever he is working, the leader must consider all sociopolitical and educational aspects, he must be tactful toward people, their needs, and their demands, and he must serve as an example on the job and at home."^{*}

Army General S. P. Vasyagin always tries to meet the high requirements imposed by the party upon personnel in leadership positions. The Soviet state gave a high assessment to his services to the motherland. He was awarded four orders of the Red Banner, the orders of Kutuzov, 2d Degree, the Patriotic War, 1st Degree, the Red Labor Banner, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland and the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Degree, many medals, and orders and medals of a number of foreign states.

Army General S. P. Vasyagin celebrates his 70th birthday at a high-ranking combat post. We wish the celebrant good health, much personal happiness, and new successes in his work for the good of our great fatherland, in behalf of further reinforcement of its defensive power.

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 70.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON GENERAL DRAGUNSKIY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80 pp 94-96

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Maj Gen V. Mozolev: "Colonel General Tank Troops D. A. Dragunskiy (On the 70th Anniversary of His Birth)"]

(Text) Twice-awarded Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General of Tank Troops D. A. Dragunskiy,* one of the prominent Soviet troop commanders, celebrates his 70th birthday on 15 February. His life's path is in many ways similar to the biographies of our other troop commanders--offspring of the people, nurtured by the Communist Party.

On graduating from secondary school in 1927, Komsomol member Dragunskiy entered the ranks of Moscow's working class. He assimilated several specialties as a construction worker, and with time he became leader of a youth work team. His team earned fame, and team leader David Dragunskiy became deputy to the Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon Soviet at the beginning of 1930 by the will of the workers of his city. The young worker was accepted as a candidate of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] on the day of the 25th anniversary of the 1905 December armed rebellion. Giving his all to his work, Dragunskiy found the time to continue his education, and he studied persistently with the hope of entering Moscow University. But life prepared its own "universities" for him.

At the beginning of 1931 the Moscow Committee of the VKP(b) sent Dragunskiy into the countryside to participate in one of the party's most important tasks--collectivization. Before 1933 he worked as chairman of the Akhmatovskiy Rural Soviet of Molokovskiy Rayon, Kalininskaya Oblast. Then he was called into the army. In 1936 he graduated from the Saratov Armored School. Becoming a tank commander, in the beginning of 1937 Gradunskiy took charge of a tank platoon in the 32d Separate Tank Battalion. Here,

* David Abramovich Dragunskiy was born in the village of Svitsk, presently of Novozybkovskiy Rayon, Bryanskaya Oblast, to the family of a poor craftsman. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1931.

under the guidance of senior comrades, the young lieutenant achieved a commander's proficiency, he assimilated the military equipment to perfection, and he acquired the experience of working with subordinates. Just a year later he was given command of a tank company, and on 13 June 1938 he was one of the first in the Far East to drive a tank under water across the swift-flowing Buyfun (Razdol'naya) River. The crossing took only 15 minutes, but it was preceded by days of deliberations, calculations, and preparations, and by inspection of the dozens of seals on the vehicle, and of the engine's air intake system. This exercise graphically revealed tank commander Dragunskiy's purposefulness, and his capability for working toward his goal patiently and persistently.*

He prepared his tank company for impending battles with the same sort of purposefulness. And when Japanese aggressors invaded Soviet territory by Lake Khasan, Dragunskiy's tank crewmen were the first in the battalion to reach their appointed line, having completed a 250-km march. On 2 August 1938 they participated in the assault of Bezmyannaya Hill, and on 6 August they were the first to break through to its summit. For their acts of heroism all of the company's personnel were given government awards, and its commander, David Dragunskiy, received his first order--the Order of the Red Banner.

Senior Lieutenant Dragunskiy began the Great Patriotic War as commander of a separate tank battalion. In July 1941 he led his battalion into its first attack at Dukhovshchina. And when during the battle the commander of the 1st Tank Company, Senior Lieutenant Sidorov, asked the battalion commander by radio which way he was to lead his troops, he heard in response the command: "The only way--forward!" From that time on these words became tankman Dragunskiy's motto. His will grew strong and his combat proficiency increased in savage battles at Smolensk, Moscow, Kursk, Belgorod, and Khar'kov. Quite naturally, his development as a commander led to appointment of Lieutenant Colonel D. A. Dragunskiy, at the end of October 1943, as commander of the 55th Guards Tank Brigade, 3d Guards Tank Army.

On 3 November 1943 the 1st Ukrainian Front began its Kiev offensive operation. Dragunskiy's brigade, which was committed to battle on 4 November, broke forward swiftly, and cutting off the Zhitomir Highway by the morning of 5 November, it blocked the enemy's retreat from Kiev. Then jointly with other formations of the 3d Guards Tank Army it liberated Vasil'kov, and early in the morning on 7 November it rushed into the enemy's deep rear as that army's forward detachment with the goal of capturing a road junction--the village of Pavloch', interdicting the fascists' lines of communication, and hindering their transfer of reserves to Fastov and Kiev. The brigade completed its mission successfully. In this case its commander proved himself to be a true master of raiding tactics in the enemy rear. Avoiding battle with major operational reserves advanced by the enemy, the tank crews swiftly

* Dragunskiy, D. A., "Gody v brone" [My Years in Armor], Voyenizdat, 1975, p. 10.

reached the village of Pavoloch' and captured it on the move. Soon the brigade was joined by local partisan detachments, and later by subunits of other of the army's forward detachments. Dragunskiy competently organized a ring defense about the village, and the movement of enemy troops was paralyzed for a radius of 15 km by diversionary actions. For about 10 days the brigade and partisan units repelled strikes by superior enemy forces 60 km from the front line. When ammunition finally ran out and there was little fuel left, on order of the commander of the 3d Guards Tank Army the brigade competently maneuvered out of the encirclement and punched its way in organized fashion to the army's main forces.

In mid-July 1944 Guards Colonel Dragunskiy returned to his brigade after recovering from a serious wound received in the previous battle, and led it further along the roads of war. In the course of the L'vov-Sandomierz operation the 55th Guards Tank Brigade once again operated as the forward detachment of the 3d Guards Tank Army; breaking away from the main forces, it rushed toward the Vistula with the objective of crossing it on the move and seizing a bridgehead on its west bank. But the deep San River blocked the brigade's way, and crossing resources were hopelessly far behind. Then Dragunskiy, recalling his prewar Far East experience, decided to cross the tanks on the bottom of the river. Quickly sealing up the vehicles, in 2 hours the brigade successfully crossed the San, lunged forward, and by as early as 30 July began crossing the Vistula. Then the tankmen heroically defended the Sandomierz bridgehead for 27 days together with other formations. Many of the brigade's soldiers received government awards for bravery and military proficiency displayed in these battles, and the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union sparkled on the chest of Guards Colonel Dragunskiy.

In subsequent engagements and battles of the Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and Prague operations the 55th Guards Tank Brigade often operated as a forward detachment. This was quite natural, since the personnel of the brigade and its commander had accumulated rich experience in conducting bold, maneuverable actions deep within the enemy disposition, apart from the main forces. And it was no accident that on 27 April 1945 the 55th Guards Tank Brigade closed the internal ring of encirclement around the enemy's Berlin garrison, joining with the 35th Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Belorussian Front. On 5 May the 55th Guards Tank Brigade rushed southward, and at dawn on 9 May it was among the first formations of the 3d Guards Tank Army to break into the northwestern suburbs of Prague.

For competent leadership of the brigade's actions during the assault of Berlin, for the personal bravery and valor displayed at this time, and for the brigade's swift transfer to Prague, Guards Colonel D. A. Dragunskiy was awarded a second Gold Star medal by a ukaze of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 31 May 1945.

Following the Great Patriotic War D. A. Dragunskiy successfully graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1949. Then he took command of a tank division, and an army. Beginning in June 1965 he became first deputy troop commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, and

Since May 1969 he has served as chief of Higher Officer Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution Red Banner "Vystrel" School.

Colonel General of Tank Troops D. A. Dragunskiy's entire life has been closely associated with the Soviet people and its advance guard--the CPSU. He has been honorably bearing the title of communist for about 50 years, and he always implements party decisions purposefully and persistently wherever he goes. In his practical activities, he relies competently upon political organs and party organizations, combining collective leadership with high personal responsibility for assigned work. D. A. Dragunskiy relates attentively to the work of his subordinates. He utilizes all of their ideas and proposals, and everything that is useful and valuable in the interests of attaining the assigned goal. When dealing with fellow workers, he is tactful, he adheres to party principles, and he is maximally modest. David Abramovich does a great deal of social-political work. He has been elected many times to local party and soviet organs, he has served as deputy to the supreme soviets of the Armenian SSR and the Georgian SSR, and as a delegate to the 22d Congress, and at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses he was elected member of the CPSU Central Inspection Commission.

For his services to the motherland, Colonel General D. A. Dragunskiy has been awarded the orders of Lenin, the October Revolution, four orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov, 2d Degree, two orders of the Red Star, and many medals. He also bears foreign awards.

D. A. Dragunskiy celebrates his 70th birthday full of creative strength and energy, devoting all of his knowledge, abilities, and many years of rich experience to the training and indoctrination of command personnel for the Soviet Armed Forces.

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DOSAAF TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Responses to Instructor's Article

Moscow VOYENNNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 8 Jan 80
pp 24-25

(Article by L. Yasnopol'skiy, chief of military-patriotic propaganda department of USSR DOSAAF CC: "In DOSAAF Organizations: Develop People of Conviction")

[Text] For about a year a discussion begun by V. Mikul'chik, senior instructor of the Donetskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee and candidate of historical sciences entitled "They Will Be Good Soldiers," has continued in the pages of the journal VOYENNNYE ZNANIYA. The ideas expressed by the author generated great interest and numerous responses from readers and activists of the Defense Society. Today we summarize results of this discussion.

Preparation of the youth for service in the Armed Forces always was a vital job for the Defense Society. In DOSAAF training and primary organizations draftees comprehend the ABC's of military affairs, learn to master equipment and weapons, and become conditioned morally and physically. DOSAAF committees display concern for ensuring a steady increase in the level of predraft-age youth training. Much is being done to improve the training methods direction of initial military training being conducted at training points.

Training organizations are widely adopting methods of programmed training, and the training facility is being renewed. The overwhelming majority of our schools have modern airfields, radio test ranges, laboratories and well-equipped classrooms. The latest trainers and instruments and modern visual training facilities all help prepare the youth for service in the Army and Navy. A. Kossov, an instructor of the Primorskiy

Kray DOSAAF Committee, writes in the journal that "the Defense Society is doing much to ensure that, in addition to acquiring a particular technical trade, young people become convinced patriots-internationalists, whose strong, capable hands are the masters of modern equipment in the troop inventory and in the national economy." This letter does a good job of passing on the feeling of responsibility of DOSAAF activists and cadre workers for seeing that people going into the Armed Forces possess high moral qualities and are ready to perform their military duty capably and steadfastly on orders from the party and people.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev notes that "even in our days military-patriotic indoctrination is one of the important tasks for shaping the younger generation. Today the defenders of the Soviet Motherland have to master the art of controlling intercontinental missiles, flying supersonic aircraft, controlling nuclear-powered submarines and being experts of many other very sophisticated kinds of weapons. . . . Even in this area, the missions thus have become more complex and more responsible and they have been elevated to a new level."

The discussion of Mikul'chik's article took place at a time when DOSAAF committees and organizations were vigorously beginning to implement the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work."

This important party document targeted the Defense Society's organizations at a further improvement of ideological-political and military-patriotic indoctrination, at increasing the level of mass defense work and preparation of the youth for service in the Armed Forces, and at developing military-technical sports.

The authors of many letters stress that the propaganda level, efficiency, concreteness and ties with life play an ever-increasing role in indoctrinating convinced defenders of the Motherland. This party demand was re-emphasized at the December (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said that "party propaganda and party agitation must be objective to the maximum. They must convincingly and knowledgeably respond to all questions troubling people. Then the party word will be able to merge into labor enthusiasm and the labor efforts of tens of millions of party members and nonparty persons."

Numerous public resources have been brought in for active agitation and propaganda work in DOSAAF organizations. Their role has increased in particular now, when preparations have unfolded broadly for the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth and for the 35th Anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War. It is very important for the Society's propagandists to be armed with material, to be well prepared and to be well briefed. A number of articles and letters express the idea that some committees still lack persistence and a system in

organizing work with the propaganda aktiv. This matter must be corrected efficiently. Each committee and each DOSAAF training organization must have a long-range plan for propagandist training and there must be regular seminars, briefings and exchanges of experience. The lectures and briefings prepared must be constantly analyzed. It must be recalled that the level of military-patriotic propaganda cannot be elevated without serious, thoughtful and systematic work with the propaganda aktiv.

Many responses published in the journal mention the need for a further improvement in indoctrination of the youth in glorious revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the people. The remarkable works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev entitled "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" (The Rebirth) and "Tselina" (The Virgin Land) play an enormous role in improving this work. After theoretical conferences and discussions were held with the aktiv, DOSAAF propagandists adopted vivid examples and were enriched by the profound conclusions and valuable experience of indoctrinal work which these outstanding works contain.

There is no question that all steps must be taken to ensure that all the accumulated experience of indoctrination in the glorious traditions of our socialist homeland must be used even more vigorously during days of preparation for the 35th Anniversary of the Great Victory. War heroes, frontliners and all those who defended the honor and independence of the Soviet state, fought the enemy or forged weapons in the rear in the years of the fiercest battles must be welcome guests in DOSAAF primary and training organizations.

I would like to support the opinion of a number of authors that it is desirable to link propaganda of the exploits of war years with the propaganda of today's heroism. The article entitled "One Has to Become a Soldier" emphasizes that there must be broad contact between draftees and soldiers and there must be a constant demonstration of the heroics of service in the Armed Forces. It is well that school cadets are constantly briefed on the courageous exploits of Soviet soldiers and about their allegiance to the oath, and that they are told how school graduates are serving.

This all develops love for military service, instills a pride in the Army specialty and generates in the young person a desire to continue the Army and Navy traditions with his own deeds. It is very important that the Society's propagandists and instructors and masters of production training make skilled use of the numerous examples of heroism and of military and labor exploits in their indoctrinal work. It should be recalled here that we surround military service with general respect and honor. And this will serve the work of instilling high personal responsibility for fulfillment of military duty in the youth.

Socialist competition has an ever-growing influence in accomplishing the tasks of increasing the level of mass defense work and improving

preparation of the youth for service in the Armed Forces and developing military-technical sports. It now is under way under the fighting motto: "Turn 1980 into a year of shock work, of work in a Leninist manner!"

This party appeal has been taken up by all organizations of the Defense Society. And where competition is businesslike and concrete, it has become an effective lever for motivating DOBAAF members to perform missions at hand and it clearly displays its indoctrinal role. Graphic proof of this is the high indicators achieved last year by many organizations of the Defense Society. Take the Sverdlovsk DOBAAF Radio-technical School for example. In telling about it, A. Orlov, chairman of the Sverdlovskaya Oblast Committee of the Defense Society reported that this collective was presented with two USSR DOBAAF honor emblems and certificates of the CPSU obkom and CIC of the Red Banner Ural Military District.

Socialist competition is capably organized here and its indoctrinal effect vigorously used. Visual agitation reflects its results objectively and promptly. Cadets and instructors struggle vigorously to attain the goals planned in socialist pledges.

Meanwhile, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the indoctrinal role of competition still is being used far from enough in a number of organizations. Many DOBAAF organizations approached the finale of last year with low indicators in mass defense work. The fact is, as many participants of the discussion emphasized, that concern is not always shown for fulfillment of the pledges and elements of formalism are permitted. There is no question that this year we must avoid these deficiencies and ensure broad scope of competition and the active participation therein of all DOBAAF members.

All forms and methods and all levers must be used more vigorously in the struggle to raise the level of indoctrinal work. An improvement in the entire system of military-patriotic indoctrination of the Society's members, and the youth above all, is linked inseparably with introduction of an integrated approach to the job of indoctrination. Integrated organization of work is a complex and many-sided process. It includes moral-political preparation of the future soldier, arming him with military and military-technical knowledge, training in a military specialty, and physical conditioning.

Speaking of the integrated organization of military-patriotic indoctrination, many readers remarked that it is very important for training organizations to implement the principle: "Training and indoctrination are a single process." This task continues to be one of the primary ones for the directors and instructors of our schools. Where concern is shown for this, where love for the military specialty is instilled in cadets during training, and where military indoctrination is carried on, the level of preparation of young people for service in the Armed Forces invariably rises.

It is important here that instructors and masters of production training systematically expand their theoretical and pedagogic knowledge, improve methods skills and implement foremost experience of working with cadets.

In summarizing results of the discussion conducted in the journal's pages, it should be noted that it unquestionably will assist the Defense Society's aktiv to determine its tasks more clearly and concretely, and to adopt the best examples of capable and thoughtful military-patriotic work. The task is to achieve a new rise in the level of military-patriotic, mass defense, training and sports work and persistently train Soviet citizens for defending the Motherland.

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Murmansk Technical School

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p 24

[Article by I Vasil'yev, city of Murmansk: "During the Days of the Month-long Campaign"]

(Text) Every four hours music and the sound of bells are heard at the Memorial to Sunken Ships on the shore of the Murmansk Harbor. It is a sacred spot for residents of the largest North Sea port in the country!

Here is where a column of cadets and instructors of the Murmansk DOSAAF Joint Technical School heads to lay a wreath at the marker of eternal memory to the fallen defenders of the Soviet Arctic in the Great Patriotic War.

O. Gromov, chief of the training organization, told us that "we conduct many such activities instilling allegiance to traditions of the older generation in the youth, especially during the All-Union Monthlong Campaigns of Mass Defense Work."

"On such days the Red Banner Northern Fleet Museum arranges a mobile exhibit in the foyer of the school at our request. In looking it over, the future soldiers learn of the exploits of Hero SU V. Kizlyakov, who held Nameless Hill alone for a day, beating off a company of fascists; of submariner Capt-Lt A. Shabalin; and of other brave defenders of the socialist homeland. They learn of examples of courage displayed by Northern Fleet navymen in peacetime as well."

The present Monthlong Campaign is taking place in an atmosphere of nationwide preparation for the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth and the 35th Anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War. And in addition to other activities, the plan for the All-Union Monthlong Campaign devoted to the 62d Anniversary of the Soviet

Armed Forces envisages lectures on the topic: "Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Homeland," "The Soviet Army: The Army-Liberator," "The World Historic Importance of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War" and others.

The vigorous military-patriotic work being performed in the training organization contributes to an increase in the cadets' awareness and instills in them a feeling of responsibility for preparing for service in the ranks of the Armed Forces.

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In Mary, Turkmenistan SSR

Moscow VOYENNNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 8 Jan 80
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(Article by Yu. Goncharov: "By Joining Efforts")

[Text] The monthlong campaigns of mass defense work became a real review of the quality of preparation of draft-age youth for Army service in our oblast. They are held jointly by military commissariats, DOSAAF committees, civil defense entities, the "Znaniye" Society and other public organizations. During this period DOSAAF primary organizations summarize results of a competitive review for best condition of the initial military training facility and they hold competitions in marksmanship and applied military combined games. Film festivals on military-patriotic topics are held in many of the oblast's cities.

This year group methods classes on pre-draft training were held with military instructors, many of whom are chairmen of DOSAAF primary organizations, during preparations for the All-Union Monthlong Campaign devoted to the 62d Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their participants spoke of deficiencies still existing in initial military training. Organizers of the classes in turn propagandized the experience of the best, and we have many of these. We can mention V. Vasil'yev, I. Barukov, V. Zverev, R. Bol'shakov, Ya. Ovesnov and A. Kondrakhin. These are veterans who gave 15-20 years of their lives to indoctrinating the youth.

An integrated plan for conducting the monthlong campaign has been drawn up under the direction of the party obkom. In conformity with it, all labor collectives and training organizations outlined concrete activities for propagandizing historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the USSR Constitution and behests of Lenin on defense of the socialist homeland. Together with military commissariates, the Komsomol and other public organizations, the Society's committees plan to organize defense evenings and invite frontliners and prominent production workers. The guests will tell the youth about the striking changes which have occurred in our country in the years of Soviet power and about the courage and heroism of

Soviet soldiers in the struggle against enemies of the socialist homeland. A discussion of works by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, entitled "Malaya Zemlya," "Vosroshdeniye," "Tseline" and "Na strahe mira i sotsializma" (Guarding Peace and Socialism) is held everywhere on such evenings.

The above activities contribute to bringing up the predraft-age youth in a spirit of love for our glorious Armed Forces and generate the desire to prepare in the best way possible for service in the Army. At the same time they help get rid of present shortcomings in preparing the youth for military service. For example, some rayons in the oblast still have no precise coordination of actions among DOSAAF organizations, military commissariats and entities of people's education. Military training rooms, shooting galleries and drill fields are not equipped well enough everywhere. We still find such instructors of training institutions who view these matters as something secondary despite demands of the USSR law entitled "On Universal Military Obligation."

Successful conduct of the All-Union Monthlong Campaign of Mass Defense Work on the threshold of the banner dates for our people--the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth and the 35th Anniversary of Victory over Hitler Germany--is a matter of honor for every committee and every organization of the Defense Society. DOSAAF activists see their task in making the level of military-patriotic, mass defense and sports work achieved during the monthlong campaign as the daily norm for every collective.

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Naval Training in Sverdlovsk

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 8 Jan 80 pp 26-27

(Individual articles by instructor B. Stryapunin, master of production training V. Volodin, and V. Maslyanyy, deputy chief of school for training and indoctrination work: "Sverdlovsk Naval")

[Text] The capital of the Urals, the city of Sverdlovsk, is located far from the sea. Nevertheless, it is closely linked with the fleet. A DOSAAF naval school is located here. Its graduates serve in the Baltic and on the Black Sea, in the Pacific and in the Arctic. They set examples of faultless performance of their duty and show a good knowledge of their specialty and high discipline.

This is a Good Cause... - B. Stryapunin

I have been working with cadets of our school for over 30 years. I had to master several military specialties and work as instructor, master of production training and finally as a teacher. I became convinced how important it is to provide the future soldier with practical skills. It is not by chance that the cadet training program devotes a large part of the time to laboratory work.

I conduct classes in a group of telegraphers. Practical training here is the basis of all the training, and we constantly take consideration of this. The trouble is that the make-up of the cadets is merely heterogeneous. There are fitters and joiners and drivers... One can ask what is the difference? The important thing is to train the specialists well. But there is a difference, and no small one at that. Not every person can be made a sufficiently skilled telegrapher. I will explain the problem. For example, take the fingers of a musician and a bricklayer. In the former they already are adapted for the keyboard, and he easily masters work on the telegraph set. The latter's hands have become accustomed to holding a trowel and bricks. His fingers have become rough and respond poorly in working on our gear. A new specialty comes with difficulty to such a cadet.

And further, we ourselves choose cadets for the group from among the predraft-age youth. We make mistakes here at times. We chat with each one and tell about the future military specialty. Nevertheless, we do not fully learn about a person. Later we ourselves pay for our little mistake.

I believe that psychological tests are necessary to make it easier to select cadets. We do not yet have them. We are in no position to prepare them ourselves, as specialists are needed for this. Such tests apparently are being used somewhere. I would like the person who is using them to share his experience through the journal.

Appropriate conditions have to be set up for successful practical training. How do matters stand with this in our school? Comparing today's situation with what we had just a few years ago, I can say with pride that our conditions are excellent! Let's take the telegraphers. Each one has an assigned desk and functioning apparatus. The trainee himself monitors its serviceability and performs a preventive inspection under the observation of a master.

But we want to have more. For example, we now can provide for simultaneous work by 70 cadets, but in the near future we plan to bring the number of training areas up to 120.

I wish to recognize our rationalizers. They are the ones who help us improve practical training. For example, a monitor created by master N. Kravtsov permits the instructor to monitor each cadet's actions

without leaving his place. The instructor promptly registers the trainees' mistakes, reacts to them immediately and takes necessary steps.

Methods instructions specially prepared by our workers for every exercise and which reflect normative requirements also are valuable. By using the text, a cadet monitors his own work and becomes accustomed to working correctly.

Supplementary classes are held with laggards at the end of the training day, which allows leveling off the pupils' training. It is true that one's own free time has to be spent for this.

We train some of the cadets without their separation from production. The lads come to school directly from work and study late. The training is difficult, they become tired and we naturally try to give them more attention.

We try to generate the lads' interest in classes. Socialist competition serves as one of the stimuli. It is held among cadets and among groups. We award distinguished persons with prizes and diplomas and we make results of competition known to the entire school.

Difficult cadets are a subject of special concern. We are more attentive toward them and watch to see that not one misses a class. If necessary, we invite parents to school, chat with them and hold parents' meetings regularly. We are also assisted by workers of the military commissariat, the Komsomol raykoms and the members of enterprises at which the cadets work.

And a final word. To ensure that the instructor himself does not lag behind, he must constantly augment his knowledge and improve himself in methodology. Each year I renew lecture outlines in the specialty, familiarize myself with technical literature and study new equipment. I make up methods elaborations for our young instructors. I am now helping young master B. Kolotinskiy. At one time he completed our school, served in the fleet and returned to us. He still has little experience, but this will come in time. The important thing is that he fell in love with his work, for training specialists for the Armed Forces is a good cause!

By the Law of Naval Service - V. Volodin

I came to work in the Sverdlovsk DOSAAF Naval School with service in the Navy behind me. I returned to Sverdlovsk because I was drawn by native lands. But I immediately yearned for the sea. And how happy I was when I sensed that everything here in the school reminds one of the sea and the fleet. I work with satisfaction.

My primary duty is to train communications specialists. But I consider making cadets into navymen to be no less important a mission, i.e., familiarizing them with the fundamentals of naval practice. For they will have to serve in the fleet, encounter the need to know flag signals, determine classes and types of warships, row and sail a boat.

And so we try to teach all this in the school. It is true that there are enough difficulties, such as with the study of the six-oared sea-boat. The water station where practical training of boating is conducted is located on a reservoir remote from the school, and it does not function in winter. What is to be done? We can't drag a seaboot to school to study its design. Then we built a real seaboot to half-scale with all its authorized gear and placed it in a classroom as a training aid. Now the cadets have an opportunity to study not only the seaboot's design in school, but also the actions of oarsmen at the commands of petty officers.

We organized the signal bridge of a warship in this same classroom. Everything is in full scale here--the searchlights for transmitting light semaphore, the set of signal flags, and the mast with halyards. On going up on the bridge, a cadet almost feels as if he is on a real ship, and he gets the desire to become a navymen faster.

In speaking of making navymen out of our pupils, I also cannot help but note the following fact. After the lads work for a month or two in the school, you see that many begin wearing knitted shirts and worn-out naval uniform shirts given them by senior comrades who went into the reserve. And we do not see any kind of a fashion fad in this. The lads simply ache for the sea while within the walls of the school. And we do not cure this illness but, to the contrary, contribute to its development in every possible way.

Many teenagers know about the DOSAAF Naval School in Sverdlovsk. They often drop in on us and ask about training. And while just relatively recently some draftees went to the Navy unwillingly because of the extra year of service, they themselves now ask to be sent to our school. Such lads learn with great willingness and prepare themselves conscientiously for service. The cadet collective is becoming more and more cohesive and lives according to the laws of military service. I recall a recent incident. The lads noted that one cadet was poorly dressed. They learned that his family was not well off materially. They gave the lad a good jacket on his birthday. Everyone was happy that they had helped a comrade. There need be no doubt that should such lads get into a difficult combat situation, they would act according to the laws of traditional fleet friendship.

Learning that the military specialty obtained in "civilian life" will hardly come in handy, some cadets become cool toward training and believe that they are wasting time in vain. But if we manage to generate their

desire to become navymen, to serve aboard ship and to go on long deployments, then they change their attitude toward training. We succeed in this most often and after some time we find a letter has come to the school from the fleet: The commander is thanking us for the good training for service of our pupil, who is assiduously performing his duties. And this is the same cadet who was grieving that his military specialty was inappropriate.

Lessons of Patriotism - V. Maslyany

We try to hold every class with cadets so that it is at the same time a lesson in patriotism, for one of our primary missions is the military-patriotic indoctrination of students and the shaping of the spiritual make-up of the future navymen.

Sverdlovsk has all opportunities for successful work in this regard. Our city is the center of heavy industry in the Urals and dozens of its enterprises are known throughout the world, especially Uralmash. Sverdlovsk is famous for its labor exploits, both in the war years and in peacetime. Many war veterans from the Urals live here. They are frequent guests of the school.

I recall a meeting with WO (Ret) S. A. Pogrebinskiy, a participant of the heroic defense of the Hanko Peninsula. The veteran came to school in the uniform he wore during wartime. On his chest were combat orders and medals. The cadets listened with bated breath to the veteran's story of the unforgettable days of the Great Patriotic War and of the exploits of Baltic Fleet navymen. In the name of the city veterans' council, he gave the lads an order to prepare themselves excellently for service in the fleet and to preserve and augment the traditions of Soviet navymen.

The numerous displays prepared by the cadets themselves also call for this: "They Fought for the Motherland," "The USSR Navy," "The School's Graduates are Naval Officers," "Be Worthy of the Heroes' Glory" and others.

The Lenin room has become an effective center of military-patriotic indoctrination. Here we hold schoolwide lessons of courage, we organize a viewing of films on the Army and Navy and invite veterans of war and labor here.

And how the cadets fight for the right to take part in the ceremonial procession held in Sverdlovsk on Victory Day on 9 May!

On this day the best pass through the city's central square in the uniform of seamen. We usually follow a column of former naval frontliners. One has to see the impression this leaves on every cadet. The lads draw themselves up as if they have matured, realizing that they are to receive the baton of combat glory.

Almost two-thirds of cadets who have graduated during the school's existence completed it with outstanding grades. The graduates come to the fleet with a profound understanding of their duty. Here is what we were written by former cadets, now Baltic Fleet navymen, Snn S. Miklin and Snn S. Romanov: "We arrived in the unit and became convinced from the very first days that it was well that we had not been lazy in the naval school and had heeded the advice and admonitions of instructors and the behests of veterans. Knowledge and an understanding of our duty--all this helps us master our duties and become otlichniki faster. And we advise the lads who now have come to the school in our place: Don't waste time; take everything you are given in the classes and practices; remember that you are to become defenders of the Motherland and to serve in the fleet."

We post such letters on a special display for general viewing. There are always crowds of young cadets near it. The lads are fulfilling the behest of the navymen. They will do everything to prepare themselves for exemplary service in the fleet.

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DOSAAF: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Cooperation with Komsomol Organizations

Moscow VOYENNNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 signed to press 8 Feb 80
pp 30-31

[Article by G. Peklichev, chief of a department of Komsomol CC: "In DOSAAF Organizations: Combat Cooperation"]

[Text] Komsomol members and all Soviet youth are preparing to mark the 110th Anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War with new achievements in labor, in training, in military service and in public work in an atmosphere of high political and labor enthusiasm.

Lenin's name is sacred to the Komsomol. Throughout the entire history of the heroic struggle and victories of the Soviet people, the Communist Youth League, led by the Party of Communists, bore allegiance to the cause of October and to the immortal behests of the leader of the first workers' state in the world.

The Leninist Komsomol sees as its most important task to continue worthily the traditions of the older generations, to learn communism, to master knowledge and professional expertise persistently, to work selflessly in production and to fulfill its military duty to the Motherland wholeheartedly. Today the BAM [Baikal-Amur Mainline] and KamAZ [Kama Automobile Plant], "Atommash" and the non-Chernozem area, and the grandiose construction sites of Siberia and the Far East have become the addresses of the civil and labor exploits of young boys and girls in our country.

One of the most responsible party assignments to the Komsomol is mastery of the ABC's of military affairs, preparation of the youth for armed defense of the Motherland, and bringing young boys and girls in for active participation in strengthening our state's defenses.

The decision of the 5th Komsomol CC Plenum states: "It is the patriotic duty of Komsomol organizations to instil in the younger generation a feeling of historic responsibility for the destiny of socialism. To indoctrinate the youth consistently and purposefully in the heroic traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. . . . All this work must be aimed at developing in young people a love for the Soviet Armed Forces, at preparing them to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army, and at increasing the practical readiness of young boys and girls to defend the Motherland..."

And the Komsomol is accomplishing this important task in close cooperation with the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy. Suffice it to say that over 30 million Komsomol members go through the school of courage and patriotism in the Defense Society, and Komsomol members head up every third DOSAAF primary organization.

Interesting experience of joint military-patriotic and mass defense work has been gained in the many years of fruitful cooperation. Today no major military-patriotic activities of the Leninist Komsomol manage without the participation of DOSAAF. At the same time, the initiative of the Defense Society always finds support of the Komsomol.

Joint efforts of the Komsomol and DOSAAF go into arranging defense-sports health camps and military-patriotic youth associations. They hold competitive reviews of military-patriotic work and tests of draft-age and predraft-age youth in military-technical training, and monthlong and weeklong campaigns devoted to banner dates in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces.

There are many other useful projects in our cooperation practice that have received general recognition. Above all, it is the All-Union Tour of Komsomol Members and the Youth through Places of Revolutionary, Combat and Labor Glory of the Soviet People, in which over 56 million young boys and girls take part. Originated 15 years ago, the All-Union Tour has become the most popular, most massive form of indoctrinating the youth in heroic traditions.

Guided by demands of the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" concerning a quest for new effective forms of military-patriotic indoctrination of the population, and the youth above all, the AUCCTU, Komsomol Central Committee, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, USSR Ministry of Culture and the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport of the USSR Council of Ministers passed a joint decree on an annual All-Union Memory Watch of the Youth and Young Pioneers from 3 through 9 May, devoted to the Soviet people's exploit in the Great Patriotic War. This watch has become a vivid symbol of the young generation's indestructible allegiance to the glorious traditions of the fathers and grandfathers.

September of last year marked the beginning of a new patriotic tradition in the city of Pyatigorsk: The 1st All-Union Rally of Komsomol-Young Pioneer Sentry Posts at the Eternal Flame of Glory was held here.

The results of all joint activity of the Komsomol and DOSAAF in the military-patriotic indoctrination of boys and girls are determined by the readiness of the younger generation for labor and defense of the USSR. It is gratifying to note that each year better trained replacements come into the Army and Navy. They are ideologically convinced, physically fit, and technically competent young people. As responses from the units and subunits attest, the draftees have a heightened interest in military service and the profession of the Soviet officer. Discipline and efficiency have improved. A further development of interesting forms and methods of indoctrinating future soldiers in the joint work of Komsomol and DOSAAF committees largely contributed to this.

Over 24 million Young Pioneers and schoolchildren, Komsomol members and the youth begin their path toward military service in the "Zarnitsa" of the Young Pioneers and the "Orlenka" of the Komsomol. The military-sports games accustom the young people to the fundamentals of military affairs and to developing qualities and practical skills needed by defenders of the Motherland. Komsomol and DOSA[?] committees regard organization of the games in a serious and businesslike manner in Rostovskaya, Kaliningradskaya, Sverdlovskaya, Vologodskaya, Gor'kovskaya, Novosibirskaya, Penzenskaya, Kirovogradskaya and Brestskaya oblasts, in the Latvian SSR and in the Chuvash ASSR.

We are rightfully proud of the fact that a majority of personnel of military units, warships and border guard posts are made up of Party and Komsomol members, that every third Army and Navy Komsomol member is an otlichnik of combat and political training, that every other one is a rated specialist, and that a majority of them acquired military specialties in the Defense Society's training organizations.

At the same time, there are still many unused points for joint application of efforts in further raising the quality of preparing the youth for service in the Soviet Army and Navy in the work of Komsomol and DOSAAF committees. Take just the training of specialists conducted by DOSAAF for the USSR Armed Forces and the national economy.

Some two million young people each year acquire specialties needed by the national economy in Defense Society organizations without separation from production. Every third draftee receives professional training here needed for service in the Army and Navy. Meanwhile, far from all Komsomol committees take part in selecting draftees for DOSAAF training organizations or in raising the level of political indoctrination work among cadets. But the fact is, our joint goal not only is to provide the cadets with vast technical knowledge, but to ensure that graduates

of training organizations serve in an exemplary manner on arriving in military collectives, that they are the example for their comrades and are the first and active assistants of commanders and political workers.

A recent check performed by the Komsomol CC and USSR DOSAAF CC in Penzenskaya Oblast and Krasnodarskiy Kray showed that where Komsomol committees realized the importance of work in DOSAAF training organizations, where Komsomol workers and activists handled the selection of cadets not in words but in deeds and where they performed political and indoctrination work with them daily and persistently, the successes are apparent.

For example, take the Penza DOSAAF Automobile School, where the chief is A. Vessel'yev. The high moral atmosphere, the cadets' active participation in sociopolitical life, and the joint, purposeful work of the Komsomol and DOSAAF to select the best part of the draft-age youth for entering the school allowed good results to be achieved. The school has been recognized with DOSAAF and Komsomol awards, but it would appear that the most important award lies in the fact that its leaders receive dozens of letters from military units in which commanders thank them not only for preparing outstanding specialists, but also for indoctrinating genuine patriots of our Motherland.

On 22 February 1979 the Penza Komsomol Obkom Bureau examined the question "On further improvement of sponsorship by Komsomol organizations of DOSAAF training organizations." As a result all Komsomol raykoms and gorkoms together with DOSAAF committees approved integrated work programs in the Defense Society's training organizations.

The Minsk and Khmel'nik naval schools, the Krasnopresnenskiy Automobile School of Moscow, Vladivostok Radio-Technical School, the Bryansk and Yegor'yevsk air clubs, the Lutsk Automobile School, and the Khabarovsk Joint DOSAAF Technical School--this is a far from complete list of the Defense Society's training organizations where joint efforts of Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations in the ideological-political and moral indoctrination of cadets permitted the achievement of a substantial rise in the quality of specialist training for the USSR Armed Forces.

Final competitions of the 7th Games of USSR Nations in Military-Technical Sports concluded last fall. Tens of millions of boys and girls took part in it. In all phases of the Games primary Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations and DOSAAF sports-technical clubs and committees held over three million competitions of varying scale in which over 50 million persons took part.

Particular note should be taken of the qualitatively new approach to organizing competitions in military-technical sports on the part of many Komsomol committees. In contrast to the previous Games, temporary Komsomol organizations were set up in the union republic ten-

Party-Komsomol meetings were held and extensive plans for political indoctrination activities were developed.

For the first time, the Komsomol CC established ten memorial prizes entitled "For Will and Courage." Komsomol CC's of union republics and Komsomol kraykoms and obkoms established memorial prizes.

Meanwhile, the Komsomol still has much to do to fulfill the Party's demand to be the sole and leading force of the mass sports movement in the country. This demand is filled with special meaning today. The Games of the 22d Olympiad will be held in the city-hero of Moscow in the summer of 1980. Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations are called upon to take a most active part in their preparation and conduct.

Speaking at a reception for delegates of the 18th Komsomol Congress in the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, Mar Avn A. I. Pokryshkin, Triple Hero of the Soviet Union, chairman of the Defense Society, noted the positive work experience of Komsomol organizations in strengthening and developing the DOSAAF physical facility.

In conformity with the Komsomol CC Secretariat Decree entitled "On Measures for Further Improvement of Joint Work of Komsomol and DOSAAF Organizations in the Military-Patriotic Indoctrination of the Youth," 42 oblast, kray and republic Komsomol committees are sponsoring the building of DOSAAF facilities.

There are many examples of successful work in this direction. The Lipetskaya Komsomol Obkom gave the Defense Society much assistance in reconstructing the Yelets Radiotechnical School. The Khabarovskiy Kraykom of the Komsomol organized Komsomol sponsorship of the reconstruction of a DOSAAF naval school. Over 10,000 man-days were put in by Komsomol members of Moscow to build rayon DOSAAF clubs. Twenty Komsomol-youth Saturday workdays were held at the initiative of the Kiev Gorkom and Obkom for constructing DOSAAF facilities in the capital of the Ukraine.

The Minskaya, Donetskaya, Volgogradskaya, Tul'skaya, Novosibirskaya and Kurskaya oblast committees of the Komsomol cooperate productively with DOSAAF committees in strengthening the physical base of the Defense Society.

Meanwhile, it must be admitted self-critically that far from all Komsomol committees are fulfilling their obligations. The efforts of Komsomol organizations in 1980 will be aimed at eliminating these deficiencies.

The Leninist Komsomol and DOSAAF are faced with important tasks of further increasing the effectiveness and quality of joint work in strengthening the defenses of the socialist Motherland and preparing worthy defenders of the achievements of October. The many years of productive

experience of our close cooperation provide every basis to be convinced that these tasks will be fulfilled honorably.

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DOSAAF Members' Biographies

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(Article by I. Moskovtsev: "Giving Their All")

[Text] A collection of essays published by Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF entitled "...And for Life" familiarizes us with 35 activists of the Defense Society. They are people of varying age, veterans who went through the Great Patriotic War or even through the Civil War, and people who still are young, who recently returned from Army service. They also have various positions, authorized or public. Some head primary organizations, others head sports-technical clubs, and still others work there as instructors... But they are joined by their attitude toward the common cause in which they are engaged; toward the cause of military-patriotic indoctrination of workers and training them, and predraft-age persons above all, to defend the Motherland.

Enthusiastic people or enthusiasts is how all whom the collection tells about can rightfully be called. Its name was given by an essay on Sergey Gavrilovich Loginov, DOSAAF committee chairman of Moscow University. His entire life as an old party member and frontlinesman was devoted to the cause of strengthening the defense of the Soviet Land. And this could be said about every hero of the collection, with their difference, as was stated, being merely in the number of years they have lived.

The authors of the essays—primarily journalists of our Defense Society—show their heroes at work and explain why they managed to achieve much in important sectors of indoctrination and training work. The important element is always in the same thing—dedication to work, enthusiasm and keenness. When this is present, everything goes well as a rule. But the enthusiasts in this instance are organizers, and this requires an ability or an art, if you wish, to teach and indoctrinate. And the sketches contain much confirmation of the fact that their heroes possess such qualities. Here is one example.

The sketch by A. Vasil'yev entitled "Young Lads Come to Manhood in 'Courage,'" which would appear to be among the best in the collection, tells about a teenagers' club in Leningrad and its tireless leader Mikhail Petrovich Grek. This club has a gymnasium, classrooms for radiotelegraphy and NVP [initial military training] and circles: marksmanship, radio, unarmed combat and others. It is easy to enumerate

them, but what efforts Mikhail Petrovich and his DOSAAF activist assistants had to apply to obtain the premises and organize them properly. The club chief is an indisputable authority for 650 youngsters who come here almost every day. The authority rests to no small extent on a respectful attitude toward the teenagers and on an understanding of how they cherish their independence and how they are sickened by tiresome coddling.

Let's hear how he speaks about worn-out indoctrination methods: "We have a contingent where shouting, visible force, so to speak, and adult superiority are not assistants... That makes it worse. But to be able to generate a response in a teenager's heart by one's own intelligence, knowledge, kindness and interest in his destiny--this is not given to every person..."

It is unquestionably given to him, to Mikhail Petrovich.

It appears to us that the value of the collection also lies in the fact that the authors report many living initiatives of their heroes, initiatives which contribute to the military-patriotic indoctrination of labor and training collectives. For example, at the Tiraspol' Sewing Factory imeni 40th Anniversary of Komsomol, the DOSAAF committee chairman Ivan Vasil'yevich Pashchenko (essay by N. Stepanishchev entitled "Trust") arranged competitions in marksmanship among shops and work shifts (and this bears a regular character). Here, too, it became a tradition to hold military-patriotic rallies in a forest tent city with the participation of shop teams competing in applied military sports and demonstrating during the unique competition how well they know the Armed Forces regulations.

The sketch by A. Nesterskiy entitled "The Tikhmyanov Heights" is dedicated to Hero SU L. Tikhmyanov, chairman of the Tul'skaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee. It tells of trips by DOSAAF agitation teams to kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the oblast. They go out in agitation vehicles which can be called clubs on wheels. They stop and quickly unfold an exhibit of military-patriotic literature, show films and hold discussions. This initiative was generalized by the Tul'skaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee and received extensive dissemination.

The sketch by L. Chepaykins entitled "A Person with a Restless Soul" is dedicated to Vladimir Stepanovich Smorodinskiy, who for many years has headed the Pavlovo-Posadskiy DOSAAF Gorkom of Moscow Oblast. It expresses an idea meriting attention, about the use by small organizations of the technical facility of large organizations. This is done from time to time in various places, but in Pavlovo-Posad we are not speaking about doing a favor, but about official assignment of one organization to another and about stipulated conditions of their inter-relations.

Kurbantay Igamberdiyev, chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the Mankent Kolkhoz in Chinkentskaya Oblast (the sketch by V. Borokhin entitled "Maturity") became convinced of how military-technical holidays held here in teams and on farms raise the authority of DOSAAF.

At first there are discussions about technical specialties and how important it is to acquire them in the interests both of the national economy and the Motherland's defense. Then there are entertaining competitions in motorcycle figure driving, motor patrol races and so on.

In the sketch by I. Benetskaya entitled "These Difficult Kilometers" we became acquainted with Nina Antonovna Dubova, who has been coping excellently for over 15 years now with seemingly strictly male duties as chief of a DOSAAF automobile school in the city of Uchta (Komi ASSR). Well, among Nina Antonovna's many initiatives the following are mentioned. Relying on instructors and the cadet aktiv, she organizes automobile trips to places where the famed Red Partisans fought fierce battles with the White Guards in the distant years of the Civil War. This is the country's history. And let the history of the automobile school, which trained so many fervent patriots of their Motherland, merge with that history as a small rivulet. And Nina Antonovna and her instructor colleagues decided that all memorable events in the life of the training organization should be filmed. Many rolls already have been accumulated, and these amateur films are viewed with interest by all new generations of cadets. They view them and add to them.

It is believed that the reader will close this book with a good feeling. He will have met many people worthy of respect. Such people make up the capital of our Defense Society, if it can be expressed thus. It is strong in them. With them it accomplishes the responsible missions assigned by the Party.

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In Belgorod

Moscow VOYENNNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 signed to press 8 Feb 80 p 33

(Photo report: "Routine of the Rayon Organization")

[Text] "Indoctrinating the youth in traditions of the older generation is the main direction in the work of our defense organization," says I. Berdenikov, chairman of the Oktyabr'skiy Rayon Committee of DOSAAF of the city of Belgorod. "And after we joined the All-Union Competitive Review of DOSAAF Rayon and City Organizations devoted to the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth, this activity took on even greater scope. A'l

primary organizations, and there are over 200 in the rayon, are conducting vigorous propaganda of the behests of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin on defense of the socialist homeland, demands of the Constitution and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress on further strengthening the defensive might of the Motherland. To this end we hold meetings with war veterans and tours to places of the Soviet people's glory, and we organize lectures and discussions.

"Training and sport work has improved considerably in the rayon organization. During the All-Union Competitive Review we prepared over 200 drivers, motorcycle operators and tractor operators and hundreds of ranking sportsmen in marksmanship, underwater sport, radio sport and parachute sport.

"A worthy greeting for the Leninist jubilee! All defense collectives of the rayon now are living and working under that motto."

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. Memorials to heroes of the battle in the Kursk Bulge.
2. Acceptance into Komsomol membership in the memorial museum's room. The lads are receiving badges and Komsomol cards from the hands of Great Patriotic War veterans and Defense Society activists Yu. Boyev and I. Prisukhin.
3. DOSAAF activist and candidate for master of sport N. Terekhov conducts another class in the marksmanship section of the Belgorod Industrial Tekhnikum.
4. Members of the radio sport section of the primary DOSAAF organization of Boarding School No 23 of the city of Belgorod are preparing for the next competitions. Many of them such as V. Bashminov, M. Kononov and L. Oserova are members of the oblast team.
5. Participants of a motorcycle trip through places of revolutionary, combat and labor glory of the Soviet people at the Eternal Flame.

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Military Medley Competition

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[Article by V. Pestovskiy, two-time USSR champion in VPM (applied military combined events): "Congratulations on VPM, Lada!"]

(Text) When it was suggested that I test myself in a new form of sport, the applied military combined events, in 1970 I already had the tekhnikum,

the Army, four years of study in the Institute of Physical Culture and 30 years of life behind me. At that age many athletes are thinking about physical culture, but here was a new kind of sport! It was simplest, of course, to refuse. But the diversity and physical practicality of the VPM appeared very attractive to me.

This is an integrated kind of sport. It demands endurance in crosscountry racing with a weapon over broken terrain, the ability of firing from the move when sweat pours into the eyes and the pulse rate exceeds 180 per minute, and throwing grenades long and accurately on a line as if on the battlefield. And if we add to this swimming, filigree control of a vehicle, emotions, strength, adroitness and accuracy in a marksmanship duel, and an applied military obstacle course, it becomes understandable why I still decided to begin my athletic career anew.

By the way, "begin anew" is not quite accurate. In the Army I was drawn to the officers' combined events and in the Institute I worked on the modern pentathlon and a little on naval combined events, so that I was familiar to a certain extent with many of the VPM elements. Nevertheless, I had to train stubbornly to prepare for performances at the 5th Games of USSR Nations in Applied Military Sport, which for the first time included a USSR championship in VPM. And although the Games turned out to be fortunate for me (I became Soviet Union champion), I needed another ten years to confirm this title and win the right to again go up on the highest level of the pedestal.

It is no small matter to return to major sports again at the limit of age for an athlete and after this become two-time champion of the USSR and six-time champion of Moscow. And the reader will have to excuse me for the fervent emotion, but I give deep respect to you, VPM, and many thanks for everything but, most important, for my health.

As a veteran of this sport, I can say with complete responsibility that a lad who has gone through the school of VPM will not be a greenhorn in the first days of service, but a genuine master of his trade. Become friends with VPM, lads!

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Advice for Shooters

Moscow VOYENNNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 signed to press 8 Feb 80 p 35

[Article by Ye. Khaydurov, Honored Coach of USSR, and Ye. Roshchupkin, Master of Sport of USSR of an international class]

[Text] Shooting always must remain a pleasant and desirable matter for the athlete attempting to attain high and, most important, stable results. If this feeling is present, one must preserve it; if it still

has not taken shape or already has disappeared, develop it in yourself consciously.

The athlete must constantly read specialized literature on the fundamentals of sports practice and analyze it.

With his very first steps in the sport, the shooter must be attuned to a steadfast quest in the field of shooting techniques and tactics. It is also very important for the shooter to learn to see himself from the side, as it were, to analyze his compensations and draw appropriate conclusions.

Between competitions one must comprehend the technique of carrying out an ideal cycle in firing a shot and the most rational shooting tactics. To this end one must attempt to formulate the basic elements of shooting techniques and tactics precisely and present them in discussion form either to one's coach or to a colleague in arms. It is even better if these thoughts are constantly reflected in your shooting diary. By looking through the entries periodically, one can refresh in memory the fundamentals of rational shooting and plan training correctly.

Remember that practicing without a cartridge is very productive. It is enormously simpler to practice an individual technical movement in the pure form without a cartridge. Such practices are used most often during warm-ups and especially when renewing practices after a long break. It is recommended that this method of practice also be used when a drop in shooting results arises which is unexplainable from your point of view.

Use of the telescope during shooting must be reduced to a minimum. This will permit reducing expenditures both of nervous and physical energy. It will increase the demands and, at the same time, trust in your own sensations. The primary task is to have the shot cycle performed in a technically correct manner, but through the telescope you are seeing what can no longer be corrected (it stands to reason that your weapon has been zeroed in).

Know that the time spent in testing any innovation or complication in practice must not exceed 25-30 percent of the overall time of one session.

The shooter must make cautious use of exercises with weights in general physical training (dumbbells, expander, barbells and so on). It should be remembered that they have a negative effect on shooting results, since rashly developed strength dulls muscle sensations needed in shooting sport.

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Girls' Swim Competition

Moscow VOENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 signed to press 8 Feb 80 pp 36-37

[Article from city of Sverdlovsk by A. Chernykh: "Little Girls Came to the Pool"]

[Text] Each day little girls and boys with sports bags hurry from all corners of wintertime Sverdlovsk, with the cold, penetrating winds, to the Water Sports Palace. And on this evening as well the noisy throngs of youngsters rushed in here.

They are engaged in water sports. Some have come for their first swimming lessons, and others for practices to fulfill the next norm. There are many sections and circles here. There also is a section of underwater racers of the DOSAAF Sports-Technical Club.

Club chief Svetlana Nikolayevna Kupina thought a bit at my request to introduce the best section, then named the underwater racing sports section.

"There are many promising athletes here, especially little girls," she says. "They work in a truly enthusiastic manner, for they spend all their free time in the pool. There are practices six times a week and they return home toward midnight. And in the mornings some go to the plant and some to school. The youngsters have no time to watch television or go to the movies and the theater. They consciously deprive themselves of all this."

They can be understood. The pool is fun. The building, finished inside with white and blue tile and with an enormous glass wall which lets in direct sunlight during the day, really resembles a palace. It is especially pleasant to feel the warmth of its turquoise water when it is below zero on the street.

I arrived here in good time. The water lanes were occupied by youngsters being taught to swim. They constantly rotated, with others coming to replace them. It came the turn for the racers. One was struck by the fact that there were many girls in the section.

"I didn't think that I would encounter so many swimmers in your city, which is renowned for its skiers," I said to a group of girls.

"Well, we also ski and we all have rankings, but we were drawn to the water. We also learn to swim."

"But I came to the pool at the doctor's advice," injects a pugnosed, rather radiant young girl of about 12. "And I have not been sick once in the last two years."

As always, classes began with a warm-up, after which everyone went into the pool. Fitted with a coupled flipper, the athletes dove into the water, shattering the smooth blue surface. They swam either at an accelerated or a slow pace, fulfilling the coach's commands. Everyone working out here has swum before, but they came to continue training and increase their expertise. Aleksandr Vynotskiy, a design engineer of the Uralmash Plant and public coach of the section, said: "It is difficult for us to vie with the teams of other cities, because we have no authorized coaches and very few public coaches; there is no technical DYUSSH (children and youth's sports school) in the city; and there is no opportunity to conduct classes with a stable composition of athletes. Both members of the oblast team and beginners work in the same group. The athletes' qualification varies from third category to USSR Master of Sport. The section is given only two lanes in the pool."

During the period 1978-1979 two USSR Masters of Sport and six candidate Masters were developed. Comparing this with other cities, these figures will not appear very impressive. But no matter how difficult it is to vie with the teams of a higher rank, the youngsters still receive their weighty medals. They have no candidates for the national team, such as in Gor'kii, Novosibirsk or Saratov. But the Sverdlovsk citizens are always in pursuit of the strongest teams in the country in competitions. For example, the Sverdlovsk team took an honorable 5th place in the finals of the RSFSR championship in Novosibirsk while it became champion in early 1979 in competition in the Ural zone of the USSR Cup. They are always the leaders in their zone.

But for now there are only two USSR Masters of Sport in the section. They are Vera Vasil'yeva and Lena Dmitrenko. They already have gotten the better of the boys! The girlfriends are studying in a construction teknikum and came here in 1977. In two years of practices they increased their expertise considerably. It is obvious that the friendship helps, since they became USSR Masters of Sport in 1979 almost simultaneously; one at the USSR Games of Nations, and the other in the USSR Cup in her own zone.

One has to believe that the team is developing many masters. They also will have their candidate for the composite team. The important element is that they have a goal for which they are giving their all to achieve.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. USSR Master of Sport Vera Vasil'yeva.
2. Before a practice heat.
3. Underwater athletes before the start.
4. Candidate for USSR Master of Sport Lena Leonova.

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Naval School in Zhdanov

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 80 signed to press 8 Feb 80 pp 38-39

[Roundtable discussion recorded by I. Shabrov: "Stay on Top!"]

(Text) An eight-story modern building stands in the center of the city of Zhdanov. In the evening a neon sign with the inscription "DOSAAF Naval School" lights up on its pediment. It became the beginning of the path to the gangplank of a warship for many, many youths, and they arrive there prepared in the specialty of helmsman-signalsman.

A roundtable discussion organised by the editors of the journal VOYENNYE ZNANIYA was held in this DOSAAF training organization about improving the training process.

"Every one of our graduates has every opportunity to become an otlichnik of the Navy," said Capt 2d Rank (Res) B. Gozdetskiy, senior master of production training.

Boris Lavrovich is a Navy veteran. He began service in the menacing war years when he came aboard ship while not yet 18. The Motherland awarded him several medals for participating in combat operations.

Later came training in a higher naval school and officer service aboard ships of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. He has state awards for performance of command assignments with initiative in peacetime.

For seven years now Gozdetskiy has been working at the naval school. He also has firmly established a reputation here as a knowledgeable master of production training and a capable indoctrinator of the youth.

"I would like to dwell on logistical support of the training process. The school has all necessary equipment, models of warship ordnance, and various electrified and radio-equipped visual aids at the trainees' service. In addition, the training organization has a good watercraft base on the banks of the Sea of Azov. The availability of 30 Yal-6 and Yal-4 boats, an "RK" training launch and several crew boats permits the cadets not only to fulfill the program of naval practice, but also work seriously on military-technical water sports.

"It also should be noted that our school has a strong managing and teaching complement. All my colleagues are naval reserve officers and the instructors are reserve petty officers and rated specialists. Almost 60 percent of them are our own graduates who returned to their home

school after naval service. This circumstance strongly helps them in training the cadets in naval specialties."

"In showing concern for high quality in the cadets' training, the faculty strives for constant improvement in the methodology of employing equipment," declared N. Shevel', master of production training.

Nikolay Mikhaylovich is a representative of the younger generation of teachers. He was awarded the jubilee medal "For Military Valor: In Celebration of the Centennial of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's Birth" for exemplary performance of military duty during active service, and he has commendations. He is a petty officer 1st class reserve and is distinguished by high exactingness and an excellent knowledge of his work. The cadets esteem the "boatswain," as they call Shevel' among themselves, for the fact that he places strict but just demands on everyone.

"Twice a year the pedagogic council examines methods questions at its sessions. Instructors and masters of production training express their views on filling a particular class with practical elements. Their suggestions and wishes serve as the basis for the work of the rationalization and inventions bureau set up in our school. For example, an inspection commission once identified slackness in how the cadets were working on practical skills of receiving and sending text with blinking devices. A pedagogic council assembled. Much was said there about insufficient logistical support to the lessons and about improving the training methodology for future navymen. After this instructor-rationalizers A. Lysov and N. Shavlach set up 12 MSNP-250 instruments and the "Problek" instruments at a signalling test area and outfitted another six stations, which made it possible to conduct practical classes with the stations a long distance from each other. As a result, the cadets' training improved considerably."

"The quality of knowledge today is a guarantee of high effectiveness of naval service," emphasized Capt 2d Rank (Res) V. Koren', deputy chief of the school for training and production.

Vitol'd Valentinovich is a seafarer by calling. When he was accepted in a higher naval school as a cleanshaven lad he believed that his most cherished dream had come true. That was long ago, almost 30 years ago. Later came command service aboard ships of the Red Banner Black Sea and Red Banner Pacific fleets. Koren' took part in five long deployments and proved himself to be a knowledgeable officer of initiative. He has state awards for exemplary performance of responsible missions.

He has been working at the naval school for several years now. He is considered the chief of staff here, emphasizing this by his ability to plan and to organize the training process precisely.

"Here are two excerpts from numerous letters of thanks coming to the school. 'Your school graduates Petty Officer 2d Class G. Atamanov and senior seamen V. Khatyushin and A. Valuyev are serving aboard the ship in the position of helmsman-signalsman. They have proven themselves to be disciplined, diligent personnel. They love their specialty and study it zealously. At the present time they are first class specialists and otlichniki of the Navy. . . . The crew esteems the high special and political knowledge of these seamen on its merits and rightfully considers them the best aboard ship.'

"And here is another response about our former cadets. 'Your school graduates seamen S. Turitsa and P. Nuzel'd, who were awarded the "For Outstanding Training" Badge, came aboard ship for service in 1978. From the first day they began to study their specialty assiduously, which permitted them to pass tests ahead of schedule for the right of authorization for independent servicing of the station. The ship's command element sees in these servicemen a worthy replacement for the seamen going into the reserve.'"

Such responses gladden and inspire the instructors and masters of production training at the school to even greater efforts for preparing a worthy replacement for our fleet.

It must be said that the above seamen as well as others mentioned in thankful responses studied excellently here, took an active part in public life and engaged in sports diligently. In seeing them off for service, the collective laid its hopes on their outstanding attitude toward military labor and did not err in these hopes.

"Each of us long will preserve the warmest memories of the naval school," said Cadet Valeriy Lunev.

Valeriy was born in the city of Zhdanov. He completed Secondary School No 56, where he took initial military training under the direction of military instructor Lt Col (Res) N. Odintsov. The words of the experienced officer about duty to the Motherland and about military service went deep into the lad's heart.

He now is working with his father at a ship repair yard. Is it easy for him? Not very easy. He gets up at 5:30 and goes to work. When he finishes his shift he hurries to the DOSAAF school for classes. And so it goes until 9 o'clock in the evening. But the lad is coming to manhood in his difficulties.

"Here we felt the romance of the sea for the first time. As a matter of fact, when one stands on the captain's bridge--and it is set up at full scale in the practical studies classroom--one visually pictures both the ocean expanses and the steep waves.

"But we do not just become accustomed to naval service at school. Here there are excellent conditions for sports activities. We have boxers, wrestlers and weightlifters among us. But there are especially many ranking persons in military-technical sports: boat-rowing, naval combined events and others. Nikolay Gusarov is a champion in signalling. Just picture it: He transmits 160 characters a minute with flags from a prepared text, and 96 with light. That's speed!

"In studying naval affairs and preparing for the military calling, many lads work in circles of amateur activities. The school leadership encourages this, believing that both the accordionist and a merry songster are so necessary during fleet service. And we have such lads.

"We work on a great deal. We study very complex sections of physics, mechanics and mathematics. In short, we, like our predecessors, are preparing to be masters of naval service."

Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Bal', the chief of the school, recalled a fighting motto--"Exploits of the Fathers are the Wings of the Sons!"--in telling about the extensive military-patriotic work performed in the training organization.

Yevgeniy Nikolayevich was born and grew up in a Ukrainian village in the steppe. But from childhood he dreamed of naval service. After the ten-year school he entered the Leningrad Higher Naval School imeni Frunze without a second thought, and he completed it with honors. After that came command service aboard ships of the Twice-Honored Red Banner Baltic Fleet. He is a participant of eight long deployments, during which he proved himself to be a knowledgeable officer of initiative. He was awarded six medals for service in the Navy.

Naval school after the dock house of a warship? Such a prospect did not immediately appeal to Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, as they say. But years went by and the new job fully enveloped him.

"I was very much gladdened by the words of Valeriy Lunev. They attest to a serious, adult approach to his future service. I think that this is the result of the fact that a complex of activities is conducted in our training organization aimed at bringing up cadets as genuine patriots. The heart of these activities is propaganda of the courage and heroism of people in the older generation. Displays have been posted telling of the exploits of Russian and Soviet navymen. Dozens of emotional meetings are held with fleet veterans and frontlinemen during the year.

"The heroic-patriotic readings from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books 'Malaya Zemlya,' 'Vozrozhdeniye' [The Rebirth] and 'Tselsina' [The Virgin Lands] will long remain in the cadets' memories. Malaya Zemlya veterans N. Yakushin and M. Bakayev told about meetings with

Col L. I. Brezhnev, chief of political department of 18th Army. They said that Leonid Il'ich shared the bitterness of failure and the joy of victories with the fighting men and commanders in the foxholes and dugouts from the first to the last day and inspired them for exploits by his personal example of courage and selflessness and by the word of Party truth.

"A Virgin Lands veteran and wearer of the Order of Labor Red Banner, B. Manashkin, told the cadets about the labor exploit of those emissaries of the Leninist Komsomol who cultivated the Kazakhstan Steppe and who made this land flowering and abundant.

"The school regularly conducts issues of verbal journals and Lenin readings, i.e., those activities which in our view develop in the cadets an active position in life and help them deeply perceive the essence of military duty.

"The debate entitled 'Honor, Valor, Courage--What Do You Take This to Mean?' generated many feelings and reflections in the school's students. The judgements varied, but all speakers agreed on the fact that the qualities of a genuine patriot who will not fail you at a difficult moment and who if necessary will give his life for the Motherland are developed in peacetime and that to display these qualities means to reinforce by your labor the homeland's economic and defense might and to continue worthily the combat traditions of fathers and grandfathers.

"The leaders and instructors of the training organization attempt to ensure that future navymen combine training with active public work. We recommend that training otlichniki head up technical circles and sections in the primary organization of the sponsored school of general education. During their training the cadets receive the work skills of agitator, Komsomol group organizer and operational news-sheet editor, which come in handy during service.

"We are gratified that almost 90 percent of the cadets are studying with grades of good or outstanding, and that each year over half the graduates are awarded the "For Outstanding Training" Badge. For several years in a row now the school has held the title of 'Exemplary' for successes in training worthy replacements for our fleet.

"Of course, we also have difficulties and unresolved problems. We have to improve indoctrinal work, build up the technical facility and improve the outfitting of classrooms and training methodology. I believe we will solve these problems successfully. A guarantee of this is the general striving to stay on top and go forward, from one success to another. This desire was reflected in the socialist pledges made in honor of the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's birth and the 35th Anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The collective unanimously decided to mark these dates with new successes in training and in mass defense work."

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MATERIAL: TRACKED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER DESCRIBED

Moscow ZA RULM in Russian No 3, Mar 80, signed to press 28 Jan 80 p 6

Article by Lt Col-Engr V. Gerasimov and Lt Col-Engr Yu. Bairnov: "A Multipurpose Transporter"

Text The conditions of modern battle require much of a military transport vehicle, especially as concerns cross-country ability, maneuverability and high speed. These requirements are largely met by the MT-LB light armored transporter-tractor.

This tracked vehicle can move at a high average speed along roads, can surmount rough terrain, trenches and ditches, inclines of up to 35 degrees and can swim water barriers. The low profile helps concealment.



The MT-LB is intended for towing trailers and artillery pieces and for transporting men and cargo. It is armed with a turret-mounted 7.62 mm PKT machinegun.

We shall examine the design and placement of the vehicle's basic assemblies. The MT-LB's welded body can be functionally divided in the forward, middle and rear sections.

The forward section includes the hull nose, in which is installed the main transmission and steering devices, and the control compartment. Between the hull nose and the control compartment is a partition. For access to the main transmission from the outside there is a hatch in the inclined surface of the hull nose. Behind the side glass on the left side in the control compartment is a seat for the driver-mechanic: a soft seat that can be adjusted by length, height and to the contour of the driver's back. In front of the driver-mechanic there is a display panel and the control levers and pedals. Near the right side, under the turret-mounted machinegun, sits the vehicle commander. The vehicle commander can simultaneously perform firing functions. The vehicle commander has a radio set in the recessed space in front of him. In battle conditions the glass in the viewing devices of the driver-mechanic and the vehicle commander is covered with armored plates. Two hatches, hermetically sealed by armored covers, are provided to the left of the turret for entrance into the control compartment.

The middle section of the body moves aside for the engine and its components and systems. The power train is displaced in relation to the vehicle's lengthwise axis to the left from the front, from the right and from the rear and is enclosed by walls with heat and sound insulation; and so along the right side of the transporter there is a narrow corridor connecting with the control compartment and the rear section, which is the cargo platform. In the passageway there are two seats one behind the other.

Four fuel tanks are installed in the rear section along the sides. In size and configuration the two lower fuel tanks are in the form of benches with porolon cushions which can seat four men each. The remaining two upper tanks are secured on the under carriage racks of the body. Near the rear wall of the engine enclosure there is one more seat. Thus, in addition to the driver-mechanic and the vehicle commander, the vehicle can accommodate 11 men. For the men to enter and exit there is a double-leaf door with openings for firing automatic rifles in the rear plate of the body. Observation during movement and the emergency exit when the vehicle is in water can be accomplished through the two upper hatches in the forward section of the platform. The free space on the top behind these hatches is for transporting cases of shells or other cargo, which is secured by special brackets.

The hermetic body gives the transporter buoyancy. The air that is fed into the body of the vehicle passes through a special purification process and creates a more than adequate pressure.

For internal communications between crew members there is a common tank intercom system. The vehicle's equipment also includes a night vision device for the driver-mechanic, a dosimeter for determining radiation level, special viewing devices and a water pumping system.

We shall now become familiar with the basic assemblies and units of the vehicle.

It has a V-8 engine; a YaMZ-238 four-cycle diesel with a liquid cooling system and a special heating system for starting in cold weather. The engine is installed in the vehicle with the flywheel forward. A dual-disk main clutch is installed in the flywheel.

The main transmission is a single unit, in the cast aluminum crankcase of which are installed a beveled pair of gears, a six-speed transmission and the planetary friction turn gears. The main transmission is joined with the engine by a Cardan shaft that passes through a tunnel to the control compartment. From here the power is fed to the right and left steering transmissions.

The steering transmission is a one-stage planetary reduction gear, on the outgoing shaft of which is installed a drive star wheel. The steel crankcase of the steering transmission is fastened by a flange to the body of the vehicle.

The undercarriage includes the drive star wheels, the track rollers, the guide wheels with belt-tightening mechanisms, the metal tracks and the suspension. The suspension of the track rollers is independent and torsion and the rear and front tracks are fitted with hydraulic shock absorbers. For operation in specific road conditions the vehicle can be equipped with special widened tracks, which give the vehicle the capability of moving in snow and swampy terrain.

The transporter is controlled by two turn levers, the main clutch pedals, a fuel feed, brakes with a pneumatic linkage and a gear stick.

The complete outfitting of the MT-LB with auxiliary equipment and systems, the simplicity and reliability, the excellent maneuverability, the off-road capability at temperatures from +45 degrees to -45 degrees place the transporter at the level of the best modern military transporter vehicles.

Technical Characteristics

General Data: Weight when armed is 9,700 kg; carrying load is 2,900 kg; weight of towed trailer is 6,500 kg; maximum speed is 60 kph; speed with full load and trailer is 30 - 35 kph; speed in water is 5 - 6 kph; maximum surmountable incline is 35 degrees; fuel capacity is 520 liters

Sizes: length = 6,454 mm; width = 2,850 mm; height = 1,865 mm.

Engine: YaMZ-238, diesel, four cycle; number of cylinders = 8; work capacity is 14.86 liters; power = 240 hp with 2,100 rpm.

Transmission: dual-disk clutch; six-speed in the main transmission unit and the planetary turn clutch. The steering transmission is a one-stage planetary reduction gear.

Undercarriage: suspension of track rollers is independent, torsion with hydraulic shock absorbers.

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